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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated the feasibility of deploying an integrated sensor-camera 
network in military and law enforcement applications.  The system was built using 
entirely commercial-off-the-shelf technologies.  The prototype used the unattended 
ground sensors combined with digital video surveillance cameras to provide accurate 
real-time situational awareness, persistent intelligence and remote security. 
A robust testing and evaluation plan was created to measure the system’s 
performance based on specific metrics.  The tests focused primarily on the capabilities of 
the sensor aspect of the network.  Tests were conducted to determine the maximum 
detection range, probabilities of detection, maximum communications range, and battery 
life.  Mathematical models were created to assist network planners.  Additionally, the 
prototyped system was tested through field exercises as part of the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System field 
demonstrations in California and northern Thailand.  Although the sensing capabilities 
exceeded the minimum metrics, the system was not suitable for use in military 
applications.  However, the prototyped network would work well in less demanding law 
enforcement environments.  Additionally, the feasibility and the need to develop an 
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The documents shaping the United States national military strategy call for the 
use of emerging information technologies as a force multiplier to produce a more agile, 
flexible, and effective military that can respond to an increasingly asymmetric enemy.  
Joint Vision 2020 recognizes the role of unattended sensor networks in full-spectrum 
dominance by increasing battle-space awareness and precision engagement.  Likewise, 
Sea Power 21 calls for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations 
using unattended ground, air, and sub-surface sensor grids.  These documents led to the 
development of the Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG) concept.  The ESG will provide 
real-time sensor coverage using hundreds to thousands of fully networked, low-power, 
plug-and-play nodes with long battery lives.  The ESG aims to increase military 
effectiveness and efficiency by fusing sensor data seamlessly through the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of US and Coalition forces.   
Although the concepts of wireless ad-hoc networks and infrastructure-less 
communication have been investigated and researched for several decades, the wireless 
sensor network subcategory is relatively new.  Wireless sensor networks consist of 
interconnected devices embedded in larger systems or environments.  Their capability to 
observe and interact with the environment accurately in “real time” suggests numerous 
applications in the research, industrial, and military communities.   
The emergence and relatively low cost of commercially available wireless 
networking technologies, which support traditional peacekeeping, law enforcement, and 
non-governmental organization applications (such as humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief), create potentially important operational and resource considerations for decision-
makers.  Previously, the implementation of wireless sensor networks for military and law 
enforcement purposes was not feasible due to the lack of commercially available 
equipment and the constant monitoring and substantial processing needed.  
Improvements in sensor-network technology continue to decrease size, cost, and weight 
of sensors while increasing their reliability and the capabilities of the sensors.  However, 
many technological challenges and limitations associated with operational military and 
2 
law enforcement applications remain.  Exploiting the true capabilities of an integrated 
sensor network can greatly benefit military and law enforcement agencies.  
 
A. OBJECTIVES  
Recent theoretical and simulation studies have provided a basis for implementing 
integrated sensors to detect, classify and track objects.  Even though these studies provide 
sufficient background, a more in-depth study is needed to determine the feasibility of 
deploying such technology in real-life military and law enforcement scenarios. 
The objective of this thesis is to undertake a system level test of commercially 
available integrated sensors and IP cameras to assess the networks capability to detect, 
classify, and to track anomalous events in a variety of military scenarios.  Specific 
performance metrics include radio and sensor range, detection probabilities, battery life, 
and sensor elevation. 
Using the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol and Commercial-off-the-Shelf-Technology 
(COTS), a prototyped sensor-camera network was developed.  The network consisted of 
a Crossbow MSP410CA integrated sensor suite and Axis network IP cameras.  Measures 
of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance, discussed in detail in subsequent 
chapters, were created to compare the test results and to determine the effectiveness and 
feasibility of deploying the system in real-world military and law enforcement 
environments.  The networks radio range, sensor range, and capabilities were measured 
in numerous operating conditions. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary research question explores the optimal configuration of an integrated 
sensor-camera network to detect vehicular traffic.  Additionally, this thesis focuses on 
determining the true capabilities of the network under varying operational environments 
and meteorological conditions.  Secondary questions include, but are not limited to: 
1. Will 802.15.4 maintain connectivity in an adverse, high-temperature, high-
humidity environment? 
2. What is the maximum effective detection range of Crossbow sensors in 
varying environmental conditions? 
3 
3. How does the elevation of the sensor affect detection range? 
4. How can Crossbow sensors be employed to classify various objects? 
5. What are the probabilities of detecting objects traveling through a sensor 
grid? 
6. How does the physical topology affect sensor capabilities? 
 
C. SCOPE  
The principal research consists of several system-level tests and evaluates a 
prototyped sensor-camera network.  The primary objective is to determine the optimal 
configuration of an integrated sensor-camera network to detect vehicular traffic.  To 
accomplish this objective, a robust test and evaluation plan is produced.  Using this test 
plan, the system is base-lined in the moderate operating conditions of Monterey, 
California.  The system is then tested in various operating environments to include, but 
not limited to, California (Point Sur, Fort Ord, and Fort Hunter-Liggett) and northern 
Thailand as part of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Coalition Operating Area 
Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) field experimentation program from late 
CY2005 through mid-CY2006. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology consisted of extensive research of available literature, both hard 
copy and electronic, as well as extensive testing and evaluation of the prototyped sensor-
camera network.  The research methodology was divided into the following phases: 
Phase 1: Development of Metrics and Test Plan 
This phase included the necessary academic review of existing technical material 
for Crossbow integrated sensors and various IP cameras.  Additionally, the research 
focused on the desirable attributes from the end-user's perspective.  Measure of 
Performance and Measures of Effectiveness (MoP/MoE) were created.  These were used 
to develop an effective test and evaluation plan. 
Phase 2: Base-lining and Experimentation 
Once a test and evaluation plan was created, the prototyped sensor-camera 
network was base-lined in the moderate operating environment of the Naval Postgraduate 
4 
School.  The Crossbow Sensor suite has numerous data collection tools built-in.  
Additional tools such as network analyzers and packet sniffers were used.  Following 
base-line experimentation, the system underwent the same procedures in various 
operating environments to include Point Sur and Thailand. 
Phase 3: Analysis of Results and Conclusions 
The final phase consisted of analyzing the results of each case study.  The results 
were compared to the base-lined systems as well as the MoP/MoE's determined in Phase 
1.  By comparing the results from the case studies to the base-line test and the 
MoP/MoE's, one can determine the effectiveness and feasibility of deploying the system 
in real-world military and law enforcement environments. 
 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this thesis provides an overview of the technology behind wireless 
ad-hoc mesh networks and introduces the concept of wireless sensor networks.  This 
chapter introduces sensor network architecture, layers, network components, and 
operating characteristics and constraints.  Finally, this chapter introduces possible 
wireless sensor network applications. 
Chapter III provides an overview of digital video technology.  It introduces and 
briefly describes the topics of frame rate, video streaming, and compression.  
Additionally, it identifies the constraints and challenges of using cameras in real-world 
military and law enforcement applications. 
Chapter IV describes the prototyped sensor-camera network.  It introduces the 
COASTS 2006 research program and discusses the role of the integrated sensor-camera 
network in the operational scenarios.  Additionally, Chapter V provides specific details of 
the selected network components. 
Chapter V consists of the selection of metrics.  It describes the characteristics of 
effective metrics.  The chapter also describes the detailed test and evaluation plan used 
throughout the tests. 
5 
Chapter VI includes the results from the experimentations and case studies.  
Moreover, the results and implications of the tests are discussed.  Performance 
characteristics illustrated by the various tests and operational scenarios are also discussed.  
Finally, Chapter VI provides several models intended to aid network architects in 
designing an integrated sensor-camera network. 
Finally, Chapter VII surveys the entire study and addresses the conclusions 
reached concerning the feasibility and applicability of integrated sensor-camera networks 
for military and law enforcement applications.  Additionally, Chapter VII discusses 
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II. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
Although the concept of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is an emerging field in 
computer science and information technology, the WSN relies on the well established 
technologies of wireless data networking and ad-hoc computer networks.  A WSN 
consists of devices that combine the functionality of sensing, computation, and 
communication into a single, small form-factor device that is capable of self-organization 
and inter-device connectivity.  Wireless sensor networks can potentially be used in a 
variety of military, law enforcement, and commercial applications.  This chapter surveys 
the WSN, their characteristics, network architectures, and connectivity.  Network 
protocols are discussed along with the challenges of security.  In addition, power 
management, synchronization, and tracking are discussed.  This chapter concludes with a 
brief overview of a variety of common sensors. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION TO WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
 
1. Development of Wireless Networks 
As the term “wireless sensor network” indicates, a WSN is a subset of the 
wireless communications field.  Wireless communications have been explored since the 
early twentieth century.  The U.S. Army Signal Corps developed one of the first wireless 
paradigms in 1921 with the creation of the War Department Radio Net.  By 1933, the 
War Department Radio net was a nationwide radiotelegraphic network that managed over 
a million words annually.   
Even though the early days of wireless networks were relatively uncomplicated, 
they overcame many challenges and provided the framework for modern wireless 
communication networks.  To overcome transmission range limitations, the early wireless 
networks used ad-hoc structures to transmit messages.  The messages were transmitted 
along undedicated paths to any active relay station closer to the final destination.  




early wireless networks.  Operators manually sent Request-To-Send/Clear-to-Send 
(RTS/CTS) messages.  The National Traffic System first implemented standardized 
message formats and first introduced wireless multicasting. 
Wireless communication continued to develop throughout the twentieth century.  
Limitations such as throughput, transmission power, and communications range have 
continually been addressed.  Recently, wireless networks have become ubiquitous in 
private and commercial applications due to their inherent flexibility and low cost.   
 
2. Ad-hoc Networks 
An ad-hoc network is a self-configuring, peer-to-peer network with no defined 
infrastructure or topology.  The redundancy and survivability of ad-hoc networks have 
made them especially appealing for military and commercial communication 
applications.  The first successful ad-hoc data network was developed by the University 
of Hawaii in the early 1970s.  The ALOHA NET, as it was called, was developed to 
provide data communications between the University of Hawaii and the outlying 
Hawaiian islands.  It was a single-hop, packet-based, wireless network that used random-
access protocols and MAC protocols.   
In the early 1970s, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency sponsored an 
ad-hoc packet radio network known as PRNET.  PRNET introduced many new concepts 
still used today.  The first technology it introduced was the use of direct-sequence spread 
spectrum transmission.  Additionally, PRNET introduced concepts in flow-control and 
error-control along with routing table update schemes.  The Survivable Radio Network 
(SURAN) succeeded the PRNET.  SURAN attempted to address many of the limitations 
of PRNET.  It sought to increase the network capacity, to decrease node size and power 
requirements, and to increase security issues. 
The interest of the academic research community exploded during the 1990s.  The 
decreasing cost and size of hardware combined with the increase in computational 
abilities inspired several commercial, academic, and civilian uses of ad-hoc computer 
networks.  In 1997, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) released 
the 802.11 standard, which includes basic ad-hoc networking capabilities.   
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Figure 1.   A Simple Ad-hoc Network 
 
3. Characteristics of a Wireless Sensor Network 
A wireless sensor network consists of devices that combine the ability to sense, 
compute, and communicate into a single small form-factor device.  The WSN typically 
consists of distributed, low-power nodes, which are capable of self-organization and 
concurrent operations.  Additionally, WSNs contain nodes with diverse sensing 
capabilities (Haenggi, 2005). 
The ability to communicate between sensors provides the backbone of a wireless 
sensor network.  The wireless sensor network inherits many of the communication 
attributes of wireless ad-hoc networks and combines them with the flexibility of mesh 
networks.  The self-organizing abilities of a wireless sensor network are considered the 
most important communication feature.  Their ability to organize themselves 
autonomously provides the capability for unattended, densely populated sensor grids for 
military and law enforcement use.  Self-organization allows the sensors to identify and to 
communicate with other nodes in the surrounding area.  A WSN does not require external 
coordination or administration to establish a network.  Using dynamic routing protocols, 
the WSN can determine the most advantageous path to send information to its 
destination.   
A second key characteristic in a WSN is the ability for the sensors to form a mesh 
network.  A mesh network is defined as “a specific type of point-to-point connection in 
which there are at least two direct paths to every node … while a more restrictive 
definition requires each node to be connected directly to every other node” (Feibel, 
1996).  As a result, the WSN has a self-healing characteristic.  That is, if one connection 
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or node is lost, the network will maintain functionality by simply re-routing the 
information along other connections.  This is a vital characteristic because a WSN 
operates in adverse operating environments and is designed to have long on-station times.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Mesh Network Topology 
 
Wireless sensor networks employ a variety of sensing nodes.  The number and 
type of sensors deployed vary depending on the intended purpose of the sensor network.  
For example, a sensor network used for intrusion detection might consist primarily of 
passive infrared sensors, magnetic sensors, and acoustic sensors while an environmental 
monitoring network will likely employ temperature, pressure, humidity and light sensors.  
Because the sensing capabilities do not affect the node’s ability to communicate, a WSN 
can contain a wide variety of sensing types. 
A wireless sensor network must be capable of performing numerous operations 
concurrently.  Data gathering, which is essentially sensing data and disseminating the 
data, is the first fundamental operation a sensor must perform.  The second fundamental 
operation is reporting.  Report procedures consist of communicating data and the 
aggregation of the networks data.  Sensor networks must be able to perform both 
functions simultaneously due to network distribution and limited storage capacity. 
 
B. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK APPLICATIONS 
The characteristics of sensor networks make them applicable to numerous 
environments.  Because they interact deeply with the physical environment and can 
extend the reach of the existing Internet, sensor network applications are virtually 
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limitless.  High-level tasks such as detection, classification, and tracking are common 
applications of sensor networks (Zhao & Guibas, 2004).  The following overarching 
sensor network applications are based on the writing of Callaway (2004), Haenggi 
(2005), Culler and Hong (2004) and Culeer, Estin, and Strivastava (2004). 
 
1. Industrial Control and Monitoring 
Industrial factories, power plants, and production facilities are beginning to use 
wireless sensor network for controlling and monitoring systems.  It is common to monitor 
the industrial complex for safety, maintenance and even quality control purposes.  
Traditionally, this process involves a complex and expensive wired network.  However, 
as wireless sensor networks become more robust and reliable, they are quickly being 
applied to the industrial control and monitoring arena.  The small size, self-forming and 
self-healing characteristics of WSNs make them appropriate for diverse applications 
ranging from balanced services, robots, assembly lines, and rotating equipment. 
 
2. Environmental Monitoring 
Wireless sensor networks are ideal for environmental applications due to their 
fault tolerance, self-organizing, and low power characteristics.  Wireless sensor networks 
have applicability from climate control to water management to agriculture monitoring.  
Additionally, they can be configured to detect seismic activity, forest fires, floods, and 
even water quality.  Environmental monitoring is, perhaps, the pioneering application for 
wireless sensor networks.  Their innate characteristics meet the intense demands needed 
for proper environmental deployment. 
 
3. Home Applications 
A third emerging application for wireless sensor networks is home automation.  
Wireless sensor networks can be employed in a home environment similar to the ways 
they are deployed in environmental and industrial settings.  Home automation provides 
increased control of home appliances and security.  Climate control and security systems 
are the most common types of home automation applications.  However, as technology 
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has increased, new applications are emerging.  For example, refrigerators can be designed 
to monitor contents, determine what items need to be bought, and even provide 
customized temperature control depending on what items are in specific parts of the 
refrigerator.  Currently, this is predominately achieved through installing traditional 
wired networks.  WSNs provide the potential to increase the flexibility and sensing 
capabilities of home automation systems while simultaneously reducing costs by 
minimizing installation and maintenance costs.   
Health monitoring is a second home application of wireless sensor networks.  For 
example, networks can be used to monitor “body temperature, blood pressure, and pulse” 
of patients and to trigger some sort of alert or automated action depending on values 
(Haenggi, 2005).  Additionally, sensor networks can be applied to toys.  Their sensing 
capabilities and small size make WSN nodes perfect for designing toys of the future, 
which will act in complex manners. 
 
4. Asset Tracking 
Asset tracking is another key application for wireless sensor networks.  This 
concept is applicable to both military and commercial organizations.  Effective control 
and monitoring of supply chains can drastically increase the effectiveness of any 
organization.  Many commercial companies have begun to employ radio frequency 
identifiers (RFIDs) to identify, to localize, and to track shipments.  By placing wireless 
sensors inside shipping containers, efficiency can be increased by eliminating errors, 
streamlining the process, and increasing control of the supply chain (Callaway, 2004).  
With all aspects being equal, the organization with better control and awareness of its 
assets will be more efficient.  For example, wireless sensors can be used to track critical 
objects through an organization’s supply chain and to make changes to manage assets 
more effectively.  This improved control of the supply chain makes just-in-time logistics 





5.  Military and Law Enforcement 
Military and law enforcement applications are another promising field for 
wireless sensor networks.  Joint Vision 2020 and Sea Power 21 advocate the use of 
unattended sensors for intelligent, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  To best achieve 
these goals, a sensor network must be quickly deployable, have a long on-station time, 
and possess a variety of sensing capabilities.  Wireless sensor networks are ideal for this 
type of application due to their self-organizing and self-healing characteristics.  Since 
they have the high-level capabilities to detect, classify, and track objects, WSNs are ideal 
for physical security applications.  For example, a WSN can be deployed around a 
perimeter to reduce the number of guards needed.  They can be used as an early warning 
system to alert a quick reaction force.  The diverse sensing capabilities of WSNs can also 
improve the command and control capabilities through battle-space monitoring (Haenggi, 
2005).  They can be used similarly to monitor equipment for the industrial applications.  
For example, WSNs can be used to monitor engine-room temperature and vibration 
levels on ships, aircraft and tanks.  Additionally, they can be designed to detect chemical, 
biological, and nuclear attacks.  They also provide the capabilities to develop “smart” 
weapons such as minefields, which discriminate between targets.   
 
C. CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES 
Wireless sensor networks are a relatively new technology, yet they have many 
useful applications.  The preceding section briefly introduced emerging applications in 
industrial monitoring, environmental monitoring, asset tracking, home applications, and 
military and law enforcement.  As their capabilities increase, wireless sensors will 
become even more ubiquitous.  
However, wireless sensors face numerous challenges in power management, 
localization, synchronization, security, and communication.  For example, long on-station 
times combined with small form factor require nodes to use limited power sources 
efficiently.  Localization refers to the node’s ability to identify its physical location.  
Synchronization techniques are used to establish a network and to support localization.  
As with all wireless technologies, secure communications is paramount.  Real-time 
communications are required for many sensor network applications. 
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1. Power Management 
Most WSN applications require long on-station times.  The small form factor 
associated with wireless sensors, however, results in limited power supply options.  
Traditional wired sensor networks can be powered over Ethernet or wall outlets, but 
wireless nodes must be powered by a self-contained power supply.  Usually these power 
supplies are batteries or solar cells.  As a result, power management is the most 
challenging constraint of wireless sensor networks.  Power management can be divided 
into two categories: node-level management and system-level management. 
 
a. Node-level Power Management 
Node-level power management refers to the efficiency of the individual 
sensor nodes.  A sensor node consists of four basic components.  The first component is 
the microprocessor and memory unit, which is responsible for controlling the processing 
and logic tasks.  The second component is the sensing unit, which contains the sensors 
that detect and interact with the environment.  The third component is the communication 
unit, which consists of the radio circuitry for data transmission and reception.  The final 
basic component of a node is the micro-operating system.  This operating system is 
responsible for controlling the other components (Wang, Hassanein, & Xu, 2005).  Node-
power management begins with the design and selection of circuitry.  Low-power chips 
and careful optimization of processes provide the foundation for energy efficiency 
(Holger & Willig, 2005).  Dynamic power management is a technique often used to 
improve energy efficiency.  This technique shuts down node components when they are 
not being used actively.  Dynamic voltage scaling (DVS) is another technique to increase 
efficiency.  DVS is the process of scaling supplied voltage to meet the instantaneous 





Figure 3.   Node-level Power Management Diagram (From: Wang, Hassanein & Xu, 
2005) 
 
b. System-level Power Management 
System-level power management involves controlling the transmission 
power of the sensor network as a whole.  Controlling the transmission power affects 
many aspects of the sensor network.  Communication ranges, battery life, network 
topology, routing paths, and transmission rates, for example, are aspects affected by 
transmission power (Wang, Hassanein, & Xu, 2005).  The purpose of the sensor network 
often dictates the most efficient transmission power.  An application that requires greater 
distances between nodes will require a greater transmission power, while a dense 
deployment scheme will require lower transmission power.  System-level management 
also considers communication protocols and policies, such as rotating the nodes’ 
functionality (Wang, Hassanein, & Xu, 2005).  Many deployment strategies involve 
dividing the functionality of a node into sensing, computing, and data aggregation.  Each 
function requires different amounts of energy.  By rotating the functionality, one can 
extend the lifetime of the entire network. 
Effective power management in a wireless sensor network is one of the 
most important and difficult challenges.  At the node level, power management begins by 
properly designing the nodes.  This often involves trade-offs between application 
requirements and technological capabilities.  At the system level, power management 
involves the proper selection of the deployment scheme, transmission power, and 
architecture.  By effectively managing power at the node and system level, one can 
produce WSNs with the extremely long lifetimes required by many applications. 
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2. Localization 
Localization is the node’s ability to determine its location.  Localization can be 
divided into absolute localization and relative localization.  Absolute localization relies 
on the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.  Relative localization employs 
signal processing and determines a node’s position with respect to the other nodes in the 
network.  Using GPS receivers for localization is an attractive possibility; however, 
several factors make this less than ideal.  GPS units tend to be large compared to the size 
of wireless nodes.  They also require more power, which lowers the effective lifespan of 
a sensor node.  Additionally, GPS units might not work well in congested areas, such as 
building or jungles (Murphy and Manoj, 2004).  This section discusses many of the signal 
processing techniques researchers are investigating to achieve localization. 
Achieving localization in indoor environments is significantly easier than outdoor 
environments.  Indoor localization techniques commonly rely on fixed-beacon signals 
strategically placed throughout the area of operation.  The sensor nodes receive the 
beacon signals and calculate the signal strength, angle of arrival, and time difference-of-
arrival.  These calculations allow the sensor to determine location through triangulation 
or some predetermined knowledge base (Sivalingam, 2002). 
Outdoor deployment environments, on the other hand, increase localization 
difficulties.  In such applications, there is no fixed infrastructure to pre-station beacons or 
calculate data used in a knowledge base.  Outdoor sensor networks rely on GPS enabled 
nodes.  Because GPS receivers consume relatively large amounts of power, only a few of 
the nodes are equipped with GPS and are often supplemented with extra power sources 
(Sivalingam, 2002).  The non-GPS enable nodes will estimate position similarly to indoor 
networks.  Signal strength is a good range estimator despite the sensitivity to the 
surrounding environment.  Calculating the time difference-of-arrival and angle of arrival 
improves the accuracy of RF localization.  A second localization algorithm assumes the 
beacon nodes broadcast location information to all nodes in the network and a central 





As with traditional wired networks, synchronization refers to a common time 
reference.  Synchronization supports network formation.  It also supports localization by 
providing time difference-of-arrival capabilities.  However, synchronization techniques in 
WSN are constrained by low-power characteristics. 
Most wireless sensor networks use some sort of time division multiple access 
(TDMA) scheme to control communication flows.  TDMA is used to sustain 
communications on wireless mesh networks.  Additionally, synchronization is required to 
aggregate sensor readings effectively.  Knowing when a sensor is reporting readings 
during the aggregation process is crucial.  By accumulating the synchronized data, one 
can eliminate duplication, detect trends, track objects through a sensor grid, and present 
the end-user with a usable representation of the raw sensor data (Sivalingam, 2002). 
Two categories of synchronization algorithms exist.  The first category of 
synchronization algorithms achieves short-lived synchronization, known as pulsed 
synchronization.  Pulsed synchronization relies on low-power broadcast beacons.  The 
sensor nodes perform local synchronization by normalizing time stamps.  Major 
drawbacks of pulsed synchronization schemes are the short duration of synchronization, 
the reliance on additional hardware, and the limited range associated with the need to be 
within transmission range of the beacon (Elson and Estrin, 2001). 
The second category of synchronization algorithms achieves long-lasting global 
synchronization.  Global synchronization protocols commonly rely on the knowledge of 
neighboring nodes’ control signals and are common in cluster architectures.  The node 
leader periodically transmits synchronization information to its neighbors, which then 
rebroadcast the information throughout the network (Ofek, 2002). 
 
4. Communications 
In order to achieve maximum applicability, sensor networks must support real-
time communications.  Real-time communications increase the end-user’s knowledge and 
control of the surrounding environment.  As a result, the time delay between sensing an 
event and communicating the event has emerged as a measure of WSN quality.  Although 
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true real-time communication is difficult to achieve, several algorithms exist to minimize 
the delay between an event and to propagate the report to the base station efficiently.  
RAP and SPEED are two common protocols used to support real-time communications in 
WSNs. 
The RAP protocol relies on the base station (BS) to coordinate queries.  The BS 
contains the application layer of the sensor network, specifies the desired event 
information, and can query specific parts of the WSN to gather the desired information.  
The protocol ensures efficient communications by ensuring the arrival of queries to and 
from the addressed nodes.  The SPEED protocol supports real-time communications by 
guaranteeing the maximum delay between communications.  SPEED is a stateless 
architecture designed to create near real-time communications through congestion 
management and standardized delivery speed across the sensor network (He, Stankovic, 
Lu, and Abdelzaher). 
 
5. Security 
As with all wireless networks, network security is a challenge in implementing 
wireless sensor networks.  Effective security provides the means of data authentication, 
data integrity, and privacy.  Security issues are important to all WSN applications, but 
they are especially important in military and law enforcement applications due to the 
sensitive nature of the data.  This section examines the security and privacy aspects of 
WSN and introduces several security protocols common in wireless sensor networks. 
Wireless sensor networks have four characteristics, which impact network 
security (Slijepcevic, Wong, and Patkinjack, 2005).  The first security related property of 
WSNs is the application’s requirements and architecture.  The inherent flexibility of 
WSNs allows the architect the freedom and capability to prioritize, adjust, and implement 
security measures.  However, due to the computational and power restrictions of sensor 
networks, significant trade-offs exist between resources and achieved protection.  Finally, 




D. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURES 
The constraints and challenges associated with WSN node design combined with 
design and deployment objectives necessitate strict system architecture and topology.  
The low-power characteristic associated with WSNs greatly impacts the network 
architecture and topology due to the impact on networking and routing.  Relatively, the 
power consumed by the node’s sensing elements is far less than the power consumed by 
the data transmission elements (Wang, Hassanein, Xu, 2005).  As a result, sensor network 
architectures must be structured to maximize efficiency and flexibility while being 
constrained by low transmission power and data rates.  Wireless sensor network 
architectures can be classified in two general categories of “layered architecture” and 
“clustered architecture.”  As the following figure illustrates, these general categories can 
be further broken into sub-categories, such as negotiation-based, flat, query-based, 
hierarchical, and adaptive-based (Al-Kraki and Kamal, 2005).  The general layered and 
clustered architectures are discussed in the following sections. 
 
 





1. Flat Network Architecture 
In sensor networks using layered network architecture, a single base station (BS) 
and multiple node layers populate the network.  Layers are formed by grouping nodes 
with an identical hop count to the base station.  Figure 5 illustrates the layered 
architecture.  The BS acts as a gateway or access point to a traditional wired network.  
Additionally, the BS collects and disseminates data gathered by the sensing nodes.  The 
nodes create a wireless "backbone" for connectivity.  End-users can access the network 
through a wired connection to the BS or through wireless transceivers such as Personal 
Digital Assitants (PDAs).  The PDA can connect to the wireless backbone formed by the 
nodes.  Flat network architectures are common in wireless sensor networks because they 
reduce the necessary transmission ranges and allow for more efficient use of power. 
The Unified Network Protocol Framework (UNPF) is a set of protocols used to 
implement a layered architecture.  The UNPF protocol relies on three operations to 
achieve a flat network: network initialization and maintenance, Medium Access Control 
(MAC), and routing protocols.  During the network initialization phase, the BS will 
broadcast an identification beacon on the control channel.   The nodes to which the BS 
can directly communicate form layer one.  The layer-one nodes then transmit a second 
beacon signal.  The nodes that receive beacon signals from layer-one nodes form layer 
two.  This process is repeated until all nodes in the network are included in one of the 
network layers.  After the network is established, the BS will periodically refresh the 




Figure 5.   Layered Network Architecture (From: Murthy and Manoj, 2004) 
 
2. Clustered Network Architecture 
The second general wireless sensor network architecture is the clustered 
architecture, shown in Figure 6.  Clustered architectures consist of a Personal Area 
Network (PAN) coordinator, or cluster head, which organizes the sensor nodes and 
communicates with the BS or external network.  Clustered architectures are commonly 
used in situations in which data fusion is required.  In these environments, the cluster 
head will gather the data from the sensor in the cluster and then transmit the data to the 





Figure 6.   Clustered Network Architecture (From: Murthy and Manoj, 2004) 
 
Clustered architectures rely on distributed network layer protocols, such as Low-
Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH), to perform autonomous self-
organization (Heinzelman, Chadrakasan, Balakrishman, 2000).  The LEACH protocol 
consists of two main network stages: network set-up and steady state.  In general, the 
network set-up phase is a relatively short, yet power-intensive process.  To minimize 
energy consumption, LEACH randomly selects and changes the cluster head.  By 
randomly selecting and periodically changing the cluster head, LEACH prevents one 
node from expending too much energy and helps to distribute the energy expenditures 
evenly.  After being selected as a cluster head, the node will then broadcast its 
information to the other nearby nodes.  The non-cluster head nodes then associate with 
the nearest cluster head by comparing the signal strengths received from the cluster 
heads.  Once the network is formed, the cluster heads establish a TDMA communications 
schedule for all the nodes in that particular cluster.  This marks the beginning of the 
steady-state phase of network operations.  During this phase, the sensor nodes interact 
with the environment and communicate data to the cluster heads based on the TDMA 
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schedule.  During this phase, LEACH attempts to conserve energy by processing and 
aggregating sensor data at the cluster-head level (Heinzelman et al., 2000). 
This section described the two major classifications of sensor network 
architectures.  The sub-categories were also introduced to the reader.  The most common 
protocols for network formation were discussed.  This section also detailed how the 
characteristics of self-organization and low-power constraints govern wireless sensor 
network architectures.  The following section discusses the typical protocols found in 
WSNs. 
 
E. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK PROTOCOLS 
As with all other computer networking environments, WSNs use a layered 
protocol similar to the OSI 7 layer stack.  The general layered protocol stack for wireless 
sensor networks is illustrated in Figure 7 below.  The application layer is responsible for 
analog-to-digital conversion.  The network layer handles the seamless transfer of 
information while the data link layer handles fair access and error control.  The physical 




Figure 7.   Typical Protocol Stack (From: Stallings, 1996) 
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In the following sections, the layer’s roles are discussed in further depth. 
 
1. Physical Layer 
Due to the inherent power constraints, wireless sensor networks are designed to 
use low-bit rates during transmission.  Low-bit rates reduce the needed transmission 
power and, therefore, support long battery life and aid in self-organization.  Although 
sensor networks can use infrared communications, radio frequencies (RF) are the most 
common and are the focus of this section.  Several RF techniques are commonly found in 
WSNs, including PiccoRadio, Wireless Integrated Network Sensors (WINS), and the 
802.15 Standard for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN).  PiccoRadio techniques 
rely on the use of ultrawide band communications (Rabaey, Ammer, Silva, Patel, and 
Roundy, 2000).  Like 802.11, WINS uses spread-spectrum techniques in the unlicensed 
Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) frequency ranges (Callaway, 2004). 
Many commercially available sensor systems use the recently adopted 802.15 
family of standards.  The 802.15 family supports three different physical layer methods.  
The first standard, 802.15.1, uses Bluetooth technology as the basis for transmission.  The 
802.15.3 standard is the high-bit-rate WPAN protocol.   The final, and perhaps most 
common, is the 802.15.4 protocol, which is a low-bit-rate, spread-spectrum technique. 
 
2. Data Link Layer 
The data link layer has two roles: to provide fair access to the physical layer and 
to provide error control during transmission.  The nature of the data gathered by sensor 
nodes and the time sensitive qualities make fair access to the transmission layer and 
error-free transmission extremely important wireless sensor networks. 
This section briefly discusses challenges and categories associated with MAC 
protocols.  Additionally, it provides a brief description of commonly used MAC 
protocols. 
The MAC protocol serves as an intermediary between the physical layer and the 
upper layers of the protocol stack.  Traditionally, the MAC layer coordinates and 
interfaces with the network layer by using logical link control.  The MAC protocol 
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typically supports the physical layer by using the most efficient data frame size and 
frequency of transmission.  As a result, the MAC protocol affects energy management, 
synchronization, timing, flow control and error control. 
MAC protocols employed by WSNs can be categorized in to three types: fixed-
allocation, contention-based, and demand-based.  Fixed-allocation protocols provide fair 
access to the transmission medium by following a predetermined transmission schedule.  
As a result, fixed-allocation protocols are best suited for sensor networks where the 
traffic is predictable, such as environmental monitoring.  Contention-based protocols are 
often used in sensor networks where there is non-deterministic traffic.  However, 
contention-based protocols often result in traffic collisions that cause delays of time-
sensitive data.  Demand-based protocols are a time-varying technique that allocates 
channel usage based on node demand.  Demand-based protocols are well suited for 
variable rate traffic despite the overhead associated with reserving the transmission 
channel (Murthy and Manoj, 2004). 
There are four common MAC protocols in these categories: Self Organizing 
MAC for Sensor Networks (SMACS), Eavesdrop and Register (EAR), Hybrid 
TDMA/FDMA, and CSMA-Based. 
SMACS and EAR compliment each other to handle mobility and network 
initialization.  SMACS handles network initialization through link-layer associations.  It 
also handles the node discovery process and the channel assignment process 
concurrently.  A communication link is established consisting of a pair of time slots 
operating at a randomly chosen, but fixed frequency.  SMACS achieves power 
conservation by using random wake-up schedules during the connection phase and 
disabling the radio during idle time slots.  The EAR algorithm is used to ensure a 
seamless connection between nodes even if a node is mobile.  The EAR algorithm uses 
specific mobile nodes to update neighbors and to terminate poor connections (Sohrabi, 
Gao, Ailawadhi, and Pottie, 2002). 
The Hybrid TDMA/FDMA protocol is a centrally controlled MAC scheme.  It 
uses sensors with energy limitations designed to communicate directly to a single, nearby 
BS.  By using a hybrid TDMA/FDMA protocol, the network achieves effective time 
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synchronization while minimizing the bandwidth required for operations.  The TDMA 
aspect of the protocol is used to reduce delays that affect synchronization.  The FDMA 
scheme allows the minimum signal bandwidth per node.  The hybrid MAC scheme uses 
an ideal number of channels to diminish the power expended during set up and 
communications.  This number is determined by a ratio of the transmitter power to the 
receiver power.  If the receiver power expenditure is greater, the hybrid scheme is more 
FDMA oriented.  However, if the transmitter power is greater, it tends to be TDMA 
oriented, due to the ability to disable the radio during idle periods (Shih, Cho, Ickes, Min, 
Sinha, Wang and Chandrakasan, 2001). 
CSMA-based MAC schemes are generally best suited for networks generating 
random traffic flows.  As with traditional computer networks, the CSMA-based MAC 
algorithms are contention-based─that is, they are designed to handle the possibility of 
collisions.  CSMA-based MAC schemes use binary exponential back-off techniques to 
reduce the likelihood of multiple collisions.  They also control data rates so that nodes 
close to the BS do not dominate over those further away from the BS (Woo and Culler, 
2001). 
 
3. Network Layer 
As with wired networks, the WSN network layer is responsible for controlling 
network operations, such as routing packets through the network.  The distributed, ad-hoc 
nature of WSNs makes routing data difficult.  This difficulty is only compounded by the 
low transmission power associated with the networks.  Routing protocols control how 
data flows from the source to the destination.  As a result, protocols greatly affect the 
efficiency of the network.  Several routing techniques are commonly used in sensor 
networks and are briefly discussed in the following sections. 
 
a. Routing Techniques for Layered Architectures 
Flooding, gossiping, and rumor routing are the most common routing 
techniques used in layered sensor network architectures.  The first and most 
uncomplicated routing technique is called “flooding.”  Flooding is when the data packet 
is continually rebroadcast until the final destination is reached or until a maximum hop 
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count is reached.  Even though this technique avoids complexity, it causes data 
duplication, network congestion, and is not energy efficient.  Gossiping is a modified 
version of flooding.  In the gossiping technique, the data are not broadcast, but rather 
transmitted to a randomly selected neighbor.  Gossiping prevents data duplication but 
does not provide the needed reliability.  Rumor routing is designed for best effort 
delivery.  It does not produce the optimal routing; however, it does reduce data 
duplication and network traffic.  The disadvantages of rumor routing are that the routing 
parameters depend heavily on the topology and that the delivery of data is not guaranteed 
(Braginsky and Estrin, 2002). 
 
b. Routing Techniques for Clustered Architectures 
Cluster-based architectures require more evolved routing techniques.  The 
layered architecture routing techniques work well when the primary communications are 
with the BS.  However, in clustered architectures, routing between the clusters is 
difficult.  One common protocol is the Directed Diffusion.  Directed Diffusion allows the 
destination to specify the data-rate requirement based on the ability to report on the 
destination’s interests (Intanagonwiwat, Govindan and Estrin, 2000). 
Peer-to-peer enabled architectures are a subset of clustered architectures.  
Peer enabled routing techniques include Cost-Field approach, Geographic Hash Table 
(GHT), and Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation (SPIN).  Cost-Field 
algorithms attempt to find the optimal path by calculating the cost, or number of hops.  
When data packets are sent, the “cost-so-far” field is updated as the packet transverses 
the network. As the algorithm continues, the system is able to find the path of least-cost 
to various destinations (Ye, Chen, Lu, Zhang, 2001).  The GHT compiles geographic 
coordinates and identifies which nodes are in the different geographic areas.  When a 
sensor wants to pass data to a node not in its own geographic area, it will pass the data 
packet to the nearest node in the same geographic area as the destination node 
(Tatnasamy, Karp, Yin, Yu, Estrin, Govindan, Shenker, 2002).  The SPIN algorithm is 




versatility.  Negotiation reduces data duplication by dynamically determining the optimal 
path.  This, in return, helps minimize errors and prolongs network lifetime (Perrig, 
Szewcyzk, Wen, Culler, Tygar, 2001).   
The power constraints associated with sensor networks have resulted in 
the creation of many routing protocols that consider efficiencies at multiple levels in the 
protocol stack.  One such protocol is LEACH, discussed previously.  XMesh is another 
such protocol.  XMesh was derived from the Surge-Reliable and Mint Route protocols 
developed by Hill and Woo.  XMesh is a commonly used protocol that can provide the 
self-organizing, low-power, self-healing attributes required by WSNs.  XMesh employs 
idle periods and transmission periods.  The protocol “awakens” the idle node eight times 
per second for transmission.  When a node wakes up, it first determines if another sensor 
is transmitting.  If another sensor is transmitting, it prepares to receive data.  If no other 
node is transmitting, it can either send its own data or retransmit data received from 
another node.  XMesh uses messaging to establish the best route and also uses dynamic 
voltage scaling to minimize the number of hops. 
 
4. Application Layer 
The application layer of sensor networks is the sensors themselves.  The role of 
the sensor is to interact with the environment, detect a physical phenomenon, and to 
convert it into transmittable data.  Once the data are packetized, they are sent to the 
appropriate node or BS for further operations. 
 
F. IEEE 802.15.4 PROTOCOL 
The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol was approved in 2003, specifically to support 
networks requiring low data rates and low transmission powers.  The 802.15 family is 
well suited for low data rate applications; however, the other family members do not 
support low-power transmissions needed for sensor networks.  As a result, the standard 




home automation and security applications use the IEEE 802.15.4 standard because they 
require low-to-medium bitrates, and moderate amounts of delay are acceptable (Holger 
and Willig, 2005).   
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard describes two types of devices on a Low Rate 
WPAN (LR-WPAN).  The standard supports full-function devices (FFD) and reduced-
function devices (RFD).  RFDs are used in simple applications with minimal amounts of 
data traffic.  RFDs typically only communicate with a specific FFD.  FFDs are used in 
more complex environments with high data traffic.   
The LR-WPAN is based on the Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer 
model illustrated in Figure 8.  However, the application and network layers are not 
addressed by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.  Only the physical layer and the MAC layer are 
included in the standard.  The standard relies on the Type I 802.2 Logical Link Control 
(LLC) and the Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (SSCS) to interact between the 




Figure 8.   Open System Interconnection (OSI) Seven-Layer Model (From: IEEE 






1. Network Formation 
The most appropriate topology for a sensor network depends largely upon the  
application. The standard allows the LR-WPAN to operate in a star or peer-to-peer 
topology.  The following sections detail the network formation processes associated with 
the various topologies. 
 
a. Star Network Topology 
In the star topology, a single PAN coordinator governs the 
communications between sensor nodes.  The PAN coordinator is typically a FFD, which 
initiates and terminates the network communications throughout the network.  As Figure 
9 (a) shows, the PAN coordinator also handles the routing between the network nodes.  
The coordinator assigns a unique identification to all members in its sphere of influence 
and broadcasts its own identification.  Nodes associate with the coordinator by 
responding to the broadcast.  If a node is within range of two coordinators, it will respond 
to only one broadcast (IEEE 802.15.4, 2003). 
     
 
 
Figure 9.   Star and Peer-to-Peer Topologies (From: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, 2003) 
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b. Peer-to-Peer and Cluster Formation 
The peer-to-peer topology, shown in Figure 9 (b), consists of a network 
coordinator, which coordinates with the other FFD and RFD nodes.  The peer-to-peer 
topology is distinct from star topology in that the nodes can communicate among 
themselves.   
The peer-to-peer topology supports the networking characteristics 
desirable in a sensor network.  Peer-to-peer networking allows the formation of truly ad-
hoc, mesh, multi-hop, self-healing networks.  Like the star topology, the peer-to-peer 
topology also consists of a network coordinator.  Even though the nodes can 
communicate among each other, they associate with only one PAN coordinator.  Through 
the use of the PAN identification and the node identification, communication between 
PANs becomes possible.  This results in the formation of clusters.  Clusters are 
comprised predominately of fully functional nodes.  A RDF can be part of a cluster, but it 
is restricted to only communicating with the coordinator.  The PAN coordinator provides 
synchronization for other devices.  The first PAN coordinator establishes itself as the 
cluster head (CH) and has a cluster identifier (CID) of zero.  The CH then broadcasts this 
information.  Nodes that receive the broadcast associate with that cluster.  If a node does 
not receive the beacon but can communicate with other nodes, it will form a new cluster.  
This process is repeated until all the nodes are associated with a cluster.  Cluster 






Figure 10.   Cluster Formation Using Peer-to-Peer Topology (From: IEEE 802.15.4 
Standard, 2003) 
 
2. Physical Layer 
The first layer described by the 802.15.4 standard is the physical (PHY) layer.  
The standard identifies two primary PHY layer services.  The PHY data service is 
responsible for controlling the radio and the transmission and reception of the data units.  
The second service, management services, performs Energy Detection (ED), Clear 
Channel Assessment (CCA) and Link Quality Indication (LQI) for the network.  The 
standard also provides specification for turn-around-time, transmission power, LQI, and 
CCA for all of the approved frequency bands.  Turn-around-time is the period between 
the ability to transmit and the ability to receive, or receive-to-transmit.  The 802.15.4 
standard requires a twelve-symbol turn-around-time.  Moreover, the standard mandates 
that transmitters be designed to operate with at least -3dBm and have the ability for low-
power transmission to minimize interference.  The maximum transmission power is 
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  The PHY provides three 
manners to conduct CCA: detecting energy above a defined threshold, carrier sense only, 
and carrier sense with energy above a threshold.  The carrier-sense method indicates a 
busy channel when a signal is detected that matches the IEEE 802.15.4 modulation and 
spreading standards (IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, 2003). 
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The physical layer of the 802.15.4 standard specifies three frequency frequencies.  
The 868-868.6 MHz frequency range is predominately used in Europe.  The 902-928 
frequency range is used predominately in North America.  The 2400-2483.5 MHz range 
is approved for world-wide use.  All of the approved frequencies fall within the 
unlicensed ISM band.  The PHY layer uses Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) 
techniques.  The different frequency ranges use different bit rates and numbers of 
channels.  Additionally, they use either Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) or Quadrature 
Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) as the modulation technique.  The following table 





Band Modulation Bit Rate 
Number of 
Channels 
868-868.6 BPSK 20 1 868/915 902-928 BPSK 40 10 
2450 2400-2483.5 O-QPSK 250 16 
 
Table 1. Frequency Bands and Data Rates for IEEE 802.15.4 (From: IEEE 
802.15.4 Standard (2003)) 
 
3. Medium Access Control Layer 
The MAC layer serves as the interface between the SSCS and the physical layer.  
The MAC layer provides two key services for the protocol.  The first service is the MAC 
data service.  The MAC data service is responsible for ensuring successful transmission 
and reception of the data units (illustrated in Figure 11), through the PHY data service.   
The MAC management service acts like the device coordinator.  It is responsible for 
managing the beacon signals, PAN association or disassociation, error control and 
validation, and for maintaining reliable links between nodes.  Additionally, the MAC 
management service provides device security.  Finally, the management service 
implements a CSMA-CA process to ensure channel access and to avoid data collisions.   
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard identifies four acceptable frame types: the beacon 
frame, data frame, acknowledgement frame, and the MAC command frame.  The frame 
formats are based on the general MAC frame format shown in Figure 11.  The MAC 
Header (MHR) consists of the frame control, sequence number, information field, and the 
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MAC payload.   The Frame Control field identifies which frame type it is. The sequence 
number identifies where the frame falls in the sequence of frames sent.  The final parts of 
the frame are the MAC Footer (MFR) and the Frame Check Sequence (FCS).   
 
Octets: 



















MHR   
 
Figure 11.   General MAC Frame Format (From: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, 2003) 
 
The following figures illustrate the four MAC frame types.  The beacon frame is 
sent periodically by the PAN coordinator.  The beacon is used to provide information 
about the network management and to provide synchronization of the network devices.  
The data frame is used to transmit data received from the higher layers.  Like traditional 
wired networks, the data are encapsulated into the data frame.  If the data being sent 
exceed the data payload size, they are broken into multiple data frames.  It is important to 
note that when a node receives a data frame from another node, it is not required to send 
an acknowledgment frame.  The acknowledgement frame is used to confirm receipt of a 
transmitted frame.  The final frame is the command frame.  This frame is used to 





















MHR MAC Payload MFR 
 




Octets 1 (see 7.2.2.2.1) Variable 2 




Data Payload FCS 
MHR MAC Payload MFR 
 
Figure 13.   Data Frame Format (From: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, 2003) 
 
Octets:2 1 2 
Frame Control Sequence Number FCS 
MHR MFR 
 
Figure 14.   Acknowledgment Frame Format (From: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, 2003) 
 
 













MHR MAC Payload MFR 
 
Figure 15.   Command Frame Format (From: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, 2003) 
 
G. ZIGBEE 
The ZigBee standard is a rapidly growing standard developed by a non-profit 
industry consortium designed to produce “a reliable, cost-effective, low-power” open 
global standard (Heily, 2004).  As Figure 16, shows ZigBee is designed for low 
throughput and short-range networks.     
 
 
Figure 16.   Overview of Wireless Communication Standards (From: Heily, 2004) 
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The ZigBee standard is not intended to replace the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.  
Instead, it is designed to expand upon the existing 802.15 infrastructure.   The ZigBee 
framework builds upon the network and application layers of the protocol stack (Craig, 
2005).  The ZigBee standard further identifies possible network topologies, including 
star, mesh, and cluster tree.  It allows for larger networks by increasing the local 
addressing to 16-bits.  The ZigBee network layer has responsibilities similar to the 
802.15.4 standard but is expanded to include the establishment of the network, new 
device configuration, addressing assignment, synchronization, security and routing 
(Kinney, 2005). 
At the physical layer, ZigBee further expands upon the concept of Full Function 
Devices and Reduced Function Devices.  ZigBee introduces the concept of “logical 
devices” to sensor networks.  It relies predominately on FFDs but allows the use of 
RFDs.  The first logical device is the “ZigBee Coordinator.”  The ZigBee Coordinator is 
similar to a BS or CH.  The coordinator is responsible for initializing and maintaining the 
network.  Under the ZigBee Coordinator is the “ZigBee Router.”  The router is 
responsible for routing traffic throughout the network.  In accordance with the 802.15.4 
standard, these two devices must be FFDs.  The final device introduced is the “ZigBee 
End Device.”  The end device is the lowest level of the network.  These devices are 
solely responsible for interacting with the environment and forwarding detection 
information.  They may be FFDs or RFDs because they only communicate with higher 
level devices.  Figure 17 illustrates the various topologies and node type introduced by 
the ZigBee standard. 
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Figure 17.   ZigBee Network Topologies and Node Devices (From: Kinney, 2005) 
 
The ZigBee standard also addresses the issue of security in WSNs.  ZigBee adds 
security to the MAC layer through the use of encryption.  It adds a header to the MAC 
frame, which indicates if a frame is encrypted.  For encryption at the MAC layer, the 
ZigBee standard uses either the Counter mode of AES or the Cipher Block Chaining 
mode.  In addition, frame integrity is checked using the Message Integrity Code (MIC).  
At the network layer, ZigBee relies on a modified combination of Counter mode AES 
and Cipher Block Chaining mode.  The network layer is responsible for encrypting the 
information it adds to the data frame.  At the application layer, ZigBee behaves similarly 
to the lower levels.  It uses a key to secure the message and then encapsulates it into a 
data frame.   
The ZigBee specifications expand upon the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and move 
toward a universally accepted standardization for wireless sensor networks.  ZigBee adds 
the support for the traditional OSI 7 layer model.  Furthermore, it increases the security 
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capabilities, which are important, due to the sensitive nature of WSN data.  The ZigBee 
protocol is quickly being adopted by commercially available sensor networks. 
This chapter introduced wireless sensor networks and described key WSN areas.  
The early evolution of WSNs from wireless and ad-hoc mesh networks was discussed.  
This chapter also discussed the variety of WSN applications and the challenges 
associated with each application.  Then, the constraints and challenges that are unique to 
wireless sensor networks were discussed.  Next, this chapter introduced the major WSN 
architectures and the advantages and disadvantages with each.  Wireless Sensor Network 
protocols were also examined in detail.  Additionally, the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol was 
presented.  Finally, this chapter described the new ZigBee protocol designed for world-
wide acceptance.  This chapter provided the technical and theoretical background of 
























III. VIDEO TECHNOLOGY 
Video imaging technology has been actively used since the early twentieth 
century.  Video technologies are used in numerous applications, including providing 
information, entertainment, and historical documentation.  Today, video imaging is used 
in countless military and law enforcement applications.  Understanding the processes that 
provide video from a remote sensor to the watch-stander is an important part of network 
design.  This chapter introduces key concepts of video image capturing, encoding, and 
delivery. 
 
A. DIGITAL VIDEO AND IMAGING INTRODUCTION 
Digital imaging devices rely on traditional camera optics combined with silicon 
charge-coupled device (CCD) chips.  CCDs focus and convert the reflected light into 
electronic signals.  They are clusters of light receptors that convert the received light into 
three discrete electrical signals.  The electrical signals are then converted to digital 
information through the digitization process. 
Digitization converts the electrical signals into digital information through 
sampling and quantization.  Sampling is the measurement of electrical energy created by 
the CCD within a specific region or time period.  Quantization is the process of assigning 
an integer value to represent the amplitude of the electrical energy sampled.  The 
sampling and quantization processes are repeated until an entire digital representation of 
the physical image is created.  The accuracy of a digital representation of real or analog 
information is related directly to sampling and quantization.  Increasing the sampling rate 
produces more discrete digital samples of the same analog signal.  This allows for a more 
accurate representation of the image signal.  Increasing the number of quantization bits 
allows the accurate representation of the amplitude of the image signal.  For example, an 
image signal represented by only two quantization bits is less accurate than the same 
signal with ten quantization bits.  The combination of sampling rates and quantization 
allow digital images to represent the real image accurately. 
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The digital representation of the image is presented as a matrix of values.  Each 
value represents the color and intensity of a specific area of the image.  The specific 
element is known as a picture element, or pixel.  The digital video image is achieved 
through the aggregation of hundreds or thousands of pixels.  The final digital image can 
then be transmitted, displayed, or stored in various manners.  Digital video is increasingly 
being transmitted using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) but 
is also transmitted using radio frequencies. 
The number of pixels on the CCD chip determines the quality of the digital 
image.  Additionally, the number of lines and the number of pixels per line determine the 
quality of the image.  As the number of pixels rises, each pixel represents a smaller part 
of the image, thus allowing for more detail to be shown.  Several standard image formats 
have been designed to specify resolutions and aspect ratios commonly used to display 
digital images.  Table 2 summarizes resolutions for the standard image formats. 
 
 Sub-QCIF QCIF CIF 4CIF 16CIF 
Width in Pixels 128 176 352 704 1408 
Height in Pixels 96 144 288 576 1152 
 
Table 2. Image Format Resolutions (From: Wang, 2002) 
 
Digital video technology covers the capturing, storing, and displaying a series of 
images captured.  An additional item of interest is the image refresh rate, or frame refresh 
rate.  The frame refresh rate determines temporal resolution.  Temporal resolution is a 
trait of digital video that refers to the representation of motion during a given time.  Most 
forms of video simulate motion by displaying still picture frames at a high rate.  Slight 
differences in the frames are observed as motion.  Frame rates for digital video are 
commonly between 15 and 60 frames per second.  Temporal resolution significantly 





B. DATA RATE CONSIDERATIONS 
Digital video images require robust communication channels due to the relatively 
large data rates required for accurate video.  Each pixel of the CCH chip contains a 
detector for each of the three primary colors of light.  The light detected is converted to 
luminance and chrominance values, which represent intensity, hue, and color saturation.  
Each detector commonly uses eight bits to represent these values, resulting in 24-bits per 
pixel needed to send a single frame of uncompressed video.  Assuming the video is 
transmitting at 4cif, or 704 x 576, each frame requires 405,504 pixels.  At 24-bits per 
pixel, each frame requires 9,732,096 bits. 
In addition, the temporal resolution must be high to provide near-streaming video.  
For digital video surveillance in a tactical or security application, it is not necessary to 
have flicker-free video.  Assuming a steady, but modest, 15 frames per second, the video 
would require 145,981,440-bits. 
Standard wireless networks can pass between 11- and 54-Mbps of throughput to 
each client on the network.  Given a network passing 25-Mbps, digital video must be 
compressed six times to pass the video stream over the network.  Even at this level of 
compression, a single network client viewing the video would consume the entire 
network throughput.  However, several compression techniques have been developed to 
allow the efficient transmission of digital video.  The following section describes the 
most common compression techniques used for digital video. 
 
C. DIGITAL IMAGING COMPRESSION 
The considerable data rate requirements for digital video demonstrate the need for 
effective compression techniques to allow digital video to be efficiently passed over 
networks.  Compression algorithms take advantage of statistical and psychological 
redundancies found in digital images.  Two common open compression techniques, JPEG 





1. JPEG and Motion JPEG 
A working group under the ISO, the Joint Pictographic Experts Group, developed 
a general purpose still-image compression standard.  The standard, known as JPEG, is 
intended to address transmission and storage problems.  The JPEG standard effectively 
compresses grayscale and color images, but does not compress black and white images 
with sudden jumps in color well due to spatial predictive coding used.   
The JPEG standard was formally adopted in 1995 by the ISO.  Although there is 
no noticeable degradation to image quality, JPEG is considered a lossy compression 
because the algorithm discards original data that are imperceptible to the human eye.  
Motion JPEG, or MJPEG, is often used in digital video applications.  Using the Motion 
JPEG, each frame is compressed into a JPEG image.  This approach produces high 
quality video at high resolutions but can still consume significant data-rates.  The 
following sections describe how the JPEG standard compresses digital images. 
 
a. Transform RGB into Luminance and Chrominance 
The CCD chips used in digital imagery collect a wide range of red, blue 
and green (RGB) lights, many of which are not discernable by the human eye.  As a 
result, the unnecessary light values may be omitted without any perceptible decline in 
image quality.  The RGB values are converted into a single luminance value and two 
chrominance values.  The luminance value addresses the intensity of light while the 
chrominance value refers to the dominant hue and saturation.  The YUV model is used to 
represent the RGB values.  The Y value represents luminance, while the U and V values 
represent the chrominance values.  The relationships between the values is shown in the 
following equations: 
 Y = 0.299R + 0.587G + 0.11B 
 U = 0.492 (B - Y) 





b. Subsampling of Chrominance Values 
The human eye is most sensitive to the intensity of light, or the “Y” value.  
As a result, the JPEG standard leaves the “Y” value unchanged.  The chrominance value, 
on the other hand, is of lesser importance and can be discarded or changed with little 
effect on image quality.  The JPEG algorithm discards several values to reduce the 
psychovisual redundancy and to reduce image size before compression occurs.  This 
process is known as subsampling.  For example, the 4:1:1 subsampling pattern encodeds 
only one pair of chrominance value for every four luminance values, resulting in only 
half the original number of bits 
 
c. Group, Apply Discrete Cosine Transform, Quantize 
Next, the JPEG algorithm groups the pixels into eight by eight blocks.  
The blocks are then ordered into a “raster-like” left-to-right, top-to-bottom scan pattern.  
The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is then applied to each of the blocks and to each 
pixel.  The result of the DCT is an average frequency value for each block of pixels and a 
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Next, the JPEG algorithm quantizes DCT values and rounds them to the 
nearest integer value using separate “quantization coefficients” described in the JPEG 
standard.  After the values are quantized and rounded, they are ordered according to the 
zig-zag scan shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.   Zig-Zag Scan Method 
 
d. Run-length Encoding and Secondary Coding 
The zig-sag scan results in a bit-stream that is then converted into run-
length pairs forming an intermediate symbol sequence.  The “run” portion of the pair 
addresses the distance between non-zero coefficients in the block.  The “length” value 
refers to the value of the non-zero coefficient immediately following a run. Finally, the 
JPEG algorithm uses either Huffman or arithmetic coding to compress the intermediate 
symbol sequence (Gibson et al., 1998).  The arithmetic coding requires an expensive 
license and offers only minimal improvement over the Huffman Coding.  Huffman 
coding is the default method used by the JPEG standard.  After the intermediate bit-
stream is coded, the image is fully compressed. 
 
2. MPEG 
The Moving Pictures Expert Group (MPEG) has released several digital multi-
media compression standards that build upon one another.  The most recently released 
MPEG standard is the MPEG-4 standard, which was released in 1999.  As with JPEG, the 
MPEG-4 standard is considered lossy because RGB data are discarded.  MPEG-4, 
however, further discards data through inter-frame predictive coding.  As a result, 
MPEG-4 encoding significantly reduces throughput requirements.  The MPEG-4 
compression standards take advantage of spatial and psychovisual redundancies 
associated with displaying images and use advanced coding techniques to allow high 
quality video to be transmitted over limited bandwidth communication lines.  The 
following sections briefly describe the MPEG-4 encoding process. 
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The first steps in the MPEG encoding process are similar to the JPEG encoding.  
The CCD chip captures light and turns the electrical signals into RGB values.  Next the 
RGB values are converted into the YUV format and then are further sub-sampled to 
reduce the data requirements.  Then the pixels are grouped into eight-by-eight blocks and 
a DCT is performed on each element.  At this stage, MPEG differs significantly from 
JPEG. 
Because MPEG-4 is a compression standard designed for all multimedia formats, 
the compressor and decompressor must be able to process multiple sources of data.  The 
results of the DCT are organized into three different objects: video object, still texture 
object, and face object.  The algorithm codes the objects into hierarchical layers, which 
build upon one another to enhance special and temporal resolution.  This allows the 
compressor to distinguish between various objects within the video picture.  As objects 
are distinguished, the compressor can allocate more data space for objects that require it, 
such as objects in motion.  For example, if the objects in the background remain 
stationary, they might only be coded once and the foreground objects would be coded as 
needed.  Since the foreground objects tend to be only a fraction of the total video, the 
allocation results significantly increase compression efficiency (Adam, 2002). 
Furthermore, MPEG uses inter-frame predictive coding to reduce temporal 
redundancy.  This is accomplished using the IPB frame model.  The “I” frames are still 
frames of the scene.  “P” frames are a statistical estimation of what the next frame will 
look like based on previous frames.  “B” frames are coded based on comparing the eight-
by-eight pixel blocks for the “I” and “P” frames.   The MPEG video compression 
algorithm reduces the redundancies in digital video to compress video streams to a 
manageable size.  Although the initial steps are similar to JPEG encoding, the use of 
inter-frame predictive coding allows MPEG standards to reduce the amount of data 
needed significantly to transmit and store digital imagery. 
Understanding the processes that provide video from a remote sensor to the 
watch-stander is an important part of network design.  This chapter introduced the basic 
concepts of digital video technology.  The fundamentals of video capture were covered  
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followed by the bandwidth considerations associated with digital video data.  Lastly, this 
chapter introduced and discussed the existing video compression techniques used to make 


















IV. DESCRIPTION OF PROTOTYPED NETWORK 
The inherent flexibility and the unique requirements associated with wireless 
sensor networks allow the network to be customized to the user’s needs.  The area of 
operation and the intended purpose of the network greatly affect network architecture.  
For the purposes of this study, the prototyped network is designed to support the needs of 
the NPS Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) 
program.  However, the design parameters are intended to apply to possible deployment 
scenarios world-wide.  This chapter describes the operational scenarios as a part of the 
COASTS exercise and further details the design of the integrated sensor-camera network 
prototype. 
 
A. COASTS 2006 
 
1. COASTS Overview 
The emergence and relatively low cost of commercially available wireless 
networking technologies, which support traditional peacekeeping, law enforcement, and 
non-governmental organization applications, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, create potentially important operational and resource considerations for decision-
makers.   
The COASTS research and development program demonstrates the capability to 
rapidly deploy and integrate low cost, state-of-the-art, unclassified networked air, ground, 
and maritime sensors providing real-time sensor-to-shooter information to tactical and 
remote decision-makers.  As coalition operations continue to increase, the ability to 
manage and to disseminate the collected intelligence data effectively from deployed 
assets becomes ever more vital. The first iteration of the COASTS program began in 
2005.  In addition to the benefits resulting from cooperative research and development 




commitment to foster stronger multi-lateral relations in the areas of science and wireless 
technology with key Pacific Theater allies (COASTS Marine Corps Systems Command 
Proposal, 2006).    
COASTS 2006 will advance research relative to low-cost, commercially available 
solutions while integrating each technology into a larger system in support of tactical 
action scenarios.  The demonstration planned for May 2006, in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
will have a first-responder, law enforcement, and counter-terrorism and counter-drug 
focus.  Furthermore, the tactical information being provided from the deployed sensors 
will be fused, displayed, and distributed in real-time, to local (Chiang Mai), theater 
(Bangkok), and global (Alameda, California) command and control centers. This fusion 
of information validates using wireless communication mediums to support redundant 
links of the National Information Infrastructure, as well as test the “last mile” solution for 
the disadvantaged user.  
Continuing with the previous iteration’s research theme, this effort will again 
examine the feasibility of rapidly-deploying networks (Fly-away Kit) and sustainment in 
a hostile climatic (temperature, humidity, wind, etc.) environment.  Network 
improvements will include: 
• incorporation and testing of new 802.11 mesh LAN equipment 
• refinement of a jointly-developed 3-D topographic shared situational 
awareness application called C3Trak 
• integration of “satellite in a suitcase”─portable satellite communication 
equipment 
• enhanced unattended ground and water-based sensors 
• new balloon and UAV designs 
• portable biometric devices, portable explosive residue detecting devices 
• revised operational procedures for deployment of the network.  
COASTS 2006 field experiments will focus on several emerging sensor-to-
shooter technologies and capabilities.  The field experiments will be a part of the 




of an effort to link existing national and international Data Fusion Centers to promote and 
to enhance common information environments.  COASTS 2006 experiments will occur in 
areas such as: 
1) Maritime domain protection/awareness 
2) Riverine and littoral warfare  
3) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
4) Knowledge Database Design (KDD)  
5) Wireless network technologies 
6) Hastily formed networks 
7) GPS tracking technologies 
8) GPS Denied tracking technologies 
9) Unattended, integrated sensor-camera networks 
10) Wearable computing devices 
11) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
12) Situational awareness applications 
13) Persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 
14) Network security 
15) Biometric collection devices 
16) Modular network Fly-away Kits (FLAK). 
 
2. COASTS 2006 Scenario 
The COASTS 2006 network topology, illustrated in Figures 19 and 20, will be 
demonstrated in several operational contexts and field experiments.  Two demonstrations 
will be conducted in the United States in conjunction with US Coast Guard and other 
Department of Defense organizations.  Two additional demonstrations will occur in 
northern Thailand in partnership with the Royal Thai Armed Forces.  The scenario will 
entail using deployed assets to support U.S. and Thai military and law enforcement forces 
in the detection, surveillance, interdiction/destruction, and post-hostility assessment of a 
maritime terrorist smuggling operation.  This section provides an overview of the 
COASTS 2006 scenario based upon the COASTS 2006 Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) and emphasizes the role of an integrated sensor-camera network to provide 
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Figure 20.   COASTS 2006 Global Network Topology 
 
The scenario simulates a counter-drug and counter-terrorism operation.  
Intelligence indicates a suspected shipment of drugs and explosives will occur.  The 
arrival of a longboat suspected of involvement in drug and arms smuggling operations 
will be detected by various unattended sensor suites deployed at a tactical waterborne 
choke-point. When triggered by the motion of the longboat, the sensors will send an 
automatic system alert through the C3Trak Shared Situational Awareness application. 
This system alert will be observed by all the tactical forces connected to the network, and 
by the various command and control (C2) centers.  
When the longboat arrives at a “drop-point” the drug and explosive shipment will 
be transferred into the cargo bed of two awaiting trucks.  An unidentified malefactor will 
be given a CD, which details the smuggling operation and financial ties with terrorist  
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organizations. This entire process will be remotely monitored through ground-based 
video cameras and aerial surveillance platforms.  The surveillance video will be 
displayed at the local, regional, and strategic C2 centers.  
After the transfer is complete, the scenario then splits into two parts.  One part 
will entail the malefactor being tracked on foot by a Royal Thai Army and Police squad. 
The bad actor will cross land-based sensor-camera suites, again initiating a C3Trak 
system-wide alert. The IIFC will order the interdiction squad equipped with a wearable 
computing device, which can access all network data, and biometric and explosive 
residue collection capabilities to coordinate the apprehension of the suspected bad actor. 
Simultaneously, the second part of the scenario will involve the convoy being 
tracked by the integrated sensor-camera networks. As the vehicle convoy exits the area, 
they will cross a sensor grid, deployed alongside the road, sending another C3Trak 
system-wide alert. At this point, orders will be passed from the strategic C2 center to 
capture all monitored units: longboat, trucks, and bad actor.  
After the malefactor is apprehended, biometric data are gathered and passed to the 
MIFC for identity verification. Once positive confirmation is received that the captive is 
the high value target in question, the coalition ground forces holding the malefactor pass 
initial intelligence from the CD (captured with the malefactor’s personal effects) and 
initial custody status via C3Trak to all network users.  As the vehicle convoy crosses a 
final sensor-camera grid, a watch officer orders an air-to-surface strike.  Concurrently, 
coalition maritime interdiction teams apprehend the long-boat.  The scenario ends after 
all the malefactors have been captured or destroyed. 
The COASTS 2006 scenario provides the foundations for designing an integrated 
sensor-camera network.  The operational context of the COASTS 2006 represents 
common challenges and needs for deployment in any military or law enforcement 
application.  The exact requirements for the COASTS program were determined, and 
then an extensive market survey was conducted to select the components needed for the 




Appendix A, the COASTS Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The following sections 
introduce and describe the components selected to build the integrated sensor-camera 
network. 
 
B. INTRODUCTION TO CROSSBOW 
The sensor network components selected to build the sensor-camera network are 
produced by Crossbow Technologies.  Crossbow is an established company focusing on 
sensing technologies.  They are considered “a leading supplier of inertial sensor systems 
for aviation, land, and marine applications and other instrumentation sensors as well as 
the leading full-solutions supplier in the wireless sensor networking arena and the only 
manufacturer of smart dust wireless sensors (www.xbow.com).”  Crossbow offers a 
variety of commercial sensor network hardware and software developed for security 
related applications. 
 
C. SENSOR NETWORK COMPONENTS 
The sensor components selected for use are the Crossbow MSP410CA Mote 
Security System.  The MSP410 Mote Security System is a battery-powered, eight-node 
kit designed specifically for security applications and is shown in Figure 21.  The 
solution is the wireless sensor network component of the integrated sensor-camera 
network.  The robust mesh network and sensing capabilities provided by the MSP410 
nodes provide the necessary ability to detect objects in an adverse environment.  The 
following sections describe the intended deployments and components of the MSP410 





Figure 21.   Crossbow MSP410CA Mote Security System 
 
1. Proposed Deployments 
The MSP410 Mote Security System is designed specifically for security related 
applications such as “remote border security, perimeter protection, intrusion detection 
and identification, and building occupancy monitoring (Crossbow, 2005).”  Crossbow 
recommends two architectures.  The first proposed deployment architecture is perimeter 
protection pattern.  The company recommends the motes be deployed approximately 40 
feet apart around the perimeter.  They also recommend that the motes be oriented in the 




Figure 22.   MSP410 Perimeter Deployment from MSP410 Series User’s Manual (From: 
Crossbow, 2005) 
 
The second deployment architecture suggested by Crossbow is the dense 
deployment grid.  The dense deployment grid is designed to provide coverage in an area 
of interest such as an open field or anywhere that requires overlapping sensing areas.  The 
distances recommended are based on the sensor coverage area and are not limited by 
communication distances.  If overlapping coverage areas are not required, the distances 
can be increased to cover a greater area with the same number of nodes.  The 




Figure 23.   MSP410 Dense Deployment Grid from MSP410 Series User’s Manual 
(From: Crossbow, 2005) 
 
2. MSP410CA MICA2 Platform Core 
The MICA2 processor and radio board is the heart of the MSP410 mote system.  
The MICA2 board is the core element of the nodes of the MSP410 WSN and is shown in 





Figure 24.   (a) High-level View of a Mote and (b) Block Diagram of Mote Components 
from MSP410 Datasheet (From: Crossbow, 2005) 
 
The MICA2 processor and radio board controls the sensing and transmission 
capabilities of the mote.  The processor is responsible for controlling the processing and 
logic tasks such as power management.  Three variations of the MICA2 board exist based 
on the transmission frequency.  The MPR400 is based in the 915 MHz range.  The 
MPR410 operates in the 433 MHz range.  The MPR420 operates in the 315 MHz range.  
The MSP410 Mote Security Systems sold in the United States uses the MPR410 MICA2 
board and operates in the 433 MHz range.  Figure 25 shows the circuit board and 




Figure 25.   (a) MICA2 Platform Core without Antenna, (b) MICA2 Core Block 
Diagram from MPR/MIB User’s Manual (From: Crossbow, 2005) 
 
The Amtel Atmega 128 microcontroller is the processor chip and has total control 
over the function of the mote.  Two peripherals are associated with the processor: a 64-bit 
Serial Identification Number and a 4-Megabit external flash.  All sensor subsystems and 
any external devices are connected through external interfaces to the processor. 
The MICA2 chip has green, yellow, and red Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs), 
which are used to provide visual status indications.  The LEDs are controlled using 
general purpose input-output pins connected to the processor.  However, when the 
processor board is inside the protective housing, viewing the LED indicators is difficult.  
Wired communication and mote reprogramming is accomplished using a 51-pin Hirose 
interface connector.   
The MICA2 Platform Core also contains a Chipcon CC1000 radio.  The Chipcon 
CC1000 radio uses two-tone FSK and Manchester encoding to operate at a baud rate of 
19.2 kilobits per second (kbps).  The standard radio configuration uses four channels with 
a recommended channel spacing of 500 kHz around the 433 MHz band.  Although the 
59 
transmission power can be changed by reprogramming the chip, the default transmission 
power is set to the maximum level.  According to the MSP410 User’s Manual, the radio 
is capable of achieving radio ranges of “at least 250 feet on flat concrete ground and 150 
feet when placed on grassy terrain with rolling hills.” 
 
3. MSP410CA Passive Infrared Sensor 
In addition to the MICA2 core, the MSP410CA nodes contain several sensors, 
which serve to interface with the surrounding environment and gather data.   The passive 
infrared (PIR) sensor is the most powerful sensing subsystem in the MSP410 package.  
The PIR subsystem provides 360º coverage using four sensing elements placed at the four 
corners of the MICA2 board.  The PIR elements are designed to detect motion of objects 
that radiate thermal energy.  Each element generates a ± 15º vertical viewing angle and a 
± 45º horizontal viewing angle.  The horizontal field of view is further subdivided into 
nine individual “beams.”  A “detection event” occurs when an object crosses one or more 
of the beams.  This produces a shadow that crosses from one sensing element to the next.  
The sensor output is a signal proportional to the difference between the infrared energy 
striking the two sensing elements.  Moreover, the PIR elements provide a “Quad Detect” 
capability.  This allows the sensors to embed the quadrant that detected the object.  From 
the quadrant information one can extract which direction the object is moving.   
The MSP410 Series User’s Manual states that the outputs of the PIR sensor are 
affected by the sensor’s sensitivity, the sensor’s position and elevation, the ambient 
thermal noise (temperature), and the objects characteristics.  The sensors use filters to 
increase performance by reducing the effect of ambient thermal noise.  Additionally, the 
sensors use “active filtering” to eliminate the monitoring bandwidth in the area where 
they have the greatest sensitivity from .01 Hz to 15 Hz.  Table 3 summarizes the PIR 





Specifications- Performance Value Comment 
Optical Wavelength 5 µm to 4 µm  
Optical Bandwidth .01 Hz to 15 Hz  
Vertical Field of View ± 15º  
Horizontal Field of View ± 45º  
Storage Temperature -55º C to +125º C  
Human Detection Range 30 to 40 feet 
Vehicle Detection Range 50 to 60 feet 
Large Vehicle Detection Range 70 to 80 feet 
Based on Sensor elevation 
of 3 feet above the ground 
and at 7º C (44. 7º F) 
 
Table 3. Sensor Specifications Based on the MSP410 Series User’s Manual (From: 
Crossbow, 2005) 
 
4. MSP410CA Magnetic Sensor 
The second sensing system in the MSP410CA nodes is the magnetic sensor.  The 
magnetic detection subsystem consists of a two-axis magnetic field disorder detector.  
The magnetic sensor is activated when an object disturbs the local magnetic field.  The 
magnetometer uses 100 Hz low-pass filters and two-stage amplification to minimize false 
detections while increasing the maximum detection range.  Table 4 lists the 











Parameter Typical Value 
Bridge Resistance 1100 Ohms 
Field Range ± 6 gauss (Earth’s Field = 0.5 gauss) 
Sensitivity 1 mV/Vgauss 
± 1 gauss 0.05% FS 
± 3 gauss 0.4 FS 
Linearity Error  
(Best fit straight Line) 
± 6 gauss 1.6% FS 
Bandwidth DC to 5 MHz 
Noise Density 50 nVsqrt Hz at 1kHz 
Resolution 120 µgauss at 50 Hz Band Width 
Storage Temperature -55º C to 175º C 
 
Table 4. Linear Magnetic Field Sensor Specifications (From: Crossbow, 2005) 
 
5. Power Characteristics 
As part of the MICA2 family, the motes in the MSP410CA are designed to be 
powered using two AA batteries.  The MICA2 board requires a minimum of 2.7 Volts 
and a maximum of 3.6 Volts.  Theoretically, the board can be powered using any source 
that provides direct current (DC) power within the defined range.  Additionally, the board 
can be powered using the 51-pin Hirose connector and the two-pin Molex connectors.  
However, this is not a viable option due to the protective enclosure.  The Crossbow 
supplied user’s manual states that the motes will normally operate for ten hours on two 
AA batteries.  Table 5 details the power consumption characteristics of the various 








Circuit Mode Current Required 
PIR Off 1 µA 
PIR On 300 µA 
Magnetometer, per axis Off 1 µA 
Magnetometer, per axis On 3 µA 
Radio Off 1 µA 
Radio Receive Mode 8 mA 
Radio at 1 mW Transmit Mode 16 mA 
Processor Sleep 15 to 20 µA 
Processor Active 8 mA 
Serial Flash Memory Write 15 mA 
Serial Flash Memory Read 4 mA 
Serial Flash Memory Off 2 µA 
 
Table 5. Consumption Characteristics (From: Crossbow, 2005) 
 
6. MBR410CA Mote Base Station 
The base station that comes with the Mote Security System is the MBR410 serial 
base station.  The MBR410 Base Station package, shown in Figure 26, consists of an 
MIP510 serial gateway connected to a MICA2 series MPR410 radio and processor board. 
The MICA2 processor board is programmed with a node identification of “0,” forcing it 
to behave as a base station or network coordinator. 
The MBR410 aggregates the networks data and forwards the data to a computer 
for storage or manipulation.  Data transfer and mote programming is achieved through a 
standard RS-232 serial interface.  The interface is a single channel, bid-directional 
interface with a DB9 connector.  Power is supplied through an external power adapter, 




Figure 26.   MBR410 Base Station for the MSP410CA Security System 
 
D. CROSSBOW SOFTWARE 
Crossbow Technologies has developed several software applications used 
extensively as a part of the MSP410 Mote Security System and during the testing and 
evaluation process.  The important Crossbow-supplied software solutions are described in 
the following sections. 
 
1. XMesh Network Stack 
The XMesh Network Stack is the Crossbow developed sensor network protocol 
developed to support wireless sensor network.  XMesh is an open-architecture, flexible 
and powerful, embedded wireless networking and control platform built on top of the 
TinyOS operating system.  It uses proven mesh routing techniques and reduces the 
number of messages sent through the network.  This reduces power consumption and 
significantly extends the battery life of the system.  The XMesh protocol is designed to be 
completely compatible with the IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee standards. 
 
2. XServe 
XServe is a powerful command-line software component that provides remote 
data logging capabilities.  WSNs use streamlined message formats and network protocols 
to reduce the amount of power and memory needed for communications.  Traditional 
64 
internet protocol (IP)- based networks do not use the same formats or protocols.  XServe 
acts as a translator between the two networks and allows sensor network data to be 
passed over traditional IP networks (MOTE-View Users Manual, 2005). 
 
3. MOTE-View 
MOTE-View is Crossbow’s primary user interface for wireless sensor networks.  
It is designed to provide an intuitive graphical user interface (GUI) to control the motes 
and to view and log the sensor data.  The MOTE-View software is extensively used in the 
testing procedures and operational scenarios conducted as part of this thesis.  Mote-View 
is part of a three-layer network architecture developed by Crossbow.  It serves as the 
client layer, where network data can be monitored, interpreted, and analyzed.  The second 
layer is the server layer that logs data and makes them available locally or remotely.  The 
third layer is the mote layer, which consists of the onboard sensors and the TinyOS 
operating system.  The three-layer implementation is shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27.   Layer Sensor Network Implementation from MOTE-View User’s Manual 
(From: Crossbow, 2005) 
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MOTE-View provides several valuable ways to visualize the data received by the 
wireless sensor network.  One method that is used is the “data log” view, which allows 
the data to be saved in a database.  The most recent sensor data, node status, and any 
error messages are constantly updated.  The software also has the ability to query the 
database to retrieve specific data sets.  Figure 28 is a screenshot of the “data view” tab 




Figure 28.   Screenshot of the Data View in MOTE-View 
 
MOTE-View also provides the capability to view historical graphs of the data 
logged by the sensors by using the “Chart” view.  The “Chart” view displays up to three 
graphs produced from a maximum of twenty-four nodes.  Figure 29 is a screenshot of the 




Figure 29.   Screenshot of the Chart View in MOTE-View 
 
The final graphical representation of the sensor network found in MOTE-View is 
the “Topology” view.  The “Topology” view is a drag-and-drop view that allows the user 
to view the physical layout of the sensor network.  The nodes can be placed in the same 
relative position as they are deployed.  It displays all the network data including sensor 
values and parenting information.  The “Topology” view also allows the user to import 
background images such as photographs or blueprints of buildings.  Figure 30 is a 




Figure 30.   Screenshot of Topology View in MOTE-View 
 
4. Surge View 
Surge-View is another software solution provided by Crossbow Technologies.  
Although sensor data can be viewed using the program, Surge-View is primarily a GUI 
application designed to provide the user with networking information.  The Sure-View 
software contains the Surge GUI, Stats, and HistoryViewer programs.  The Surge GUI 
program, shown in Figure 31, allows the user to view connectivity and routing statistics.  
It also allows the network data to be saved to a local computer.  The Stats program, 
shown in Figure 32, provides network health statistics.  Finally, the HistoryViewer 
program (Figure 33) allows the user to replay graphical representations of the network’s 














Figure 33.   Screenshot (From: Getting Started Guide, Crossbow, 2005) 
 
E. VIDEO NETWORK COMPONENT 
The role of the cameras in the integrated network is to provide remote, real-time 
visual information to a watch-stander.  This offers several key benefits, including visual 
verification of sensor activity, remote monitoring, and persistent surveillance.  Providing 
real-time visual information assists decision makers in making accurate and timely 
decisions.   
Numerous law enforcement and military organizations currently use video 
surveillance technologies on a daily basis.  As a result, numerous commercial companies 
have begun developing video products designed for remote monitoring and security 
applications.  Among the most prolific of such companies is Axis Communications, 
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which is a global market leader in network video products and specializes in 
“professional network video solutions for remote monitoring, security surveillance and 
broadcasting (www.axis.com/corporate/index.htm).”   
The Axis 213 PTZ Network Camera, shown in Figure 34, is the video component 
selected for the integrated sensor-camera network.  The camera was selected for several 
important reasons.  Firstly, the Axis 213 camera is currently in use by several military 
and law enforcement organizations worldwide.  It is currently in use by several United 
States military organizations such as the U.S. Air Force Force Protection Battle Lab.  
Additionally, the Axis 213 is currently used by the Royal Thai Armed Forces operations 
in support of the Global War on Terror.  Secondly, the size and shape of the Axis 213 is 
conducive for covert operations and concealment.  Thirdly, the camera does not consume 
significant amounts of power and can easily be powered for extended time periods on a 
common car battery.  Finally, the Axis 213 provides significant performance capabilities 
in a single, cost-efficient package.  The camera offers impressive pan, tilt, and zoom 
functions combined with built-in infrared capabilities, adjustable frame rates, multiple 
video stream formats, and preset viewing positions.  Table 6 provides details of the 














Lens 1.5 – 91mm F1.6 –F4.0, motorized zoom lens 
Horizontal viewing angle: 42 – 1.7º 
Auto focus, 26x optical and 12x digital zoom 
Minimum Illumination Color mode: 1 lux, F1.6 
IR mode: 0.1 lux, F1.6* 
*Using built in IR light in complete darkness up to 3 meters 
Video Compression Motion JPEG 
MPEG-4 
Resolutions 704x480, 768x576, 160x120, 176x144 
Frame Rates Motion JPEG: Up to 30/25 frames per second 
MPEG-4: 30/25 or 21/17 frames per second 
Video Streaming Simultaneous Motion JPEG and MPEG-4 
Controllable frame rate and bandwidth 
Constant and variable bit rate 
Pan Angle Range 340º 
Tilt Angle Range 100º 
Zoom 26x optical, 12x digital 
Preset Positions 20 operator definable preset positions and configurable 
monitoring sequence 
Video Access Up to 20 simultaneous clients 
Supported Protocols IP, HTTP, TCP, ICMP, RTSP, RTP, UDP, IGMP, RTCP, 
SMTP, FTP, DHCP, UpnP, ARP, DNS, DynDNS, SOCKS 
Connectors RJ-45 
26-pin multi-connector 
Power 13 V DC, max 24 W external power supply 
Operating Conditions 5 – 40 ºC (41 – 104 ºF) 
20 – 80 % non-condensing relative humidity 
Dimensions 
(HxWxD) and Weight 
130 x 104 x 130 mm (5.12 x 4.09 x 5.12 in) 
700 grams (1.55 pounds) 
 
Table 6. Axis 213 Capabilities from Axis User’s Manual (From: Axis, 2005) 
 
F. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 
The integrated sensor-camera network is intended to operate with both wired and 
wireless networks.  However, finding the components with built-in wireless networking 
capabilities was impossible.  As a result, two additional network components serve to 
integrate the sensor-camera network with a wireless network.  The additional components 




1. Vlinx Wireless Serial Server 
The standard base station for the Crossbow MSP410CA system does not interface 
with an external wireless network.  The only external interface is the standard serial 
connection.  To interface with the existing COASTS wireless network correctly, a device 
is needed to convert the serial data from the base station to the standard 802.11 wireless 
data format.  The Vlinx Wireless Serial Server is a product built by B&B Electronics to 
connect serial devices to existing 802.11 b/g wireless networks.  The wireless serial 
server is designed for use in industrial environments and can be powered by AC or DC 
power supplies.  Device configuration is achieved through a standard RJ-45 connection.  
The Vlinx server is capable of operating in “Direct IP” mode, “Virtual COM Port” mode, 
and “Serial Tunneling” mode.  Direct IP mode allows the device to broadcast the serial 
data to a specified IP address using the TCP or UDP protocols.  Virtual COM Port mode 
allows programs to extend their COM ports across a network effectively.  The serial 
device will appear to be connected directly to the computer and programs will be able to 
access data as if the device was physically connected to the computer.  Serial Tunneling 
mode allows two serial devices to communicate wirelessly with each other.  During 
proof-of-concept demonstrations, the Vlinx serial server was used in Virtual COM mode, 
which allows the MOTE-View program to access the sensor data through a wireless 
network.  During integration with the COASTS network, the Vlinx server is used in 
Direct IP mode and sends the sensor data to the situational awareness programming using 




Figure 35.   Vlinx ESR901W232 Wireless Serial Server 
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2. Mesh Dynamics 802.11 Wireless Access Point 
Like the sensors, the Axis 213 camera does not have wireless networking 
capabilities built-in.  The Axis camera is designed to communicate with networks using 
an RJ-45 connection. As a result, a wireless access point is needed to connect the Axis 
213 with a wireless network. The backbone of the COASTS network is an 802.11 mesh 
network.  The Mesh Dynamics multi-radio backhaul access points are used to build a 
robust, high-speed wireless mesh network.  Additionally, the Mesh Dynamics access 
points, shown in Figure 36, are used to connect the Axis 213 cameras using a standard 
Ethernet connection.  The access points allow the seamless connection of video data to 
the wireless network.  The Mesh Dynamics access points are well-suited for military 
applications because they are in weather resistant protective housings designed to operate 
in a wide range of temperatures.  Additionally, the access points provide the flexibility to 




Figure 36.   Dynamics Mesh Network Access Point 
 
 
The addition of the Vlinx Wireless Serial Server and the Mesh Dynamics Access 
Point, allow the individual components of the integrated sensor-camera to operate 
wirelessly and to form the complete system.  The entire system is composed of easily 
available COTS technology.  The prototyped network can be quickly deployed and has a 
minimal logistics footprint.  Figure 37 shows the network as deployed in the COASTS 






Figure 37.   Deployed Integrated Sensor-Camera Network 
 
 





This chapter introduced the COASTS 2006 Program.  Furthermore, the COASTS 
operational scenario was discussed in depth.  The COASTS scenario drove many of the 
requirements and design specifications of the integrated sensor-camera network.  Finally, 
this chapter provided a detailed discussion of the individual components of the 
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V. SELECTION OF METRICS AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
The thorough testing and evaluation of systems is a critical component during the 
system’s lifecycle.  The selection of metrics and the effective design of testing procedures 
aid the decision makers during the system’s lifecycle.  Metrics must be consistent, 
quantitative, and measurable.  Testing procedures must be scientifically designed to test 
the intended parameters in a meaningful manner.  This chapter introduces the qualities of 
an effective metric.  It also describes the metrics used to evaluate the prototyped sensor-
camera network.  Finally, this chapter describes the testing processes used in the 
evaluation process. 
 
A. ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE METRIC 
An effective metric is a “meaningful measure of the extent or degree to which an 
entity possesses or exhibits a particular characteristic (DACS, 2005).”  Metrics are 
designed to measure the behavior of a system objectively and quantifiably.  Although 
there are many attributes to a good metric, useful metrics have several key characteristics 
in common. 
The first characteristic of a useful metric is that it can be observed and monitored 
over time.  This characteristic requires that the metric be quantifiable.  By observing and 
meaningfully quantifying a metric, one can analyze and compare network performance.  
Metrics should be interval data to allow for calculations, graphical representations, and 
comparisons.  Nominal and ordinal values do not allow calculations and only allow for 
counting frequency of occurrences and ranking options.  Nominal- and ordinal- based 
metrics essentially provide a “snapshot” of the system at a specific time.  Although 
snapshots provide historical performance information, metrics that allow users to predict 
and to adjust performance in real-time are much more useful for networks.  Interval-
based metrics can be tracked and graphed, allowing one to characterize network 
performance visually.  Network administrators can use the easily understandable metrics 
to adjust network parameters, such as sensor location or transmission power, and to 
optimize performance. 
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The second quality of an effective metric is that it consistently measures the same 
item.  Consistently measuring the same item allows the data to be analyzed.  Changing 
what is included in the metric invalidates the entire measurement and data collection 
processes.  For example, throughput tests must use the same packet size to analyze 
bandwidth performance properly.  Using different packet sizes will result in different 
bandwidth behavior and, therefore, provide inaccurate results. 
Thirdly, taking actions to change the indicated performance must be possible.  
Metrics are often used to ensure that performance is within acceptable values.  If a metric 
exceeds the acceptable value range, there must be actions to adjust the value.  For 
example, if latency is too high, a network administrator must have actions to reduce the 
latency.  Another example might be communication range.  If the communication range 
between sensors is unacceptable, the administrator might take several actions to improve 
the range.  For instance, the administrator might increase sensor elevation or adjust the 
transmission power until the desired ranges are met.   
The final characteristic of an effective metric is that it must be able to be 
benchmarked against similar systems.  Benchmark comparisons allow trade-off analysis 
between systems.  For example, benchmark tests can compare a wireless sensor network 
to a traditional wired sensor network.  This allows administrators to determine the effect 
of making changes to a system. 
 
B. SELECTED METRICS 
The successful evaluation of the performance of the integrated sensor-camera 
network was achieved through intensive data collection and analysis.  The metric 
selection processes consisted of extensive market research and interviews with potential 
operational end-users.  The metrics selected were chosen to offer the most beneficial 
performance indications.  Additionally, metrics were selected to provide administrators 
with a tool to assist in designing the networks. 
The first metric used throughout the operational experiments was the detection 
range of the sensors.  Detection range is, perhaps, one of the most important sensor 
performance parameters.  The detection range directly affects the usefulness of a sensor 
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network, the deployment architecture, the deployment density, and the deployment 
purposes.  For example, imagine a sensor network is designed to detect vehicles at 100 
feet.  If, for some reason, the accurate detection range of the sensors falls to 80 feet, the 
network fails to meet its design objectives.  Lapses in sensor coverage in a perimeter 
defense network pose a significant security risk to the organization.  For the purposes of 
this experiment, detection ranges are measured in feet from the sensor.  Several 
controllable factors are expected to impact the detection range.  These factors include, but 
are not limited to sensor sensitivity, sensor elevation, object type, object speed, and 
environmental conditions. 
The second metric used during the operational experiments is the RF 
communications break range.  The break range is the distance at which radio 
communications between two sensors is lost.  Break range impacts the deployment 
density and design objectives.  Vehicle tracking is one potential military and law 
enforcement application of sensor networks.  In a perfect world, operators would have 
enough sensor resources to track a vehicle through the entire area of interest.  However, 
military and law enforcement agencies operate with a limited budget and often operate in 
extremely large operating areas.  Sensor networks with higher break ranges allow 
operators to spread a limited number of sensors over a larger operating area for broad 
detection and monitoring capabilities.  More accurate detection and monitoring can be 
achieved in specific areas by increasing the senor density in that area.  The inherent 
flexibility of WSNs provides the ability to tailor sensor networks to unique applications 
easily.  The controllable factors expected to impact break range are transmission power, 
receiver sensitivity, sensor elevation, terrain, and environmental conditions. 
The third metric used is RF reassociation range and is similar to break range.  The 
reassociation range is the distant at which two sensor nodes can locate each other and 
begin communicating.  This metric is an important indicator of the survivability of mesh 
networks.  WSNs are self-healing networks that often operate in adverse conditions.  It is 
critical that the failure of a single node does not have a substantially negative impact on 
performance.  Sensor network designers must ensure that a node is within the 
reassociation range of several other nodes.  Take the example of a network in which only 
one node is communicating directly to the base station.  That node is a single-point-of-
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failure.  If other nodes cannot reassociate with the base station, the entire network has the 
potential of being disconnected.  The operator will be unable to access the sensor 
information.  The controllable factors expected to impact reassociation range are identical 
to the break-range factors. 
The probability of detection is the fourth metric used.  Although probability of 
detection is difficult to measure instantaneously, it is extremely valuable when comparing 
the effectiveness of two systems and especially during network design.  As a design tool, 
the probability of detection information allows network administrators to design sensor 
network architecture quickly to meet specific needs.  As a comparison and analysis tool, 
the information allows decision makers to measure actual performance versus predicted 
performance and to choose the system that meets their needs.  With respect to detection 
probability, two levels exist.  The first level is the individual sensor-level.  This refers to 
the probability that a single sensor can detect an object.  At this level, the probability of 
detection depends largely on sensor sensitivity, object cross-section, object speed, sensor 
elevation, and the distance of the object from the sensor.  The second level is the 
network-level.  This refers to the probability that an object will be detected if it traverses 
the network as a whole.  The network-level depends on the sensor-level probability of 
detection and the node density.  This thesis focuses entirely on the sensor-level 
probability of detection. 
The fifth metric used in analyzing the integrated sensor-camera network is link 
quality.  Link quality is the ratio of the number of packets received to the number of 
packets sent between two nodes.  Link quality is an indicator of the efficiency of a 
communications connection.  Poor link quality is typically caused by network traffic 
congestion.  Congestion, in turn, causes packet loss and often lowers the throughput.  
Packet loss can also result from bit errors caused by various link imperfections and 
improperly functioning equipment (Cottrel, et al.). 
The final metric considered is the video frame rate.  Frame rate can affect the 
timeliness and usefulness of the video being provided.  In a persistent surveillance 
environment, bit rates that qualify as streaming-video are desirable.  Low frame rates 
provide the possibility that an object might pass through the camera’s field of view but no 
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image of the object will be captured.  For example, if a camera is operating at one frame 
every five seconds, an object has four seconds to pass the camera without being captured 
on video.  If the camera is operating at 30 frames per second, the object has one-thirtieth 
of a second to bypass the camera. 
 
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE 
The selection of metrics allows the system to be benchmarked, tracked, and 
monitored.  However, this only provides a quantitative comparison of the system’s 
performance.  Measuring the relative importance of aspects and to compare the over-all 
quality of a system is often necessary.  Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) and Measures 
of Performance (MoP) are qualitative and quantitative values that allow for the impartial 
trade-off analysis. 
When evaluating a system, it is important to break down the customers’ 
requirements systematically to their most basic components and to ensure that those 
requirements are addressed in engineering specifications.  This process requires both 
qualitative and quantitative measurements.  MoE values represent the customers’ 
requirements.  They are typically qualitative in nature.  Measures of Effectiveness use 
weighted values to represent the relative importance of the customers’ requirements and 
expectations.  Additionally, MoE values are often constructed in a hierarchical manner.  
For example, there might be three broad categories that are important to the user.  
Weighted values are assigned to these broad categories.  The broad categories are then 
further decomposed into smaller units.  This process repeats until the most basic 




Figure 39.   MoE Example (From: Design Methods Fact Sheet) 
 
Engineers use the Measures of Effectiveness to develop engineering 
specifications.  Measures of Performance are used to ensure the system falls within the 
technical specifications.  MoP are quantitative in nature and typically consist of an 
acceptable range around a desired value.  For example, the desired power consumption 
might be .5 watts.  The MoP might say the acceptable power consumption is between .45 




Figure 40.   MoP Example (From: Design Methods Fact Sheet) 
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Although the process and results from developing MoP and MoE appears to be 
time consuming, they prove extremely useful in developing and analyzing complex 
systems.  As systems become increasingly complex, the design and engineering processes 
become more difficult.  Developing MoP and MoE allows designers to create a product 
that meets the customers’ requirements.  Additionally, by developing MoP and MoE, 
evaluating multiple systems objectively from a qualitative and quantitative perspective is 
possible. 
 
D. SELECTED MOE AND MOP 
The selection of MoE and MoP for this thesis was conducted through market 
research and analysis of the real-world requirements for deploying an integrated sensor-
camera network.  Initial MoE were based on the needs of the COASTS 2006 scenario and 
experiments.  Also, civilian law enforcement officers along with military security and 
force protection officers provided input.  The following sections describe the developed 
MoE and MoP for the specific aspects of the integrated network. 
 
1. Sensors 
The sensor aspect of the network was the most scrutinized part of the integrated 
network because the technology is relatively new.  The weighted values were spread 
almost equally among the broad categories of sensing capabilities, deploy ability, 
interoperability, and availability.  The sensing capability requirements focused primarily 
on the types of objects they could detect, the range at which objects could be detected, 
and the types of sensors available.  The deploy ability focused primarily on the physical 
environments in which they could reliably operate the performance under adverse 
climactic conditions, battery life, and logistics footprint.  Interoperability values focused 
on the ability to work within existing infrastructure.  The availability values primarily 
focused on the COTS aspect along with the ease of configuration.  Figure 41 depicts the 














W < 10 False Detections per Hour 
N 99% Probability of Detection for Humans at 15 Feet 
N 99.5% Probability of Detection for Vehicles at 15 Feet 
W Ability to Classify an Object Based on Sensor Values 
N Maximum Detection Range > 30 Feet for Humans 
N Maximum Detection Range > 75 Feet for Vehicles 
W Maximum Communications Range >= 120 Feet 
W Maximum Reassociation Range >= 60 Feet 
W Deployable in 10 Minutes 
N Operate with 802.11 b/g 
N Multiple Sensor Types 
N Battery Life > 3 Months 
N Operate in Urban, Wooded and Open Terrains 
N Small Form Factor (Size) 
 
Figure 42.   Selected Sensor MoP 
 
2. Cameras 
The cameras’ role in the integrated network is to provide real-time visual 
information to a watch-stander.  This offers several key benefits, including visual 
verification of sensor activity, remote monitoring, and persistent surveillance.  By nature, 
humans rely heavily on visual information.  Providing real-time visual information assists 
decision makers in making accurate and timely decisions.  As a result, the MoE and MoP 
characteristics for the cameras focus primarily on deploy ability, functionality, and 
interoperability.  Deploy ability aspects include logistic footprints, climactic limitations, 
and power consumption.  Functionality values focus on performance requirements such 
as frame rates, data format, availability of compression, and the ability to pan, tilt, and 
zoom.  Interoperability values focused on the ability to communicate with various 













W MPEG Format 
N Multicast Optional 
N Control Pan/Tilt/Zoon 
N IR Illumination 
N 20 Frames per Second 
N Wireless Connectivity 
 
Figure 44.   Selected Camera MoP 
 
E. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
The testing and evaluation process are intended to ensure that a system meets both 
the technical specifications and the customer’s requirements.  During a system’s 
lifecycle, two types of testing exist.  The first type of testing is the developmental testing 
procedure.  Developmental testing is done in controlled environments to ensure that the 
components meet the technical specifications.  Developmental testing is typically 
conducted by the engineer or project manager.  Operational testing is the second form of 
testing.  Operational testing is conducted by representative users in real-world, 
operational scenarios.  The goal of operational testing is to measure performance in a 
broad range of realistic environments (Test and Evaluation Planning Guide).  Systems 
often perform satisfactorily in the statically controlled laboratory conditions but do not 
perform well in realistic operating environments. 
Properly designing the experiments is necessary to infer conclusions from the 
collected data.  Simply employing the system might be an effective proof-of-concept, 
however, it does not allow analysts to draw conclusions or create models of performance.  
Experiment design is the structured, organized method to determine the relationship 
between input factors and the affect they have on the output.  It is the strategy of 
gathering empirical knowledge through the analysis of data gathered during experiments 
instead of using theoretical models.  Designing experiments consists of four steps.  The 
first step is to define the objective of the investigation.  The second step is to define the 
variables that will be controlled during the experiment and the values the variables will 
have.  Ensuring these design variables are measurable and controllable is important.  
Moreover, the order in which the variables will be changed must be established.  The 
third step in the design of an experiment is to determine response variable.  Designers 
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must ensure that the response variables can be consistently and precisely measured.  The 
final step is to select statistical basis for the experiment.  Several statistical models serve 
as the basis of experiments and ensure that data analysis accurately represents system 
performance.  Two commonly used methods are the full-factor experiment and the Latin 
hypercube.  A full-factor experiment design tests all possible combinations of control 
variables.  Although this method ensures complete analysis of control variables, it often 
results in an exorbitant number of runs and is often cost prohibitive.  Take, for example, a 
full-factor experiment in which there are ten test parameters with five levels.  This 
experiment would require 510, or 9,765,625 design points (Bailey et al.). 
Latin hypercube sampling is based on Latin square design.  It attempts to reduce 
the number of design points needed for an experiment by ensuring that each value of a 
variable is represented in a sample.  In statistical sampling, a Latin square is a square grid 
in which each row and column is sampled once and only once.  The Latin hypercube is 
the generalization of this concept to an arbitrary number of dimensions.  Essentially, 
Latin hypercube experimental design significantly reduces the number of design points 
by creating a statistically representative subset of the full-factor design.  The flexibility of 
the Latin hypercube technique is due to fewer restrictions on the number of factors and 
levels allowed.  Latin hypercube designs are especially well suited for screening factors 
by analyzing variance techniques and regression analysis.  Using a Latin hypercube 
design, a test of ten parameters with five levels can be reduced to only 37 design points.  
For experiments in which full-factor testing is unrealistic, the efficiency and flexibility of 
Latin hypercube design is often the best method to produce statistically reliable results. 
Several experiments were designed to evaluate the feasibility of deploying the 
prototyped sensor-camera network in real-world military and law enforcement scenarios.  
Each experiment was designed to test specific Measures of Effectiveness and Measures 
of Performance.  The tests focused predominantly on sensor technologies.  Five tests 
were created specifically for the sensors.  These consisted of the maximum detection 
range tests, probability of detection tests, RF break range tests, RF reassociation range 
tests, and battery life tests.  The Latin hypercube design technique is the primary 
technique used throughout the experiments.  Several of the tests had several control  
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variables each with a large range of values.  Conducting full-factor tests would have been 
time- and cost- prohibitive.  The tests were designed to evaluate performance under real-
world deployment conditions.   
Camera testing designs were less involved.  The Axis 213 camera is a 
commercially available product commonly used in a variety of applications.  This camera 
brings an impressive array of abilities with minimal cost.  Additionally, the Axis 213 
camera is currently in operation with several law enforcement and military organizations 
around the world.  However, most organizations do not operate in environments as 
extreme as south-east Asia, Iraq, or Afghanistan.  As a result, the testing focused on 
determining the minimum frame rate need to provide useful video information and on 
ensuring performance in adverse weather. 
Finally, the integrated sensor-camera network was used in several operational 
scenarios.  The scenarios were designed to stress the network design and performance in 
ways similar to real-world deployments.  The operational scenarios were conducted as a 
part of the broader COASTS 2006 program.  A total of four scenarios were conducted 
throughout the research.  The first scenario was conducted in Point Sur, California, 
during December.  This allowed the network to be tested in colder operating 
environments than could be found around the world.  The second scenario testing was 
done at Fort Hunter Liggett.  This scenario allowed the network performance to be tested 
during moderate environmental conditions.  The third and fourth scenarios were 
conducted in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  These scenarios allowed the evaluation of network 
performance under extreme operating conditions.  Temperature and humidity ranges 
pushed the advertised technical specifications.  Temperatures often exceeded 110°F, 
which is common in war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan.  Conducting operational 
scenarios over a wide variety of environments allows verifies the models created from 
testing and also evaluates their performance in realistic deployments. 
 
1. Maximum Detection Range 
Maximum detection range tests are designed to determine the maximum range at 
which the sensor can reliably detect an object.  Detection range was measured in feet 
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from the sensor to the furthest point at which the object could be detected.  Because the 
Crossbow MSP410 motes have both passive infrared sensors and magnetometers, the test 
was duplicated to focus on each sensing capability individually.  Several input variables 
were identified and defined.  These input variables include: sensor elevation, object 
cross-section, object speed, ambient temperature, pressure, and humidity.  Table 7 depicts 
the input variables, the unit of measurement, and the range of each variable investigated 
during testing. 
 
VARIABLE UNIT OF MEASUREMENT RANGE OF VALUES 
Sensor Elevation Inches (in) above ground level 0 to 12 inches 
Object Speed Miles per hour (mph) 0 to 50 mph 
1: Human 
2: Toyota Tacoma 
Object Cross Section Square inches or square feet 
Three Object types used to 
simulate traffic  3: Ford F-250 
Air Temperature Degrees Fahrenheit 30 to 120 F 
Atmospheric Pressure Inches Mercury (inHg) 29 to 32 inHg 
Relative Humidity Percent 5 to 100 % 
Time of Day* Hour 0700 – 2300 
   
NOTE: Since environmental conditions could not be controlled, “Time of Day” was created so tests were 
done under a variety of conditions.  The environmental conditions were recorded for further analysis. 
 
Table 7. Controlled Variables for Maximum Detection Range Tests 
 
Sensor elevation is hypothesized to affect detection range by raising the sensors 
above environmental obstacles.  Raising the sensors above ground level increases the 
ability to detect around obstacle such as stones or logs.  Additionally, objects such as 
vehicles and people tend to have more mass above ground level than at ground level.  
There is, however, a practical limit to sensor elevation.  The requirement for covertness 
prohibits placing a sensor at five feet above ground level.  Doing so would make the 
sensor easily viewable and would allow suspects to avoid the sensor grid.  The sensor 
elevation was limited to one foot above ground level.  This allows the sensor to be 
elevated without making them easily visible.  Sensor elevation was measured in inches 
above ground level.   
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Object cross-section is hypothesized to affect the detection range by increasing 
the size of the target.  Obviously, detecting a large object is easier than detecting a small 
object.  Increasing the cross-section of the target should increase the range at which the 
target can be detected.  For example, a delivery truck should be more visible than a 
human simply because the truck takes up more space.  Three “classes” of objects were 
used throughout the experiments that represent the type of objects that would be of 
interest during operational deployment.  The first object class was a human.  The person 
used during the experiment was roughly six feet tall and 180 pounds.  The second object 
used was a small truck.  As some tests were conducted in America and others in 
Thailand, using the same truck in all of the experiments was impossible.  However, the 
trucks used were nearly identical in size.  For example, the truck used in America was the 
Toyota Tacoma Extended Cab.    The final class of object was the large truck.  The large 
truck is to simulate a van or truck which might be moving personnel or equipment.  The 
primary vehicle used was the Ford F-250.  A twelve-passenger van was also used and 
produced similar results because it was roughly the same size.   
The third input variable was the object speed.  Object speed is thought to affect 
the detection range by reducing the amount of time an object is in the detection area of 
the sensors.  It is hypothesized that the faster an object is moving, the closer it must be to 
be detected.  Since humans cannot travel as quickly as vehicles, the speed for humans 
was divided into three categories: 0 to 2 miles per hour, 2 to 4 miles per hour, and 
running (4 to 6 miles per hour).  The range of vehicular speeds was from 5 to 50 miles 
per hour.   
The ambient temperature, pressure and humidity are factors that are not 
controllable in operational testing.  Conceptually, the temperature in areas of operation 
could easily range from 25°F to 150° F.  Atmospheric pressure could vary between 29.0 
inches mercury and 32.0 inches mercury.  Humidity could easily vary from 5% to 100%.  
Since the environments could not be controlled, they were recorded and used during the 
analysis process.  To ensure that a wide variety of environmental conditions were 
experienced, the testing was spread over five months and various locations.  Additionally, 
a “time of day” variable was developed in an attempt to further increase the conditions 
experienced.  The variable established sixteen hours during which experiments would be 
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conducted.  The “work day” started at seven o’clock in the morning and was conducted 
until eleven o’clock at night.  This reduced the possibility of inadvertently limiting the 
environmental conditions by conducting tests at the same time during the day. 
Conducting a full-factor test would have resulted in an exorbitant number of 
design points.  Using a spreadsheet program developed by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 
Cioppa, a Latin hypercube sample was created.  This allowed the experiment to be 
completed with only 17 design points.   
Physically conducting the experiments consisted of several steps.  First, the 
needed equipment was set up.  The BS was attached to a laptop running the MOTE-View 
and Surge View software.  Then a mote was activated and the connection to the BS was 
verified.  Next, the sensor was raised to the indicated sensor elevation.  Then the object 
moved toward the sensor until detection was indicated on the software.  Doing this 
indicated the maximum distance the object could be detected.  Next, the object moved 
roughly twenty feet closer to the sensor and turned 90° so that the direction of travel was 
perpendicular to the sensor.  The object would then repeatedly travel perpendicular to the 
sensor at the indicated speed.  If the sensor detected the object, the object moved farther 
away from the sensor.  This process was repeated until the maximum detection range was 
reached.  Finally, all the required information was recorded.  This process was completed 
several times for each design point.   
 
2. Probability of Detection 
The probability of detection tests are designed to develop a tool to help network 
architects custom design a network.  Understanding what factors affect the probability of 
detection and the impact the variables have on the detection probability at various 
distances assists network planners to ensure they achieve the desired goals.  The control 
variables for the probability test are exactly the same as the variables for the maximum 
detection range.  Exactly the same design points were used.  Only two significant 
differences were introduced.  First, was deciding the distances and the intervals for the 
experiments.  After considering possible deployment scenarios and analyzing the RF 
reassociation ranges, several distances were selected for further analysis.  The distances 
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selected were 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 feet.  These selected distances 
provided information on common deployment scenarios for perimeter defense, vehicle 
detection, and dense deployment.  The second difference was the number of times the 
object moved perpendicularly past the sensor.  For this experiment, the object would 
cross the sensor coverage area.  Detection or non-detection was recorded.  This process 
was repeated 100 times for each design point.  After all the design points were 
accomplished for a given distance, the entire process was repeated for the next distance.   
 
3. Break Range 
Understanding the maximum reliable RF communications range of a network has 
significant effects on network design.  The need to understand the communications break 
range is compounded by the need for survivability.  Since network reliability and 
survivability often depend on the ability to communicate with multiple nodes, 
understanding how communications range changes greatly improves one’s ability to 
design a robust and reliable network while maximizing the size of the sensor grid.   
Although the complete understanding of RF propagation is not the primary focus 
of this thesis, the radio range affects network performance and is investigated.  A 
thorough analysis of RF properties at 433 MHz is complex enough to warrant its own 
thesis.  However, general performance is addressed to determine the feasibility of 
deploying the prototyped network in real-life environments.  Several factors are known to 
affect RF communications range, including terrain, transmission power, receiver 
sensitivity, RF interference, antenna configurations, elevation, and environmental 
conditions.   Since this thesis focuses on COTS technology, several of these factors could 
be considered negligible or constant.  These tests focus on the effects of transmission 
elevation and environmental conditions on the break range.  To eliminate the effect of 
terrain, all tests were conducted on a flat road with no objects between the two 
transmitters.  Receiver sensitivity, transmission power, and antenna configuration effects 
were eliminated by using standard configuration from the manufacturer and ensuring that 
the transmission powers were all set to the same level.  Additionally, the same two nodes 
were used throughout the tests.  Before all tests were conducted, the area was surveyed 
using a spectrum analyzer to ensure that no other RF activity would interfere.  To ensure 
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exposure to a variety of environmental conditions, a complete round of testing was 
conducted twice monthly and also in Thailand to allow exposure to extreme heat levels.  
Table 8 depicts the variables used in the break range tests. 
 
VARIABLE UNIT OF MEASUREMENT RANGE OF VALUES 
Sensor Elevation Inches (in) above Ground Level 0 to 12 inches 
Terrain N/A Flat Road 
Transmission Power Decibels Standard Configuration 
from Manufacturer 
Receiver Sensitivity Decibels  Standard Configuration 
from Manufacturer 
RF Interference1 Decibels N/A 
Air Temperature Degrees Fahrenheit 30 to 120 F 
Atmospheric Pressure Inches Mercury (inHg) 29 to 32 inHg 
Relative Humidity Percent 5 to 100 % 
Time of Day2 Hour 0700 to 2300 
   
NOTES 
1. Prior to conducting tests, a spectrum analyzer was used to ensure no RF activity in the frequencies was 
used by the Crossbow Sensors. 
2. Since environmental conditions could not be controlled, “Time of Day” was created so that tests were 
done under a variety of conditions.  The environmental conditions were recorded for further analysis. 
 
Table 8. Break Range Testing Variables 
 
Initial empirical evidence showed that the break range between two motes was 
different than that of a mote and the base station.  As a result, two separate break range 
tests were conducted.  The first break range test was the Mote-Mote break range.  The 
second test was the BS-Mote break range. 
The first step of the Mote-Mote testing process was to initialize the components.  
This involves connecting the BS to the laptop, powering-up the motes, and verifying 
communication through the Surge View software.  Next, the motes were placed at the 
indicated elevation and set at a distance of ten feet apart.  Next, Surge View was checked 
to verify that the farthest mote was communicating with the closest mote instead of with 
the base station.  After this was verified, the link quality was recorded.  The furthest mote 
was then moved five feet away.  Link quality was again recorded.  This process was 
repeated until link quality reached zero and the software indicated the connection was  
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lost.  The environmental data were recorded, concluding one run of the experiment.  A 
total of ten runs were conducted at each elevation.  Next, the entire process was repeated 
at a sensor elevation of six inches and at one foot. 
The BS-Mote break-range testing procedures were virtually identical to the Mote-
Mote procedures.  First, the components were initialized and placed at the indicated 
elevations.  Next the single mote was placed ten feet from the BS.  The connection was 
verified and the link quality was recorded.  The mote was then moved five more feet 
away.  This was repeated until the connection was lost.  Environmental conditions were 
recorded and one run of the experiment completed.  Again, a total of ten runs were 
completed for each elevation.  The entire process was then repeated at elevations of six 
inches and at one foot. 
 
4. Reassociation Range 
As with the RF break range, understanding the reassociation range of the motes is 
an important tool for planning a wireless sensor network.  The survivability and self-
healing characteristics of WSNs are extremely important for tactical deployments.  The 
hostile conditions─such as explosions, sand storms, and enemies tampering with 
equipment─make the failure of one or more sensor nodes extremely likely.  The network 
must be able to overcome the loss nodes and continue functioning.  Understanding how 
the reassociation range can change is a useful planning tool to ensure the network can 
self-heal in a timely manner. 
The reassociation range tests investigated the same parameters and followed the 
same constraints as the break-range tests.  An additional constraint was placed on the 
time given for reassociation.  In a tactical scenario, timely information is critical.  The 
time for reassociation was limited to ten minutes because it was sufficient to allow the 
network to heal, but not long enough to present a significant loss in tactical functionality.  
Table 9 details the variables used in the reassociation range tests.  As with the break 
range, initial observations indicated the reassociation ranges between two motes and a 





VARIABLE UNIT OF MEASUREMENT RANGE OF VALUES 
Sensor Elevation Inches (in) above Ground Level 0 to 12 inches 
Terrain N/A Flat Road 
Transmission Power Decibels Standard Configuration 
from Manufacturer 
Receiver Sensitivity Decibels  Standard Configuration 
from Manufacturer 
Time to Reaassociate Minutes 0 to 10 minutes 
RF Interference1 Decibels N/A 
Air Temperature Degrees Fahrenheit 30 to 120 F 
Atmospheric Pressure Inches Mercury (inHg) 29 to 32 inHg 
Relative Humidity Percent 5 to 100 % 
Time of Day2 Hour 0700 to 2300 
   
NOTES 
1. Prior to conducting tests, a spectrum analyzer was used to ensure no RF activity in the frequencies was 
used by the Crossbow Sensors. 
2. Since environmental conditions could not be controlled, “Time of Day” was created so tests were done 
under a variety of conditions.  The environmental conditions were recorded for further analysis. 
 
Table 9. Break Range Testing Variables 
 
The tests relied on initial analysis of the break-range tests to estimate how far the 
nodes would need to be stretched apart before the link was lost.  First, the components 
were initialized and the connection verified.  The farthest mote was iteratively stretched 
until the RF link was lost.  The mote was then moved five feet closer to the other mote or 
BS.  If the connection was re-established within ten minutes, the distance was recorded as 
the reassociation range.  If the connection was not restored, the mote was moved back to 
the original starting position.  The nodes were then stretched apart until the link was lost 
again.  The mote was moved an additional five feet closer.  This process was repeated 
until the reassociation range was established.  The entire process was repeated ten times 
at each sensor elevation.     
 
5. Battery Life 
The battery life of the nodes in the integrated network determines the effective 
on-station time.  Long stand-alone on-station times are required to achieve the 
Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG) envisioned by Sea Power 21 and Joint Vision 2020.  
From a network management point-of-view, the number of nodes needed to form large, 
densely populated sensor grids also encourages long battery life.  For example, replacing 
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the power source on 15,000 sensors every two days is not only economically unfeasible, 
but it also man-power intensive.  From a tactical point-of-view, long on-station time is a 
requirement.  The network must be rapidly deployable and need no on-site interaction for 
extended periods of time.  Returning to replace power sources will alert the enemy of the 
location of the sensors.  The enemy will then simply avoid the sensor grid, rendering it 
tactically useless.  In an environment such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Thailand, insurgents 
might place snipers near the nodes to deter anyone replacing a power source.   
The factors that are known to affect power consumption in sensor networks were 
discussed in Chapter II.  However, the objective of this test is not to determine the factors 
that affect power consumption.  Nor was the objective to establish the effect of changing 
a parameter on battery life.  The objective was to discover the on-station time that can be 
expected from an unchanged system from the manufacturers. 
Two constraints were used on the test.  The first constraint was that the BS was 
powered from a wall socket, essentially giving the BS an indefinite power supply.  This 
was considered acceptable because the objective of the test focused on the sensor nodes.  
However, failure of the BS would prohibit the Crossbow sensors from communicating 
with an external network, therefore, rendering it ineffective.  The second constraint was 
the network was considered ineffective once six of the eight sensors died.  Although data 
feeds from two sensors are better than no sensor data at all, two sensors would not be able 
to represent the sensor grid sufficiently.  For example, if a network designed for 
perimeter defense lost 75 percent of the sensors, it would not provide adequate coverage.  
Large coverage gaps would render the network tactically useless. 
The testing procedure for the battery life test is straight forward.  Fresh AA 
batteries were placed in each of the eight motes from the Crossbow MSP410 set.  The BS 
was connected to a laptop running MOTE-View and the motes were turned on and placed 
in an environment with a moderate amount of traffic.  The motes were allowed to run 
until six of the eight consumed the power source.  The elapsed time is recorded as the 




F. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
The tests mentioned above were carefully designed to produce results that could 
be considered statistically representative of performance.  The results can be the basis for 
determining the feasibility of deploying the network in military and law enforcement 
applications.  However, several other characteristics are of general interest in evaluating 
network performance and design.  Although no experiments were designed to test these 
characteristics directly, they were observed numerous times in a variety of environmental 
conditions and operational scenarios.   
The first observed characteristic was performance in three common operating 
environments.  The three environments were chosen because they are commonly visited 
by military and law enforcement forces.  The first environment observed was an “open” 
environment such as a field or a road.  All of the tests described previously were 
conducted in an open environment.  This environment is commonly encountered in 
perimeter defense and object tracking applications.  The second environment was the 
urban environment.  The urban environment would most commonly be encountered by 
law enforcement agencies.  An integrated sensor-camera network can also be employed 
by military forces in urban environments such as Baghdad, Iraq.  The final environment 
observed was the wooded environment.  A sensor-camera network might commonly be 
deployed in a wooded environment for perimeter defense, environmental monitoring, and 
even “smart obstacle” scenarios.  Understanding how the network performs in these 
environments is useful in planning, deploying, and evaluating the network. 
The second observation was the effect of deploying the network in uneven 
environments.  All of the tests were conducted on flat ground.  Realistically, the network 
will be deployed on hills, in ravines, and on uneven ground.  Having a general idea of 
how the network will perform in such environments is also useful in evaluating the 
network.   
The final general observation is the effect of rain on performance.  A sensor-
camera network will be deployed in places that undergo the gamut of weather 
phenomenon.  It is important that the network be able to perform satisfactorily in all 
conditions.  Rain will not stop an enemy from attacking and must not significantly 
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degrade network performance.  Since it was impossible to control rain for testing 
purposes, performance in rain was observed on several occasions.  The performance 
objectives were to determine the effect on detection and communication ranges. 
This chapter introduced and discussed the processes of testing and evaluating a 
system during the development phase.  Thorough testing and evaluating systems is a 
critical component during the system’s lifecycle.  The attributes of an effective metric, 
measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance were introduced.  The metrics, 
MoP and MoE used to evaluate the integrated sensor-camera were described.  The 
specific tests and processes were described in detail.  Finally, this chapter concluded by 
describing general performance characteristics that will be used to help develop, plan, 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
This chapter discusses the results from the experiments designed to evaluate the 
performance of the integrated sensor-camera network described in Chapter V.  All tests 
were conducted according to the process described in Chapter IV.  The experiments are 
categorized into detection ranges, probability of detection, communication ranges, battery 
life, and general observations.    
 
A. DETECTION RANGE TESTS 
The sensor subsystem of the Crossbow MSP410CA Wireless Security Mote Kit 
was tested in depth.  The objective of the detection range tests was to determine the 
maximum range at which the sensor can reliably detect an object.  Furthermore, a Latin 
hypercube design was used to create a model for predicting the maximum detection range 
based on sensor elevation, object cross-section, object speed, ambient temperature, 
pressure, and humidity.  Because the sensing subsystem contains multiple sensors, the 
tests were repeated for both the PIR sensor and for the magnetometer.  The results are 
discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
1. PIR Detection Range Results 
The PIR sensor subsystem was tested against objects ranging from personnel to 
large trucks.  Tests were conducted under a variety of object speeds, sensor elevations, 
and weather conditions.  Successful tests indicate the maximum detection range for a 
human of 45 feet and a maximum detection range of large trucks of 148 feet.  The results 



















45.3 12 3 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
27.9 3 3 9 75.1 29.76 70.6 
35.7 5 1 4 70.6 30.15 33.4 
38.4 8 2 16 77 29.97 94.9 
42.1 11 2 2 59.3 30.2 51.4 
32.6 4 2 13 57.4 30.00 94.1 
28.1 2 3 5 54.5 30.12 82.8 
35.2 11 3 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 
38.5 6 2 8 88 29.80 77.2 
25.6 0 1 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 
31.4 9 1 7 106.8 29.57 20.3 
39.5 7 3 12 41.8 29.62 95.1 
38.1 5 2 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
26.2 1 2 14 93.6 29.74 46.7 
37.7 8 2 3 81.4 29.88 84.2 
39.3 10 1 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 
27.5 2 2 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 
Note: 
1. Speed categories are defined as follows: 1 represents 0 to 2 mph, 2 represents 2 to 4 mph, 3 
represents 4 to 6 mph. 
2. “Time of Day” was created so tests were done under a variety of weather conditions. 
 
Table 10. PIR Detection Range Results for a Human 
 
Once collected, the data were analyzed using linear regression and Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) techniques.  The initial analysis resulted in the following 
relationship: 
Human PIR Detection Range = 8.5 + (1.47 x Sensor Elevation) – (0.357 x Speed) – 
(0.0828 x Temperature) + (0.70 x Pressure) + (0.0402 x Humidity). 
Furthermore, ANOVA analysis shows that the sensor elevation and ambient 
temperature are the two most significant predictors of the detection range.  Of the 
investigated predictors, sensor elevation and temperature had the most statistically 
significant impact on the detection range.  Given a ten-percent significance level, the 




Human PIR Detection Range = 33.8 + (1.42 x Sensor Elevation) – (0.0828 x Temperature). 
 
This result corroborates expectations.  Raising the sensor from the ground 
prevents obstruction from environmental obstacles and brings the sensor closer to the 
center of mass of the human, which will increase the likelihood the object is detected.  
Due to the nature of the PIR sensor in the motes, the ambient temperature also is 
expected to impact the detection capabilities.  As the temperature increases, the PIR 
sensor cannot easily distinguish between the heat emitted by an object and the ambient 





















150.6 12 3 19 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
86.2 3 3 8 9 75.1 29.76 70.6 
79.2 5 1 11 4 70.6 30.15 33.4 
110.8 8 2 13 16 77 29.97 94.9 
124.1 11 2 39 2 59.3 30.2 51.4 
93.8 4 2 50 13 57.4 30.00 94.1 
109.0 2 3 33 5 54.5 30.12 82.8 
143.6 11 3 30 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 
104.0 6 2 28 8 88 29.80 77.2 
72.1 0 1 36 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 
86.4 9 1 47 7 106.8 29.57 20.3 
100.5 7 3 44 12 41.8 29.62 95.1 
101.4 5 2 42 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
80.6 1 2 16 14 93.6 29.74 46.7 
102.4 8 2 5 3 81.4 29.88 84.2 
73.7 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 
60.3 2 2 25 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 
Note: 
1. Cross Section values are categorical.  1 represents a small car, 2 represents a small truck, 3 
represents a large truck. 
2. “Time of Day” was created so tests were done under a variety of weather conditions. 
 
Table 11. PIR Vehicle Detection Range Results 
 
The data analysis for vehicle detection using the PIR sensor was conducted in the 
same manner as for human detection.  The resulting equation for vehicle detection, 
shown below, again confirmed expectations that sensor elevation and object cross section 
have the most significant impact on detection capabilities. 
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Vehicle Detection Range = -185 + (3.75 x Sensor Elevation) + (19.3 x Cross Section) + 
(0.178 x Speed) – (0.019 x Temperature) + (7.6 x Pressure) – (0.149 x Humidity). 
 
However, ANOVA analysis shows that the speed, temperature, pressure, and 
humidity predictors were not statistically significant.  Assuming a ten-percent 
significance level, the above equation can be reduced to: 
  
Vehicle Detection Range = 37.7 + (3.94 x Sensor Elevation) + (18.0 x Cross Section). 
 
The resulting equation appears to support the data provided by Crossbow, which 
claims that PIR performance is dependent upon ambient environmental conditions, 
velocity, and the size of the object.  Experiments showed the most dominant predictors of 
vehicle detection range are sensor elevation and the cross section of the vehicle.  One 
would expect that object speed is a statistically significant determinant of detection range.  
However, ANOVA analysis showed that object speed was not significant at the ten- 
percent level.  This result was collaborated by follow-up tests, which showed that the 
detection range with the object traveling 5 mph was nearly identical to the detection 
range of the object traveling 65 mph. 
 
2. Magnetometer Detection Range Results 
As with the PIR subsystem, the magnetometer tests were designed to determine 
the maximum detection range based on object cross sections, object speeds, sensor 
elevations, and weather conditions.  Conceptually, a magnetic detection can be used to 
classify an object detected by a sensor grid.  As a result, the ability to model detection 
range is also important.  Magnetic detection range tests were conducted using the same 
three vehicles used in the PIR detection range tests.  Successful tests indicate detection of 
a large truck at 58 feet, a small truck at 45 feet, and a car at 32 feet.  Table 12 presents the 























58.9 12 3 19 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
52.4 3 3 8 9 75.1 29.76 70.6 
31.2 5 1 11 4 70.6 30.15 33.4 
43.9 8 2 13 16 77 29.97 94.9 
45.3 11 2 39 2 59.3 30.2 51.4 
42.7 4 2 50 13 57.4 30.00 94.1 
51.7 2 3 33 5 54.5 30.12 82.8 
58.2 11 3 30 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 
43.2 6 2 28 8 88 29.80 77.2 
31.9 0 1 36 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 
31.9 9 1 47 7 106.8 29.57 20.3 
56.1 7 3 44 12 41.8 29.62 95.1 
42.9 5 2 42 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
41.0 1 2 16 14 93.6 29.74 46.7 
43.4 8 2 5 3 81.4 29.88 84.2 
32.4 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 
41.9 2 2 25 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 
Note: 
1. Cross Section values are categorical.  1 represents a small car, 2 represents a small truck, 3 
represents a large truck. 
2. “Time of Day” was created so tests were done under a variety of weather conditions. 
 
Table 12. Magnetometer Detection Rang Results 
 
The magnetometer detection range results were analyzed using the same ANOVA 
and regression analysis techniques.  Analysis produced the following prediction equation: 
 
Magnetic Detection Range = 5.5 + (0.404 x Sensor Elevation) + (11.7 x Cross Section) 
 + (0.0136 x Speed) – (0.0200 x Temperature) + (.482 x Pressure) – (0.0136 x Humidity). 
 
The equation can be simplified upon further review.  Only sensor elevation and 
cross section are significant at the ten-percent level.  The equation produced, combined 
with ANOVA analysis, confirm that the most significant determinant in the magnetic 
detection range is the cross section of the vehicle.  Larger vehicles often contain more 
metallic parts, increasing the distance that the sensor can detect an object.  The analysis 
shows that the magnetic detection ranges can be predicted based upon the following 
equation: 
Magnetic Detection Range = 17.6 + (0.415 x  Sensor Elevation)+ (11.6 x  Cross Section). 
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The various detection range results supported the original hypotheses and 
technical information provided by Crossbow.  As expected, sensor elevation has a 
significant positive relationship with detection distances.  Additionally, the size and 
physical composition of the object significantly impact the maximum detection distance.  
The sensor subsystem met or exceeded the selected MoE and MoP concerning maximum 
detection ranges.  The maximum detection range for humans during the experiments was 
consistently over 30 feet.  The MoP set a minimum threshold for human detection at 30 
feet.  Likewise, vehicle detection far exceeded the 75 foot threshold established by the 
MoP.  The PIR sensor was able to detect small vehicles well over 80 feet and consistently 
detected vehicles at distances over 105 feet.  These values also exceeded the values 
published by Crossbow in technical documentation.  Additionally, the magnetometer 
could to detect vehicles at over 40 feet.  This shows that the PIR and magnetic sensors 
can be used to distinguish between human and vehicular traffic easily.  However, for both 
PIR and magnetometer detection range results, there appears to be an absolute maximum 
detection range at which raising the sensor elevation will not increase performance.  For 
example, the PIR sensor never detected a human at ranges over 48 feet, regardless of the 
sensor’s elevation.  These limits are determined by the sensitivity and nature of the sensor 
subsystems. 
 
B. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION RESULTS 
Understanding how network parameters affect the probability of detection is an 
important ability during sensor network planning.  The probability of detection 
experiments were designed to provide network engineers a tool to help design a network 
to meet the intended needs properly.  Tests were conducted at specified intervals using 
the same design points as the detection range tests.  Each design point was repeated 100 
times to produce a probability value for each design point.  The complete results of the 
experiments can be found in Appendix B.  At each specified distance, the design points 
were analyzed using linear regression to create a prediction equation.  The final equations 




Pd 10 Feet = 0.974 + (0.000615 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00723 x Cross Section) 
Pd 15 Feet = 0.967 + (0.000663 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00957 x Cross Section) 
Pd 20 Feet = 0.967 + (0.00143 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00705 x Cross Section) 
Pd 30 Feet = 0.964 + (0.00178 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.0060 x Cross Section) 
Pd 40 Feet = 0.959 + (0.00123 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00525 x Cross Section) 
Pd 50 Feet = 0.907 + (0.002277 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00889 x Cross Section) 
Pd 60 Feet = 0.908 + (0.00175 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00931 x Cross Section) 
Pd 70 Feet = 0.893 + (0.00204 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.0104 x Cross Section) 
Pd 80 Feet = 0.893 + (0.00204 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.0104 x Cross Section). 
 
The results from the probability of detection experiments again confirmed the 
initial theory that sensor elevation and object cross section have the most significant 
impact on the probability of detection.  This was observed during the experiments and 
confirmed after linear regression and ANOVA analysis.  As the distance from the sensor 
increased, the equation’s constant decreased, which indicates the overall probability of 
detection is decreasing. At the same time the coefficients for the predictors became 
larger, indicating the sensor’s elevation and the object’s cross section were impacting the 
probability of detection more noticeably.  At large distances, the object’s cross section 
became the most significant predictor.  This fact validates the theory that larger objects 
are more easily detected at long distances. 
 
C. BREAK RANGE RESULTS 
The self-healing nature of sensor networks requires the nodes to be capable of 
communicating with multiple other nodes.  As a result, understanding the maximum 
communications distance is a useful tool for planning sensor-camera networks.  The 
break range tests were designed to discover the relationship between maximum 
communications distances and various determinants such as sensor elevation and 
environmental conditions.  The break range tests were conducted with sensor elevations  
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at ground level, six inches, and one foot above ground level.  Additionally, all tests were 
conducted on flat asphalt roads to reduce any terrain interference.  The following sections 
describe the results for mote-to-mote and mote-to-base station experiments. 
 
1. Mote-to-Mote Break Range Results 
Empirical evidence showed that Mote-to-Mote communication distances were 
farther than Mote-to-Base Station distances.  Table 13 shows the average result for each 
elevation.  The complete results can be found in Appendix B.  Mote-to-Mote 
communication distances increased significantly as sensor elevation increased.  
Furthermore, regression analysis showed that the environmental conditions do not have a 
statistically significant affect on the communications distance.  However, communication 
distances fell significantly during rain showers.  Experiments were not conducted when it 
was raining.  The prediction equation shows the following relationship: 
 
Mote-to-Mote Break Range = 72.7 + (5.19 x Elevation). 
 
Elevation Distance Temperature Pressure Humidity 
0 75.30 69.82 29.66 66.27 
6 98.75 70.58 29.81 65.87 
12 137.60 73.69 29.95 61.54 
 
Table 13. Average Mote-to-Mote Break Range Results 
 
These results confirm the expectations that the most significant determinant of 
communications distance is sensor elevation.  Elevation is known to have a significant 
impact on line-of-sight transmission distance.  Raising the transmission elevation reduces 
scattering, absorption, and interference from the environment.  One would expect that 
humidity and transmission distance are inversely related.  As the moisture level in the air 
increases RF scattering and absorption should also increase.  Surprisingly, the humidity 
level did not have a significant impact on transmission distance.  Although the 
experimental results fall well short of the advertised communications distance, the 
maximum mote-to-mote communications distance is acceptable based on the detection 
ranges.  Even at ground level, the break range was greater than most maximum detection  
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ranges.  However, it is important to note that the break range is the maximum range 
achieved.  Networks nodes should be placed within the reassociation range to increase 
reliability and survivability. 
 
2. Mote-to-Base Station Break Range Results 
The Mote-to-Base Station experiments were designed to help determine how far 
the sensor nodes can be placed from the base station and still communicate with it.  
Understanding the Mote-to-Base Station break range is important because multiple nodes 
must be able to communicate directly to the base station to ensure the survivability of the 
network.  The experiments were conducted in the same manner as the mote-to-mote 
experiments.   
The mote-to-base station break range results were typically 10 to 20 percent 
shorter than the mote-to-mote results.  The exact reasons for these differences are not 
known, but it is hypothesized that the BS’s responsibilities result in lower effective 
transmission power.  Table 14 shows the average result for each elevation.  The complete 
results can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Elevation Distance Temperature Pressure Humidity 
0 52.1 70.95 29.77 65.59 
6 89.2 73.21 29.95 66.23 
12 115.75 72.55 29.70 63.47 
 
Table 14. Average Mote-to-BS Break Range Results 
 
The results of the mote-to-base station test results again confirmed that elevation 
was the most statistically significant determinant of the break range.  Regression analysis 
showed that there are two significant inputs based on the following relationships: 
 
Mote-to-Base Station Break Range = 60.1 + (5.29 x Elevation) – (0.0944 x Humidity). 
 
The first statistically significant variable is the elevation.  Additionally, the mote-
to-base station break range results indicated that humidity was statistically significant.  
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The analysis showed that humidity and break range are negatively correlated.  As the 
humidity increases, the break range decreases.  This supports existing research, which 
shows that low frequency RF communications are slightly degraded as humidity 
increases.   
The break range results satisfied the specified MoE and MOP.  Though the 
communication ranges at ground level were not excellent, performance increased 
significantly as the mote’s elevation increased.  The best performance from both the 
sensing and communications points of view occurred at one foot elevation.  From a 
tactical perspective, a one-foot elevation is acceptable because it significantly increases 
performance but does not reduce any covertness. 
 
D. REASSOCIATION RANGE RESULTS 
Understanding the reassociation range of the sensor network is an important part 
of evaluating and designing an integrated sensor-camera network.  The inherent 
applications of a sensor-camera network require redundant communications paths and the 
ability to self-heal.  As with the break range experiments, initial evidence showed that the 
reassociation range differed for mote-to-mote and mote-to-base station scenarios.  The 
following sections describe the results for both scenarios. 
 
1. Mote-to-Mote Reassociation Range Results 
Like the break range results, the mote-to-mote reassociation results were farther 
than the mote-to-base station results.  The same control variables were used for the 
reassociation experiments.  Table 15 summarizes the average results the mote-to-mote 







Elevation Distance Temperature Pressure Humidity 
0 45.25 71.53 29.64 66.02 
6 51.5 68.93 29.80 65.87 
12 63.8 73.64 29.99 61.79 
 
Table 15. Mote-to-Mote Reassociation Range Results 
 
After applying linear regression techniques to the data, the following relationship 
was discovered: 
 
Mote-to-Mote Reassociation Range = 48.1 + (1.52 x Elevation) – (0.0569 x Humidity). 
 
The resulting prediction equation again contains two significant inputs.  The equation 
again supported the hypothesis that elevation significantly impacts the reassociation 
range.  It further showed the small negative correlation between humidity and 
transmission ranges.   
 
2. Mote-to-Base Station Reassociation Range Results 
The mote-to-base station reassociation ranges were slightly shorter than the mote-
to-mote results.  The exact cause of the difference is not known, but it is hypothesized 
that the roles and responsibilities of the base station reduce the available energy and time 
for reassociation.  The average results for the mote-to-base station results are summarized 
in Table 16 and the complete results can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Elevation Distance Temperature Pressure Humidity 
0 37.5 71.52 29.84 63.09 
6 47.1 70.62 29.75 65.61 
12 54.66 71.95 29.84 64.98 
 
Table 16. Mote-to-Base Station Reassociation Range Results 
 
Linear regression analysis yielded a prediction equation with two statistically 
significant inputs.  The first input is elevation, which has a strong positive correlation 
with reassociation range.  This relationship is expected, especially given the results of all 
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the other experiments.  The second significant predictor is humidity, which is weakly and  
negatively correlated.  The final prediction equation is as follows: 
 
Reassociation Range = 41.1 + (1.44 x Elevation) – (0.0516 x Humidity). 
 
From an operational perspective, the mote-to-base station reassociation range 
results are lacking.  The results indicate that the Crossbow sensor suite does not provide 
the needed range to satisfy the MoP and MoE.  This might be due in part to the time limit 
applied to the experiment.  Possibly, the results might be significantly farther, given no 
time constraints.  However, the time constraints used are acceptable, given the time 
sensitive constraints of tactical military and law enforcement applications. 
 
E. BATTERY LIFE RESULTS 
The battery life directly influences the feasibility of deploying a sensor-camera 
grid in military and law enforcement applications.  To be truly effective, the network 
must have long on-station times with minimal human interaction or monitoring.  The 
battery life tests showed that the average expected on-station time for the prototyped 
network is 90 hours or 3.75 days.  The maximum battery life achieved during the tests 
was 4.5 days while the shortest battery life was 1.9 days.  The variation in lifetime is 
explained by the inability to control the traffic surrounding the testing area.  During times 
of heavy traffic, the nodes report detections more frequently.  The increase in 
transmission significantly increases power consumption and, therefore, lowers battery 
life.   
The battery life tests clearly show the prototyped network is not suitable for most 
military and law enforcement applications.  The MoP and MoE call for a minimum on-
station time of three months, with six months to one year desirable.  The prototyped 
network falls significantly short of the desired performance.  The battery life tests show 
that the designed network is not appropriate for applications requiring long on-station 
times.  However, the network is well suited for applications that require short on-station 
times.  For example, the prototyped sensor-camera network is well suited for law 
enforcement perimeter protection scenarios because they are typically short lived. 
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F. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Several general performance characteristics were observed to help evaluate the 
prototyped network yet were not directly scientifically tested.  These general observations 
focus on the impact of the operational environment, terrain, and rain.  Understanding how 
these factors affect network performance assists in determining the feasibility of 
deploying the network for military and law enforcement applications. 
The first observed characteristic was performance in open, wooded, and urban 
environments.  In open environments, the performance was nearly identical to the 
performance established during the tests described above.  The radio ranges and detection 
ranges were the greatest in an open environment.  The second environment was the 
wooded environment.  Performance in the wooded environment degraded slightly due to 
interference from trees and shrubs.  Maximum radio ranges decreased by roughly 10 to 
15 feet.  However, the sensor grid was able to cover roughly the same total area due to 
the ability to cluster and rout message traffic effectively.  Detection ranges decreased by 
roughly five to ten feet due to more interference by the terrain.  As expected, as the 
wooded environment became denser, performance degraded significantly.  The final 
operating environment was the urban terrain.  Radio range results decreased by 20 to 30 
feet due to the prevalence of energy-diffusing objects, such as vehicles, buildings and RF 
interference.  Likewise, detection ranges also decreased significantly.  Also, the number 
of false detections significantly increased in the urban environment. 
The second general performance characteristic observed was the effect of 
deploying the network in uneven environments such as hills and valleys.  The maximum 
communication ranges appeared to be negatively affected by deploying the network in 
such an environment.  Evidence shows that a three-foot vertical off-set in sensors reduced 
the maximum communication distance by five to ten feet.  Detection ranges were not 
noticeably affected.  If a network is deployed on uneven ground, it must be carefully 
designed to ensure that there are no unacceptable lapses in detection or communication 
abilities. 
The final general performance observed was the effect of rain on the network.  
Rain has a significant negative impact on the communication distances of the prototyped 
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network.  Mist and light rain had little or no noticeable affect on performance.  However, 
during periods of heavy rain and downpours communication ranges significantly 
declined.  During several episodes, the communications distance fell by 90 percent.  Such 
drastic declines in communication ranges render the network ineffective. 
This chapter presented the results of the various experiments conducted as part of 
the evaluation process.  Additionally, the experiments produced prediction equations to 
assist network planners in designing an integrated sensor-camera network.  First, the 
maximum detection range experiments were discussed.  The analysis covered PIR and 
magnetometer test results for personnel and vehicles.  Next, the probabilities of detection 
experiments were discussed.  Prediction equations were produced to discover how the 
probability of detection changes based on various inputs at specified object distances.  
Then the chapter focused on analyzing the maximum break ranges and reassociation 
ranges.  Finally, the chapter concluded with analyzing several of the general observations 
discussed concerning network performance. 
115 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This thesis focused on testing and evaluating a prototyped integrated sensor-
camera network for use in tactical military and law enforcement scenarios.  First, the 
individual technologies were researched and introduced.  Chapter II provided an in-depth 
introduction and discussion of wireless sensor networks.  That chapter introduced the 
technological history of sensor networks and covered current and potential applications 
of wireless sensor networks.  Next, the chapter introduced the leading network 
architectures and routing techniques.  Finally, Chapter II introduced the most common 
protocols, including IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee.  Chapter III provided an introduction to 
digital video technologies.   That chapter introduced the process behind capturing, 
storing, and transmitting digital video data.  Next, Chapter III discussed the data rate 
considerations and introduced the need for effective compression to allow digital video to 
be transmitted using wireless networking.  Finally, Chapter III introduced and briefly 
described the two leading video compression techniques. 
Chapter IV provided an in depth description of the prototyped integrated sensor-
camera network.  First, that chapter provided an introduction to the COASTS 2006 
research project and described the network’s role in the COASTS scenario.  Next, 
Chapter IV introduced the specific components used in the network.  First, the Crossbow 
MSP410CA Wireless Security Mote Kit was discussed in depth.  Next, the Axis 213 PTZ 
network camera was introduced as the video component of the network.  Finally, Chapter 
IV described the various other components used to integrate the sensor and camera 
components with the COASTS wireless network.   
Chapter V described the selection of metrics and experiment design processes.  
First, the chapter introduced the attributes of effective metrics, measures of effectiveness, 
and measures of performance.  Next, the selected measure of effectiveness and measures 
of performance were described.  Finally, the chapter described the experiments used to 
provide a thorough analysis of the system’s actual capabilities in a real-world 
environment.  The experiments were created to allow statistically sound and accurate 
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results to be drawn from the collected data.  The tests focused primarily on the 
capabilities of the sensors used as part of the prototyped network.  They investigated the 
passive infrared and magnetometer detection ranges, probabilities of detection, RF break 
ranges, reassociation ranges, and battery life.  Understanding the network’s capabilities in 
these areas provides a basis for determining the feasibility of deploying the network for 
military or law enforcement applications.   
Finally, Chapter VI analyzed the results of the experiments.  ANOVA and linear 
regression techniques were applied to produce prediction equations.  The prediction 
equations were intended to serve as a development tool for network planners.   Lastly, the 
chapter briefly compared the results to the selected MoE and MoP.  The next sections 
discuss lessons learned during the process and evaluate the prototyped system. 
 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
Several important lessons were learned during the experimentation process.  
Many of the lessons learned were the result of actions or difficulties that could not be 
controlled.  Other lessons learned were oversights or challenges that might have been 
avoidable given additional time and resources. 
The first lesson learned during the testing and scenario demonstration processes 
was the importance and difficulty of power management.   The challenge of power 
management was discussed previously regarding wireless sensor networks.  The 
challenge became evident when deploying in a real-world operational scenario.  Although 
the individual motes lasted significantly longer than expected based on Crossbow 
technical information, they fell well short of the needed three to six months.  Moreover, 
finding a long lasting power source for the base station proved to be difficult.  It is 
important to choose a system that requires common voltages or can be powered using 
power sources that are easily available.  For example, during the March COASTS 
demonstration, the Crossbow base station was powered using an improvised source built 




demonstration, but the average battery life was only 1.5 days.  Certainly, powering 
systems in an operational environment is challenging; however, careful planning can ease 
the challenge significantly. 
The second lessoned learned is the burden of heat reduction in an operational 
environment.  Temperature is often referred to as the enemy of electronics.  The March 
and May COASTS demonstrations proved that effective heat reduction and management 
is an essential aspect in using COTS technology in military applications. Several of the 
components used in the prototyped network suffered from heat-related malfunctions.  For 
example, the Axis 213 camera is only rated for use up to 104° Fahrenheit.  During the 
March COASTS demonstration in Thailand, the temperature exceeded that mark nearly 
every day.  As a result, the camera would often over heat and shut down.  No damage 
was done to the camera, but the crucial video surveillance capability was lost until the 
camera cooled down enough to begin normal operations.  Research was done to find 
methods to cool the camera efficiently enough to allow full operation at temperatures 
above 104° Fahrenheit.  The information can be found in Appendix C.  After 
implementing the design recommendations, the camera operated in temperatures 
exceeding 104° Fahrenheit.  In addition to the cameras, the Vlinx Wireless Serial Servers 
suffered from similar heat-related problems.  The Vlinx would typically function well 
until it overheated and communications were lost.  After it overheated, communications 
were intermittent until the next morning when the server cooled.  Most COTS 
technologies are not designed to operate in the types of environments faced by military 
and law enforcement units.  It is important either to find systems capable of handling the 
weather environments or to modify systems carefully to ensure they will continue to 
operate.    
The third lesson learned was that the “capabilities” claimed by the manufacturer 
are often much different than the actual performance.  Most systems are tested in a 
laboratory environment, which can be closely controlled.  Often, performance in a 
laboratory environment is significantly better than in an actual scenario.  For example, 
the Crossbow data claimed a communications range of 150 to 250 feet.  These data are 
significantly further than any distance achieved during testing, even with the motes at 
three feet above ground level.  Sometimes the manufacturer’s claimed performance is 
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less than what can be achieved.  For example, Crossbow claims a detection range of 70 to 
80 feet for large trucks.  During the maximum detection range experiments, large trucks 
were routinely detected at ranges over 100 feet.  Additionally, Crossbow claims the 
motes typically last ten hours on two AA batteries.  The battery life tests showed that the 
actual lifetime is significantly longer.  Ultimately, it is vitally important to test all COTS 
systems thoroughly before deploying in a military or law enforcement scenario to 
understand the actual performance in real-world scenarios. 
The fourth lesson learned is that integrating COTS technologies for military 
applications can be very difficult.  The entire COASTS 2006 network consisted of 
commercially available technologies.  As a result, integration issues often arose.  For 
example, the Vlinx servers were not capable of using some of the encryption techniques 
that the 802.11 mesh backbone used.  Subsequently, the plans for encryption were 
discarded.  Additionally, integrating the Crossbow serial data onto the 802.11 network 
proved to be more difficult than expected.  Also, the manufacturer’s support significantly 
impacts the success of integrating the technology.  For example, the Vlinx technical 
support staff was excellent, often delivering solutions or assistance with little notice.  The 
Crossbow technical support was not as helpful.  While trying to integrate the Crossbow 
data into the C3Trak Shared Situational Awareness program, several problems arose.  
Crossbow was not helpful in trouble shooting or providing assistance to integrate its 
product into the application.  Ultimately, the Crossbow sensors were not integrated into 
the application for demonstrations.  If more time or better technical support been 
provided, the sensors might have been fully integrated.  However, these difficulties 
helped to highlight the importance of cooperation between the user and manufacturer for 
applying the COTS technology to a unique and demanding situation. 
 
C. FINAL EVALUATION 
The prototyped sensor-camera network performed satisfactorily during the 
COASTS scenario demonstration in May, 2005.  The sensing capabilities proved to be 
significantly better than expected.  However, one must objectively evaluate the network 
based upon the metrics, MoP, and MoE discussed in previous chapters. 
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The sensor subsystem of the prototyped network performed satisfactorily during 
the evaluation experiments.  The passive infrared sensor successfully detected humans 
and vehicles at ranges exceeding the MoE and MoP.  The sensing capabilities were worth 
40 percent of the sensor network’s evaluation.  The passive infrared was worth 24 percent 
of the total evaluation, with eight percent given to the ability to detect each of the 
categories of objects.  Since the passive infrared sensor exceeded all of the minimum 
detection distance, full values were awarded.  The magnetic sensor was worth 16 percent 
of the total evaluation.  Again, the magnetic sensor detection ranges exceeded minimum 
values, so full values were awarded.  The deployability of the sensor network was worth 
another 40 percent of the evaluation.  The deployability in various operating 
environments absorbed 16 percent of the evaluation.  The sensor network performed well 
in urban, wooded, and open terrains.  The sensor network interoperability suffered in 
high-temperature environments due to problems with the Vlinx serial server.  As a result, 
the network was awarded 14 of 16 points.  The logistics aspect of the network was worth 
24 percent of the evaluation.  The network lost eight points due to the short battery life 
and was awarded 16 of the 24 points.  A total of 10 of 14 points were awarded for 
interoperability due to the lack of native 802.11 networking capabilities.  Finally, the 
network was awarded all six points for availability.  When compared to the MoE, the 
sensor network was awarded a total of 86 out of 100 points.  The sensor network satisfied 












Characteristic Points Allowed Satisfied Points Given 
PIR Human Detection 8 Yes 8 
PIR Small Vehicle Detection 8 Yes 8 
PIR Large Vehicle Detection 8 Yes 8 
Magnetometer Small Vehicle 
Detection 
8 Yes 8 
Magnetometer Large Vehicle 
Detection 
8 Yes 8 
Urban, Wooded, Open Terrain 8 Yes 8 
Adverse Climactic Conditions 8 No 6 
Small Logistics Footprint 8 Yes 8 
3+ Month Battery Life 8 No 0 
Rapidly Deployable 8 Yes 8 
Graphical Interface 2 Yes 2 
Minimal Training 2 Yes 8 
Native 802.11 Networking 10 No 0 
COTS Technology 6 Yes 6 
TOTAL 100  86 
 




























Characteristic Need/Want Satisfied 
Less than 10 False Detections per 
Hour 
Want No 
99 % Probability of Detection for 
Humans at 15 Feet 
Need Yes 
99.5 % Probability of Detection for 
Vehicles at 15 Feet 
Need Yes 
Ability to Classify and Object 
Based on Sensor Values 
Want Yes 
Maximum Detection Range > 30 
Feet for Humans 
Need Yes 
Maximum Detection Range > 75 
Feet for Vehicles 
Need Yes 
Maximum Communications Range 
>= 120 Feet 
Want Yes at 1 Foot 
Elevation 
Maximum Reassociation Range >= 
60 Feet 
Want Yes at 1 Foot 
Elevation 
Deployable in 10 minutes Want Yes 
Operate with 802.11 b/g Need Not Native 
Capability, Yes with 
Additional Equipment
Multiple Sensor Types Need Yes 
Battery Life > 3 Months Need No 
Operate in Urban, Wooded, and 
Open Terrains 
Need Yes 
Small Form Factor (Size) Need Yes 
 
Table 18. Sensor MoP Final Analysis 
 
The camera subsystem also performed satisfactorily during the testing and 
evaluation processes.  The cameras’ role in the network was to provide real-time visual 
information to the watch-stander.  The MoE and MoP focused primarily on deployability, 
functionality, and interoperability.  Deployability points were spread equally between 
logistic footprints, climactic limitations and power consumption, for a total of 25 percent 
of the evaluation.  The Axis 213 was awarded 23 of the 25 points due to the problems 
associated with overheating.  The ability to pan, tilt, and zoom the camera was worth 
another 25 percent of the evaluation.  The Axis 213 received all 25 points due to the 
excellent capabilities and large field of view.  The ability to choose between multicast 
and broadcast transmission was worth another 25 percent of the evaluation.  When loaded 
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with the correct firmware version, the Axis 213 has the ability to perform in multicast or 
broadcast mode.  As a result, the full 25 points were awarded.  The ease of configuration 
was worth 12.5 percent of the evaluation.  The camera has an intuitive and easy to use 
interface that allows specified users to change configurations remotely.  The Axis 213 
received the maximum award for configurability.  Finally, 12.5 points were awarded for 
availability.  The only negative evaluation for the Axis 213 camera is the troubles 
encountered due to heat.  However, with slight modifications the camera performed well 
above expectations even in high-temperature environments.  Tables 19 and 20 depict the 
comparison with the selected MoE and MoP. 
 
MoE 
Characteristic Points Allowed Satisfied Points Given 
Multicast/Broadcast 
Optional 
25 Yes 25 
Controllable 25 Yes 25 
Deployability 25 Yes 23 
Easy to Configure 12.5 Yes 12.5 
Immediately Available for 
Purchase 
12.5 Yes 12.5 
TOTAL 100  98 
 
Table 19. Camera MoE Final Analysis 
 
MoP 
Characteristic Need/Want Satisfied 
MPEG Format Want Yes 
Multicast Capability Need Yes 
Control Pan/Tilt/Zoom Need Yes 
IR Illumination Need Yes 
20 Frames per Second Need Yes 
Wireless Connectivity Need Not Natively, Requires 
Additional Equipment 
 
Table 20. Camera MoP Final Analysis 
 
As a whole, the prototyped network performed satisfactorily during the COASTS 
demonstrations in Thailand.  Despite the successful performance in the scenarios, the 
prototyped network is not suitable for military applications but is well suited for law 
enforcement applications.  Although the sensing capabilities of the Crossbow MSP410 
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Mote Security System far exceeded the minimum capabilities, several key negative 
aspects arose.  The first, and most prominent, was the battery life of the system.  Military 
operations require much longer battery lives than provided by the prototyped network.  
Law enforcement operations are typically much shorter and, therefore, require shorter on-
station times.  The second reason the system is appropriate for law enforcement 
applications and not military applications is significant performance degradation in 
extreme weather.  Military forces routinely operate in harsh environments where any 
performance degradation is not acceptable.  Components must not fail in high 
temperature.  Beyond that, the significant reduction in communications ranges during 
rain storms would render the network useless.  Although law enforcement units operate 
under adverse conditions, they tend to be less extreme than military operations.  A third 
reason is the lack of native networking capabilities.  The MSP410 base station is only 
designed to pass information using a serial connection.  Connecting the serial base station 
to any existing network is difficult.  Although 802.11 wireless networks might not be the 
best choice for tactical military networking, the system completely lacked the ability to 
transmit data along any other type of communications medium.  Military operations 
require the system be able to integrate easily into a variety of tactical networks.  
However, 802.11 wireless networks are more suitable for law enforcement applications.  
The addition of the Vlinx Serial Server and the Mesh Dynamics access point do not 
provide a significant disadvantage for law enforcement.  Further refinement of network 
components might make the network suitable for military applications, but as designed 
the prototyped network is not suitable for military operations. 
 
D. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis provided an in-depth study of the prototyped network, yet several 
areas that are suitable for future research emerged.  The avenues for future research can 
be divided into the broad categories of sensors, cameras, communications, integration, 
and power. 
The sensor component of the network presents several areas for future research.  
The first area of research is to repeat the experiments with similar sensors from a 
different manufacturer.  Other manufactures might use different components that have 
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better capabilities or battery lives.  A comparison of two different sensor sets with the 
same types can be useful.  Also, a variety of other sensor types are available.  Several 
manufacturers currently make seismic sensors that can detect the small vibrations created 
by personnel and vehicles.  A trade-off analysis between various sensor types will be 
useful in designing networks to meet the demands of military and law enforcement 
applications.  Furthermore, physical security measures must be addressed for sensor 
networks.  The network designed in this thesis had no physical security.  Knowing if a 
sensor is moved or disabled by enemy forces is important.  For example, GPS sensors 
could be used to detect if the sensor is relocated or adding biometric activation switches 
to prevent the sensors from being tampered with by enemy forces. 
The camera network is an additional area for future research.  This thesis used the 
Axis 213 camera, but several other camera models exist that might be better for such an 
application.  For example, a wireless IP camera would be well suited for the application 
and would eliminate the need to connect the camera directly to an access point.  Adding a 
night-vision camera is recommended for boarder protection applications, as most illegal 
immigration happens during low light hours.  Finally, further research for camera cooling 
methods is necessary to deploy an integrated sensor-camera network in extreme 
environments such as Iraq. 
A third area for future research concerns communications.  This thesis attempted 
to determine the maximum communications distance for the network.  Since many sensor 
networks use 802.15.4 or ZigBee protocols, it would be beneficial to understand how the 
low-power, low-data rate requirements affect RF propagation.  In addition, 
communications security techniques can be researched.  The Crossbow MSP410 motes 
use a frequency that is easily jammed and the low transmission power causes the 
frequency to be overpowered easily.  Anti-jamming and encryption techniques can be 
useful for sensor networks used in military and law enforcement scenarios.  Security 
remains a challenge for all wireless networks and is especially challenging given the low 
computing power of wireless sensor networks. 
A fourth area that has many research applications is the integration of sensor-
camera networks with emerging and existing capabilities.  For example, most current 
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WSNs have custom user interface and do not interoperate easily with existing systems, 
such as Blue Force Tracker or other situational awareness programs.  Crossbow, for 
example, uses the Mote-View program.  Attempts to integrate the data into the C3Trak 
program proved difficult at best.  A common data structure or extensible markup 
language can be created to allow programs to interact with a wide range of sensor 
networks easily.  Sensor-camera networks can also be used to trigger automatic 
responses, such as launching unmanned vehicles, weapons aiming, and force protection 
actions.  Lastly, the creation of “intelligent” weapons that activate only when enemy 
forces are present is possible.  For example, “smart” landmines could only activate when 
enemy vehicles traverse the area. 
The final area, and perhaps most important, is power management.  Sensor-
camera networks must be able to operate for several months without any direct human 
interaction.  Creating more efficient components will help extend the on-station time of 
sensor-camera networks and increase the feasibility for military uses.  Research can be 
done to create more efficient transmission protocols.  Additionally, power engineers 
might develop better batteries or power sources.  Alternative power sources such as solar 
cells can be designed to create a nearly limitless lifetime.  Power management research 
will help achieve the goal of dense, long-life unattended sensor networks for real-time 
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1.0 PURPOSE. 
This document describes the FY2006 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the 
development and implementation of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) research 
program entitled the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System 
(COASTS).  The COASTS field experimentation program supports U.S. Pacific 
Command (USPACOM), Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), Joint U.S. 
Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), NPS, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), and the Thai Department of 
Research & Development Office (DRDO) science and technology research requirements 
relating to theater and national security, counter-drug and law enforcement missions, and 
the War On Terror (WOT).  This CONOPS is primarily intended for use by the NPS and 
RTARF management teams as well as by participating commercial partners.  However, it 
may be provided to other U.S. Government (USG) organizations as applicable.  This 
document describes research and development aspects of the COASTS program and 
establishes a proposed timetable for a cap-stone demonstration during May 2006 in 
Thailand. 
 
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION: Distribution limited to the Department of Defense 
(DoD), U.S. DoD contractors, and to U.S. Government Agencies supporting DoD 
functions, and is made under the authority of the Director, DMA.  Foreign 
governments, contractors, and military personnel contributing to the COASTS 
research project are included within the limited distribution per the purview of the 
COASTS Program Manager.  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND. 
The COASTS programmatic concept is modeled after a very successful ongoing 
NPS-driven field experimentation program entitled the NPS-U.S. Special Operations 
Command Field Experimentation Program (NPSSOCFEP).  NPSSOCFEP is executed by 
NPS, in cooperation with USSOCOM and several contractors, and has been active since 
FY2002.  Program inception supported USSOCOM requirements for integrating 
emerging wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies with surveillance and 
targeting hardware/software systems to augment Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
missions.  NPSSOCFEP has grown significantly since inauguration to include 10-12 
private sector companies who continue to demonstrate their hardware/software 
capabilities, several DoD organizations (led by NPS) who provide operational and 
tactical surveillance and targeting requirements, as well as other academic institutions 
and universities who contribute a variety of resources.  
 
1.1.1  NPSSOCFEP Specifics. 
NPSSOCFEP conducts quarterly 1-2 week long complex experiments comprising 
8-10 NPS faculty members, 20-30 NPS students, and representatives from multiple 
private companies, DoD and US government agencies. Major objectives are as follows: 
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- Provide an opportunity for NPS students and faculty to experiment/evaluate with the 
latest technologies which have potential near-term application to the warfighter. 
- Leverage operational experience of NPS students and faculty 
- Provide military, national laboratories, contractors, and civilian universities an 
opportunity to test and evaluate new technologies in operational environments 
- Utilize small, focused field experiments with well-defined measures of performance for 
both the technologies and the operator using the technologies 
- Implement self-forming / self-healing, multi-path, ad-hoc network w/sensor cell, 
ground, air, and satellite communications (SATCOM) network components  
 
1.1.2 NPSSOCFEP Limitations. 
1.1.2.1 Sensitivities with Foreign Observers/Participants. 
Certain hardware, software, and tactics/techniques/procedures (TTP’s) 
implemented at NPSSOCFEP are classified or operationally sensitive, and as a result 
sponsors have not agreed to foreign military partnerships.  However, DoD requirements 
exist for U.S. military forces to operate in coalition environments (which serve to 
strengthen relationships with foreign military partners) and to execute missions globally.  
Since NPSSOCFEP remains primarily a US-only event, COASTS was designed to 
address coalition inter-operability exchange and cooperative R&D.  
 
1.1.2.2 Meteorological, Hydrographic, & Geographic 
Considerations. 
The majority of wireless network topology research conducted by the NPS 
has occurred in the California Central Coast area where vegetation and climate is not 
representative of the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR)—a likely deployment location 
for tactical or operational WLAN and surveillance/targeting technologies.   Higher 
temperatures and humidity, as well as denser vegetation in regions like Southeast Asia 
will likely create WLAN and sensor performance problems. This was proven in data 
collected during the COASTS 2005 deployment, and will be further examined in the 
2006 deployment.  
 
1.1.3  COASTS 2005. 
1.1.3.1 Purpose. 
COASTS 2005 leveraged and integrated the technological expertise of 
NPS’s education and research resources with the science and technology and operational 
requirements of the RTARF.  This was done using WLAN technologies (see Figure 1 
next page) to fuse and display information from air and ground sensors to a real-time, 
tactical, coalition enabled command and control (C2) center. The additional benefit of 
this first COASTS field experiment was to demonstrate USPACOM commitment to 
foster stronger multi-lateral relations in the area of technology development and coalition 
warfare with key Pacific AOR allies in the WOT - results from the May 2005 
demonstration were provided to representatives from Thailand, Singapore, Australia, 






Figure 1.   COASTS 2005 Network Topology 
 
1.1.4. COASTS 2006. 
1.1.4.1 Purpose. 
COASTS 2006 will expand upon the original field experiment conducted 
during last year’s deployment to Wing 2, Lop Buri, Thailand. This year’s network 
topology (see Figures 2 and 3 on following pages) will advance research relative to low-
cost, commercially available solutions while integrating each technology/capability into a 
larger system of systems in support of tactical action scenarios.  The demonstration 
planned for May 2006 is an air, ground, and water-based scenario (details provided 
below), occurring just north of Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The scenario encompasses first-
responder, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and counter-drug objectives.   The tactical 
information being collected from the scenario will be fused, displayed, and distributed in 
real-time to local (Chiang Mai), theater (Bangkok), and global (Alameda, California) C2 
centers. This fusion of information leads to the validation of using wireless 
communication mediums to support redundant links of the National Information 
Infrastructure, as well as to test and evaluate the ‘last mile’ solution for the disadvantaged 
user.  Continuing with last year’s research theme, COASTS 2006 will again: (1) examine 
the feasibility of rapidly-deploying networks, called “Fly-away Kits” (FLAK) and (2) 
explore sustainment considerations with respect to a hostile climatic (temperature, 
humidity, wind, etc.) environment.  Network improvements will include the testing and 
evaluation of new 802.11 mesh LAN equipment, the refinement of a jointly-developed 
(NPS and Mercury Data Systems) 3-D topographic shared situational awareness (SSA) 
application called C3Trak, the integration of “satellite in a suitcase” (portable satellite 
communication equipment) technology, enhanced unattended ground and water-based 
sensors, new balloon and UAV designs, portable biometric devices, portable explosive 
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residue detecting devices, and revised operational procedures for deployment of the 
network. Further explanation of the network technology can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 2.   COASTS 2006 Topology: Mae Ngat Dam 
 
 
Figure 3.   COASTS 2006 Global Network Topology 
802.16 PtP to IIFC
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1.3 SCOPE. 
This concept of operations (CONOPS) applies to all aspects of the COASTS 
project from date of issue through the May 2006 Thailand-based demonstration.  This 
document is intended to provide critical information regarding the planning and 
execution of all aspects of the FY2006 field experimentation program.  Additionally, this 
CONOPS provides a technical and tactical framework for complex system 
demonstrations used in coalition environments. This document will cover the use of 
COASTS as a stand-alone or networked capability focused on security mission profiles 
that can be enhanced by the employment of COASTS technologies. 
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2.0 OVERVIEW. 
2.1 CURRENT SITUATION.   
2.1.1 U.S. Perspective. 
The risk of asymmetric threats to U.S. national security has outpaced the danger 
of traditional combat operations against a first-tier opposing military force. National 
security requirements are increasingly focused on facing non-military, non-traditional, 
asymmetric threats: piracy, terrorism, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, weapons 
of mass destruction, and other transnational threats. Furthermore, with the always 
accelerating movement of globalization stretching U.S. interests further away from 
domestic borders, the national security issues of allies and other friendly nations are as 
vital to the U.S. as American domestic security issues.  
 
Last year in Sacramento, California over 73,000 “Yaa Baa” (crazy medicine) 
methamphetamine pills were confiscated by law enforcement. Yaa baa is produced 
primarily by the United WA State Army (UWSA), an ethnic insurgency force operating 
within the Burmese portion of the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia. These drugs 
were cultivated in the Golden Triangle, passed across the borders of multiple nations in 
Southeast Asia, and across the Pacific Ocean through various other international harbors 
such as Hong Kong or Singapore, as well as at least one domestic U.S. harbor. As easily 
as these drugs move into the interior of America, so could any multitude of other national 
security threats such as chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Numerous law enforcement, corporate and bi-lateral, multilateral, and 
international governmental initiatives are attempting to address these security issues on a 
variety of levels. JIATF-W is constructing data/intelligence fusion centers like the Inter-
agency Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC) in Chiang Mai, Thailand to enable joint and 
coalition intelligence collection for combined multi-national operations. The Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Cooperative Maritime Agreement (CMA) 
Advanced Technology Concept Demonstration (ATCD), focus on transnational open 
ocean counter-piracy and counter-terrorism, and investigate the formulation of more 
intelligence fusion centers and multilateral coastal patrolling agreements, i.e. 
MALSINDO respective to the Straits of Malacca.  
    
The importance of a coalition-oriented focus for modern Maritime Domain 
Awareness and Protection operations is not lost on U.S. combatant commanders. In a 
recent naval message, all numbered fleet commanders stated their number one Command, 
Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) requirement is improved coalition communications. Current and future 
operational capabilities are tightly tied to improved interoperability with U.S. allies in the 
operational theater. As reflected by the increasing number of requests to NPS from 
foreign partners, there is an immediate requirement for low-cost, state-of-the-art, real-
time threat warning and tactical communication equipment that is also rapidly scaleable 
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based on operational considerations. This issue has become especially apparent in the 
face of the overwhelming mission requirements placed on US forces conducting the 
WOT. 
 
The WOT extends globally where nations are engaged in direct action against 
numerous forces employing asymmetric tactics. In Thailand, the separatist insurgency in 
the southern provinces is connected to various transnational terrorist organizations which 
have struck against both the U.S. and its allies, to include both the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and Al-Qaeda.  
 
Further exacerbating the above situation, most current tactical systems lack the 
capability to rapidly enable a common information environment (CIE) amongst air, 
surface, and sub-surface entities via a self-forming, self-authenticating, autonomous 
network.  Although commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies exist that can satisfy 
some of these requirements, these same technologies typically do not meet all of the DoD 
and coalition partner requirements associated with WOT and other security missions.   
Hence a central role of the COASTS field experimentation program is to demonstrate that 
NPS, in conjunction with coalition partner R&D organizations, can integrate COTS 
capabilities into a larger system of systems to potentially satisfy technical and tactical 
mission requirements.  
 
2.1.2 Thailand Perspective. 
 
The Golden Triangle Region of Southeast Asia, which includes the border regions 
of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and China, cultivates, produces, and ships enough opium 
and heroin to be second only to Afghanistan as a global production region. Furthermore, 
the Western portion of the Golden Triangle, located along most of the Burmese border 
with Thailand, is the largest yaa baa methamphetamine producing region in the world. 




Burma remains the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium with 
an estimated production of 292 metric tons in 2004.  It is estimated that less than 1% of 
Burma's annual opium production is intercepted - the rest is smuggled out through China 
or Thailand onto the world market. Perhaps more significant, Burma and the Golden 
Triangle is the largest methamphetamine-producing region in the world.  A 1999 survey 
of 32 of Thailand’s 76 provinces showed that nearly 55 percent of youths in secondary 
and tertiary education were using methamphetamines.  Not surprisingly, Thailand views 
the opium and methamphetamine production of the Golden Triangle as a threat to 







2.1.2.2 The United Wa State Army (UWSA). 
 
The remote jungles that divide Burma and Thailand are controlled by the 
UWSA, a powerful militant organization comprised from the Wa ethnic group.  They 
have a historic reputation as a savage people; in fact some tribes practiced headhunting as 
late as the 1970’s.  The Wa, serving as the primary fighting force of the Burmese 
Communist Party (BCP) until the BCP’s disintegration in 1988, took over the BCP’s 
drug operations and expanded upon them. The UWSA is, a well-equipped military force 
of approximately 20,000 soldiers, and is the largest drug-producing and trafficking group 
in Southeast Asia, producing heroin, methamphetamine, and possibly Methylenedioxy 
Methamphetamine (MDMA), or “Ecstasy”.. The UWSA buys opium from the Kokang 
Chinese, the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), and others to use in their 
increasing number of refineries – currently estimated at more than 50. The Southern 
Military Region of the UWSA is located in the Mong Yawn Valley near the Burma–
Thailand border.  Involved in the drug trade for decades, the Wa has increasingly 
switched to the production of methamphetamine pills due to international pressure to cut 
opium production. Due to increasing friction between the UWSA and the Burmese 
government - because of law enforcement efforts and greater power sought by regional 
Communists - there has been a significant increase of violence and traffic across the Thai 
border.  As a result, a coalition effort consisting of Thai and U.S. forces was created in 
the Burma-Thailand border area of the Golden Triangle. 
 
2.1.2.3. Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA). 
 
Competing with the Wa in the drug smuggling activity is the Shan ethnic 
group in cooperation with the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA).  The SURA 
contains approximately 1,500 ethnic Shan soldiers and is one of the few remaining ethnic 
insurgent groups that have not agreed to a cease-fire arrangement with the Burmese 
Government. Recent reporting indicates that the SURA is collecting taxes from Shan 
traffickers and is forcing farmers to grow opium.  Due to hostilities with the Wa in 
Burma, over 200,000 Shan refugees have crossed into Thailand since 2000 where most 
end up as illegal laborers. 
 
2.1.3 U.S. and Thai Partnership. 
 
It is the intent of the COASTS field experimentation program to demonstrate 
TTPs that: (1) potentially reduce or mitigate drug trafficking across the Thai-Burma 
border, (2) provide actionable information (real-time) to  local, regional, and strategic 
level decision-makers, and (3) shorten the sensor-to-shooter cycle.     
 
2.2 SYSTEM SUMMARY.    
COASTS is an individual and small unit network-capable communication and 
threat warning system using an open, plug-and-play architecture, which is user-
configurable, employing air balloons, wireless ad-hoc networks, UAVs, SSA software 
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applications, biometrics capabilities, portable and fixed ground and water based 
integrated sensors, and personnel equipped with Tacticomp/Antelope or similar PDAs, all 
communicating via wireless network technology. 
 
2.3 CAPABILITIES.    
COASTS 2006 provides a mobile field experiment bed environment for U.S. and 
Thailand in support of R&D, integration, operational testing, and field validation of 
several emerging wireless technologies and equipment suites.  The following research 
elements will be addressed: 
• 802.11 b Distributed Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) 
• 802.11a/g Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) 
• 802.16 OFDM (Stationary) 
• 802.16 OFDM (Mobile) 
• SATCOM 
• Situational Awareness Overlay Software 
• Wearable Computing Devices 
• Air, Ground, and Water Integrated Sensors 
• Mobile C2 Platforms 
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (Fixed wing) 
• UAVs (Rotary wing) 
• Unmanned Multi-environment micro vehicles  
• Ultra-wide Band Integrated Sensors 
• Deny-GPS Inertial Gyro technology  
• Network Security Applications 
• Compression software applications 
• Biometrics applications 
 
2.4 MAJOR COMPONENTS.    
While the final configuration of the COASTS 2006 system may evolve further, 
the following core elements represent the major system components:  
 
• Supplied by Thailand: 
• Chiang Mai IIFC 
• Lighter-than-air Vehicle (LTAV) 
• L-39 Fighters (2) 
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• Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
• Mobile Command Platform (MCP) – Figure 4  
• Wing 41 facilities 
• AU-23 configured with 802.11g connectivity 
• Royal Thai Army (RTA) interdiction squad 
 
 
Figure 4.   Thai Mobile Command Platform 
 
• Supplied by NPS: 
• Situational awareness common operating picture (SA COP) 
systems 
• Tethered balloons and associated hardware – Figure 5  
• Airborne camera system for balloon and/or UAVs – Figure 6  
• Wearable Computing Devices (INTER-4 Tacticomp) – Figure 7 
• Three (3) laptops for use in the NMC 
• Three (3) Modular PCs (Antelope) 
• 802.11a/b/g network devices – Figure 8 
• 802.16 OFDM network devices – Figure 9 
• Deny GPS  
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• Rotomotion UAV – Figure 10 
• CyberDefense UAV – Figure 11 
• Helia-Kite Network Extender – Figure 12 
• Network Security Applications 
• Small boat FLAKs 
• Biometric devices – Figure 13 
• Morphing Micro Air-Land Vehicle (MMALV) – Figure 14 
 
 
Figure 5.   Tethered Balloon 
 
 








Figure 8.   802.11a/b/g network Mesh Dynamics Unit 
 
 




Figure 10.   Rotomotion VTOL UAV 
 
 
Figure 11.   Cyber Defense UAV 
 
 






Figure 13.   Biometric Collection Device 
 
 







The May 2006 COASTS demonstration will have four basic configurations: (1) a 
command, control, collection, and communication suite; (2) a threat warning system; (3) 




3.0 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 
3.1 USERS. 
Generally, the COASTS 2006 participants will focus on creating an international 
interaction mechanism for U.S. military forces, to include NPS, to collaborate with 
Thailand research & development organizations and military forces to support WOT 
objectives and internal/external Thai security requirements.   
 
The primary users during the May 2006 demonstration will be the military and civilian 
NPS students and faculty, JIATF-W personnel, JUSMAGTHAI personnel, and various 
units from the RTARF.  Secondary users may include members of the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF), Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), Japanese Self 
Defense Force (JSDF), Republic of the Philippines Army, and the Australian Army. 
Tertiary users will be the various vendors providing equipment and technical expertise to 
include Cisco Systems Inc., Redline Communications, Mercury Data Systems, 
CyberDefense Systems, Roto-motion Inc, Identix, and INTER-4. Specific vendor 
contributions shall be discussed in the Appendix section of this document.  The NPS, 
RTARF, and vendor team will integrate COASTS into a system to facilitate surveillance 
and monitoring of simulated “areas of interest”. 
 
3.2 COASTS SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPAL MISSION AREAS. 
As per Joint Doctrine, COASTS will directly support organizing, training, and equipping 
U.S. military forces and the RTARF in nine principal mission areas: 
 
Direct Action (DA):  The primary function of COASTS during DA missions is to 
provide Force Protection. DA missions are typically short-duration, offensive, high-
tempo operations that require real-time threat information presented with little or no 
operator interface.  COASTS will augment other capabilities in direct support of DA 
from an over-watch position.  COASTS in support of DA will target collection to support 
threat warnings relevant to that specific operation and provide automated reporting to the 
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for potential threats relevant to a specific mission.  
COASTS may also be used as the primary source of threat information in the absence of 
other capabilities.  Threat information presented by COASTS is intended to be relevant, 
real-time or near real-time, and within the area of operation. 
 
Tactical Reconnaissance (TR): The primary purpose of a TR mission is to collect 
information.  COASTS will augment other capabilities to obtain or verify information 
concerning the capabilities, intentions, locations, and activities of an actual or potential 
adversary.  COASTS will support the full range of information and communication 
functions.  COASTS will support operators with the rapid collection, processing, 
analysis, and dissemination of information.  COASTS will analyze how performance in 




Foreign Internal Defense (FID):  COASTS will assist Host Nation (HN) military and 
paramilitary forces, with the goal to enable these forces to maintain the HN’s internal 
stability. 
 
Combating Terrorism (CBT):  COASTS will support CBT activities, to include anti-
terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and 
counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), 
conducted to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.   
 
Civil Affairs (CA):  COASTS will assist CA activities in peacetime to preclude 
grievances from flaring into war and during hostilities to help ensure that civilians do not 
interfere with operations and that they are protected and cared for in the combat zone. 
 
Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):  COASTS will assist 
traditional capabilities to seize, capture, destroy, render safe, or recover WMD.  COASTS 
can provide information to assist U.S. military forces and coalition partners to operate 
against threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. 
 
Information Operations (IO):  COASTS can augment actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while defending one’s own information and 
information systems.  IO applies across all phases of an operation and the spectrum of 
military operations. 
 
Counter-narcotic Operations: COASTS will augment JIATF-W, U.S. Embassy 
Bangkok, and Thai law enforcement efforts to reduce the level of transnational narcotic 
smuggling across international borders in Southeast Asia. Since the “Golden Triangle” 
region is the second largest producer of the world market’s heroin and 
methamphetamines, this regional reduction will further contribute to worldwide counter-
drug efforts.  
 
Maritime Security: COASTS will utilize a C4ISR capability for small boats that can be 
used for connectivity between any small boat assets capable of conducting maritime 
terrorism interdiction operations. The modular usage of FLAK technology makes small 
boat interdictions ISR-mission capable. Junk Force, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), United 
States Navy (USN), Small Boat Unit (SBU), Naval Special Warfare (NSW), Special 
Operations Force (SOF), etc. will all potentially benefit from the COASTS 2006 research 
field experiment.  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operation/Leadership Interdiction Operation (MIO/LIO):  
Visit Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations are conducted by all U.S. and 
coalition forces, to include various law enforcement agencies. Various network 
topologies tested in COASTS will enhance the C4ISR capabilities of conducting these 
operations. Historically, these missions have been removed from the digital divide of 
wireless capabilities for operations, and will be a focus point in COASTS 2006.  
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Training: The demonstration will be conducted in coordination with the US military 
forces, Thailand law enforcement academies, and various Thai military communications 
divisions. The technical and doctrinal information-sharing will contribute to the coalition 
operational capability of the Thai and U.S. civilian-military forces.  
 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP): As a vital IO tool in counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorism operations, the COASTS network will analyze the ability of the 
COASTS network to be used for PSYOP missions in the tactical environment.   
 
3.2.1 Thailand Requirements. 
 
3.2.1.1 Thailand Requirement Overview.   
Thailand has a 2100 kilometer border with Burma that requires its military 
assets to patrol, as well as to provide surveillance, monitoring and targeting to combat 
drug smugglers and human traffickers from entering the country via Burma.  This illicit 
drug smuggling/human trafficking problem is significant for both Thailand and the U.S. 
as these activities may potentially support financing and operations of international 
terrorist organizations.   
 
In addition, some of the illegal drugs that successfully evade Thailand’s 
security infrastructure are ultimately taken to the U.S. via containerized shipping through 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits.  The RTAF has been assigned the 
responsibility of aerial patrols of the Thailand/Burma border areas while the Royal Thai 
Army (RTA) 3rd Army maintains cognizance for ground–based security and surveillance. 
 
Likewise, the recent difficulties in the southern regions of Thailand pose 
potential serious security concerns.  In an attempt to de-escalate tensions RTARF assets, 
most specifically the RTA 4th Army, have been deployed to the region.  Continued 
difficulty, or an escalation in unrest, might lead to instability along the border as well as 
impacting the stability postures of other nations within the region. 
 
The insurgency in the Southern Provinces has greatly affected Thailand’s 
national security. Consistent asymmetric attacks from insurgents have taken a significant 
toll on the Thailand military forces. Increasing both ground and maritime security 
through more capable ISR will enable Thailand to reduce asymmetric attacks against 
civilian and military targets.  
 
Finally, Thailand has been engaged in efforts, primarily in the Gulf of 
Thailand and surrounding territorial waters, to mitigate small boat activity involved in the 
illegal distribution of weapons and ammunition. 
3.2.1.2 COASTS Support to Thai Requirements.   
The RTARF has previously approached NPS for collaboration using 
UAVs and related surveillance/targeting technologies to augment their land and maritime 
border patrolling resources.  The RTARF is considering using UAV’s and sensor meshes 
to help control their northern and southern borders.   
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3.3 COASTS IMPLEMENTATION AND OBJECTIVES – PHASED 
APPROACH. 
The overall COASTS program uses a phased spiral development to implement the 
Thailand-based demonstration.  
  
Phase I:  This initial phase will consist of the integrated demonstration (Test I) at Point 
Sur, California from 5-9 December, 2005. The NPS COASTS team will use the Point Sur 
test as a reduced-scale baseline in support of the deployable COASTS network.  
 
Phase II:  Following the 2005-2006 holiday break, the COASTS Program Manager will 
attend a mid-planning conference with the Thai leadership in Bangkok and Chiang Mai, 
Thailand on January 23-27, 2006.  In addition, the 802.16 Wi-max link between the Joint 
Operations Area (Mae Ngat Dam) and the IIFC will be constructed and tested. Based on 
the information and decisions derived from this conference, a second integrated test (Test 
II) will be conducted at Point Sur on February 6-10, 2006. Equipment, network, and 
scenario implementation decisions will be finalized at the conclusion of Test II. The final 
planning conference will be conducted on February 20-24, 2006 in Bangkok, Thailand.  
 
Phase III: The third phase will commence with the complete COASTS system 
deployment from NPS to Thailand, and subsequent set-up and testing, occurring in late 
March 2006 (exact dates are TBD, but are expected to be March 20-31, 2006).  The 
primary focus of this phase will be to identify and mitigate any shortfalls relating to 
administration, deployment, and operation of the COASTS network. Upon completion of 
successful testing and operation, the COASTS network will be disassembled and stored 
at JUSMAGTHAI and/or Wing 41. 
 
Phase IV:  This fourth and final phase will consist of the actual operational 
demonstration, occurring May 22-31 2006.  Since the timing of the COASTS 
demonstration is in parallel with the COBRA GOLD 2006 Command Post Exercise 
(CPX), COBRA GOLD and senior RTARF leadership will be available to receive the 
COASTS executive summary and observe the actual system demonstration. 
 
3.3.1 Phase I - Work Up.   
Phase I consists of the following. 
 
Milestones Completed:   
 
• Conducted a July 2005 After Action Report (AAR) debrief for U.S. and 
Thai COASTS 2005 participants, to include full disclosure on all pertinent 
issues concerning the deployment and demonstration testing.   
• Conducted an August 2005 site survey that included Wing 41, the Mae 
Ngat Dam Joint Operations Area (JOA), and the IIFC. Baseline signal 
readings were taken at the Mae Ngat Dam as well as GPS positions for 
future network asset placements. 
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• Completed an October 2005 concept development conference at the NPS 
with RTARF officers. 
 
Major Issues Remaining: 
 
• Operational and Technical details of the LTAV? 
• Cross-channel interference from the RTAF 802.11g capability?  
• Availability of the MCP? 
• Power at the Mae Ngat Dam? 
• Lack of thesis students for key operational/technical areas? 
• GPS positions of cell-phone towers in Chang Mai, Thailand? 
• Baseline tests during the Pt Sur Integrated tests? 
• Secondary tests during the second Pt Sur Integrated tests? 
• Mini-test schedules and locations 
• MIFC VPN planning meeting 
• Biometric planning meeting 
• NSG Monterey training & operational schedule 
 
3.3.2 Phase II – Pt Sur Integrated Test I & II 
Phase II entails the collection of individual nodal and integrated tests required to prepare 
for the COASTS deployment to Thailand in March and May 2006. On December 3-9, 
2005, COASTS members conducted the first integrated test of equipment at PT Sur 
California. These tests included: 
• Initial Network Construction 
• 802.11 antenna configuration, range, and power testing 
• Deny GPS testing 
• Baseline Data Collection 
• Initial Logistics management 
• Mobile and Stationary 802.16 OFDM testing 
Overall, the completed tests identified further research avenues, equipment requirements, 
and logistics needs the team must assess prior to the deployment to Thailand in March 
2006.  
 
Over the Holiday break, individual node leaders will conduct tests to finalize their 
baseline testing parameters prior to the second and third integrated tests. These mini-tests 
will focus on antenna configuration, power management, and the removal of extraneous 
material prior to deployment. The first integrated tests to follow these will be conducted 
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at the former Fort Ord North of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The 
next integrated test will be of the final deployable network in February 2006.  
 
3.3.3 Phase III – Movement to Site 
Phase III continues the planning and preparation for the May 2006 demonstration to 
include movement of personnel and equipment to on-site Thailand locations designated 
for the demonstration.  Further, on site testing will be accomplished during Phase III prior 
to beginning Phase IV preparations. The March 2006 deployment, tentatively scheduled 
for 20-24 March 2006, will include transportation, network set-up, and initial baseline 
testing for the full demonstration.  
 
3.3.4 Phase IV – May 2006 Demonstration.   
The actual COASTS project demonstration will attempt to prove a low-cost, state of the 
art, rapidly deployable, scalable tactical system to monitor a land/sea border region using 
unattended air and ground sensors connected through an assortment of wireless network 




Figure 15.   COASTS Demonstration Configuration 
 
3.3.4.1 802.11 (2.4 GHz) End-user Tactical Network. 
This local area network will be comprised of an 802.11g footprint 
established via MeshDynamic access points (MD-300) located aloft on four balloons as 
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well as placed at various ground stations to provide system and network redundancy.  
This network facilitates the situational agents end nodes and will connect to a local 
Mobile Command Platform (MCP) – a Royal Thai Army supplied 10-ton truck equipped 
with a variety of communications equipment co-located with air assets at the Mae Ngat 
Dam. 
 
3.3.4.2 802.16 OFDM (5.0 GHz) Backbone. 
Four 802.16 OFDM point-to-point suites will be established in order to 
construct the backbone links from the origination point at the Mae Ngat Dam to the IIFC 
in Chiang Mai. Three hops will be required which will be accomplished through the 
mounting of 802.16 suites on cellular towers operated by the AIS Company of Thailand.  
Ultimately, this will enable an over-the-mountain connection from the JOA to the IIFC.   
 
3.3.4.3 802.16 (5.8 GHz) Maritime Point to Multi-point. 
In order to test the functionality of a wireless point to multi-point link to 
connect two coalition operated security boats, a separate suite of 802.16 OFDM suites 
will be utilized (on a different frequency than the backbone point-to-point links). The 
MCP will operate an omni-point antenna linking to two separate omni antennas linked to 
the planned small boat FLAK. 
  
3.3.4.4 Integrated Crossbow Sensors. 
Via an integrated sensor network supplied by Crossbow Systems, Inc, the 
remote detection portion of the network topology will be tested. The Crossbow family of 
transceivers utilizes the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol standard for low data rate sensor 
networks.  The network consists of full function and reduced function nodes operating in 
the 433 MHz, 915 MHz range and 2.4 GHz range.  The 2.4 GHz range operates over 
sixteen channels and uses offset quadrature phase shift keying modulation.  The 915 MHz 
band operates over ten channels and uses binary phase shift keying modulation.  Both 
ranges use Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA).  The 
nodes can be configured to carry a variety of sensors.  The most commonly used is the 
MTS 310 sensor board which offers an acceleration sensor, magnetic sensor, acoustic 
sensor, temperature sensor and light sensors.   
 
The Crossbow sensor network provides the capability for self-
forming/self-healing sensor grids which are easily deployed.  These advantages, 
combined with small form factor and flexible configuration give today’s warfighters a 
substantial advantage.  The creation of integrated sensor/camera networks has 
applicability in perimeter defense, vehicle security, choke point control and border 
monitoring.  Having the ability to remotely monitor an Area of Interest lessens the burden 
on the warfighter, allowing for better tactical deployment of human assets. While limited 
land-based testing of an integrated sensor/camera network has occurred, no current 
evaluation regarding the performance of this technology in operational environments or 
littoral waters have been conducted.  However, deploying the sensors along a beachhead, 
the banks of a river, or along piers is well within their current capabilities.  The goal is to  
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provide a low cost yet effective sensor mesh to improve Persistent Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in support of Tactical Coalition Networking 
Environments. 
 
3.3.4.5 Wearable Computing.  
NPS and RTARF personnel shall be equipped with wearable networked 
computing devices supplied by Mercury Data Systems (MDS).  These devices will serve 
as nodes on the network and personnel will deploy to the surrounding areas at the Mae 
Ngat Dam to ascertain vegetation effects on signal performance. 802.11g handheld 
computers will also be utilized to measure COTS capabilities concerning this equipment.  
 
3.3.4.6 Thai UAV. 
The RTA or RTAF may potentially supply a UAV, pilot, and associated 
C2 platforms to support the COASTS project.  The Thai UAV, with a maximum range of 
200km, will operate at the Mae Ngat Dam and will be equipped with a camera and an 
802.11g network connection.  The Thai UAV may also provide a live video feed to the 
MCP and the IIFC.   
 
3.3.4.7 Thai AU-23 Aviation 802.11g Link. 
The RTAF will supply an AU-23 fixed wing aircraft and pilot. The AU-23 
will operate in the JOA and will be equipped with payloads consisting of various video 
and wireless networking.  The AU-23 will provide an opportunity to test these payloads 
under varying conditions and altitudes and also to serve as a back-up aerial node in the 
COASTS network topology.   
 
3.3.4.8 Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) Agents.   
These are the nodes and software associated with unmanned sensors such 
as seismic monitors, sound sensors, and streaming ground or balloon originating video 
feeds (some with GPS enabled systems).  MDS will cooperate with various NPS students, 
enabling the development of a common information environment through the use of SSA 
software entitled “C3Trak.” 
 
3.3.4.9 Tactical Operations Center (TOC) / Network Operations 
Center (NOC)  
The TOC and NOC will collect and display the data feeds from the 
various network nodes.  This is the C2 center where the deployed technology data feeds 
are fused and the force multiplying effects of the technology is leveraged. The MCP shall 
function as a TOC and NOC respectively.   
 
3.3.4.10 SATCOM link. 
The RTAF is investigating the feasibility of a SATCOM link between the 
MCP and the IIFC/Wing 41 to provide for an entirely wireless, large coverage area 
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network, as well as a secondary communications link for the real-time information 
display to RTAF HQ, the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC), and NPS.   
 
3.3.4.11 Network Defense.  
 
A survey of the network from a defensive aspect, using open source and 
COTS products, may be conducted on a not-to-interfere basis. The 2006 COASTS 
deployment will also utilize a Network Security Detachment, who will establish 
Computer Network Defense (CND) applications to counter simulated adversary actions, 
conducted by the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) Red Team.  
 
3.3.4.12 Modeling and Simulation.  
 
Using modeling and simulation techniques, empirical results from the 
demonstration may be compared to predicted results in order to refine modeling 
capabilities and better predict the data from network testing. The Operations Research 
department at NPS has conducted war-gaming efforts based on the COASTS interdiction 
scenario involving realistic small-scale conflicts with UWSA forces attempting to 
smuggle yaa baa products across the Thai-Burmese border.  
 
3.3.4.13 Micro/Mini UAVs.   
 
Both the RTARF and U.S. military forces are interested in tactical 
application of UAVs, specifically with respect to the implementation and operational use 
of micro- and mini-UAVs.  These extremely small form factor UAVs, using swarming 
technologies or other processes, can augment and/or potentially replace the larger, 
traditional UAVs and manned aircraft. One fixed-wing mini-UAV, one rotor-powered 
mini-UAV, and one shifting multi-environment micro-UAV will be integrated into the 
COASTS network.  
 
3.3.4.14 High-Altitude LTA Platforms.   
 
Again, both the RTARF and U.S. military forces are pursuing the 
application of high-altitude, steerable, non-tethered airships.  The Royal Thai Navy 
(RTN) and Thai Department of Research and Development Office (DRDO) has already 
begun experimentation in this technology area and is seeking to partner with NPS to 
provide better, more capable, solutions. The RTN and DRDO will contribute a LTAV to 
the COASTS 2006 network and NPS will supply four 802.11g network extending 
balloons to establish aerial communications. 
 
3.3.4.15 Maritime Missions.   
 
The Thai DRDO has previously conducted ship-to-shore wireless network 
experiments in the Gulf of Thailand and is seeking to link information collected from 
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seaborne sensors with a surface search radar system deployed to the Thai Naval Station at 
Sattahip.  Ultimately the COASTS 2006 effort will contribute to the Thai objectives as 
maritime data will be collected, fused, and disseminated to appropriate C2 centers.  
 
In addition, Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL), the NPS, and the 
MDP-RG are all conducting various field experimentation as part of the Virtual Test Bed 
concept, which when augmented by the COASTS 2006 demonstration, will showcase the 
functionality of a fused intelligence-sharing capability for countering asymmetric threats 
in the maritime environment.  
 
3.3.5 COASTS Critical Event Schedule.   
The table below depicts a high level schedule of critical events for the COASTS project - 




4-7 October Concept Development Conference (Monterey) 
20-30 November Site Survey (Chang Mai, Thailand) 
5-9 December Integrated Network Test I (Pt Sur, California) 
2006  
1-12 January  Mini-tests (Monterey, California) 
12-16 January  Baseline Node Tests (Fort Ord, California) 
23-27 January  Mid-Planning Conference (Thailand) 
6-10 February  Integrated Network Test II (Pt Sur, California) 
20-24 February  Final Planning Conference (Thailand) 
20-31 March  COASTS Network Set-up Deployment (Thailand) 
22-31 May COASTS Demonstration Deployment (Thailand) 
TBD June COASTS After Action Review (Thailand) 
  
Figure 16.   Critical Events Schedule. 
 
3.4 CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES (COIS)  
• The COASTS project demonstration in Thailand has four primary 
overarching COIs:  
• Does COASTS provide threat warning information as part of a 
wireless LAN/WAN? 
• Does COASTS meet performance requirements when deployed to 
Thailand (ground/jungle/maritime scenario)? 
• Does COASTS enable a last mile data connection for regional and 
global fusion centers? 
• Can the COASTS network be utilized to enable coalition law 
enforcement and military operations in a hazardous tactical 
environment?  
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The COASTS Oversight Group will refine and finalize the supporting Measures 
of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs), linked to specific 
operational tasks, standards and conditions, based on the OPORDS for each specific 
demonstration.  The assessment strategy and the final assessment criteria will be clearly 
delineated in the appendix of the final demonstration OPORD. 
 
3.5 MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) AND MEASURES OF 
PERFORMANCE (MOP). 
In order to make logical decisions and choices in network development, criteria to 
measure the value or relative importance of aspects of the network is required.  This is an 
essential pre-requisite for system analysis and predictive study.  Both the client 
(customer, user) and network designer have such measures, and these measures are 
related.  
 
MOE represent the user view, usually annotated and of qualitative nature. They 
describe the customers’ expectations of functional performance and should be viewed as 
the voice of the user. 
 
MOP are the corresponding view of the designer; a technical specification for a 
product. Typically MOP are quantitative and consist of a range of values about a desired 
point. These values are what a designer targets when designing the network, by changing 
components, protocols and infrastructure locations, so as to finally achieve the qualities 
desired by the user. 
 
Both the MOE and the MOP can be constructed as a hierarchy diagram. Each 
horizontal level of the hierarch represents 100% of the effectiveness or performance. 
 
COASTS MOE and MOP were evaluated by the Data Collections team to most 
efficiently gather and analyze the data associated with each measure.  In the following 
hierarchy diagrams, each node is identified and MOE and MOP are listed in an attempt to 
specifically communicate each node’s data collection needs.   
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3.5.3 Balloon MOE / MOP 
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3.5.5 C3 Trak MOE - 2 
 
167 
3.5.6 C3Trak MOP - 1 
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3.5.7 C3Trak MOP-2 
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3.5.8 Cameras MOE / MOP 
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3.5.9  Sensors MOE 
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3.5.10  Sensors MOP 
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4.0 MANAGEMENT STRATEGY. 
4.1  PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS, ROLES, AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES. 
 
4.1.1 COASTS Oversight Group. 
The oversight committee will be chaired by the NPS Dean of Research. 
Membership includes the Director MDP-RG, COASTS Program Manager, the COASTS 
Operational Manager, the COASTS Air Marshall, and the COASTS Student Team and 
Network Leaders. 
 
4.1.2 COASTS Program Manager (PM).   
Lead element of the COASTS project; responsible for project execution, 
coordination between NPS, DoD, foreign partners, and commercial vendors; responsible 
for all fiduciary reports and contractual agreements.  The COASTS 2006 PM is Mr. 
James Ehlert (Information Sciences Department faculty member). 
 
4.1.3 COASTS Operational Manager (OM).   
The OM is responsible for developing all demonstrations, plans, collection and 
dissemination of data, site surveys, MOE, MOP, NPS resource allocation, internal NPS 
coordination, and support to the PM.  The OM plans, coordinates and directs all user 
activities related to the COASTS project.  The OM will develop and provide the 
CONOPS, TTPs, operational mission scenarios, and the overall utility assessment.  
Additionally, the OM will coordinate administrative tasks for user participants, 
equipment and facilities supporting demonstration events.  The COASTS 2006 OM is 
Mr. James Ehlert (Information Sciences Department faculty member). 
 
4.1.4 COASTS Technical Manager (TM).    
The TM is responsible for technical management including program management, 
engineering, and acquisition of technologies to integrate and demonstrate.  The TM will 
provide technical support to the OM and manage all funding and technology development 
efforts related to the COASTS project.  The TM has the overall responsibility for 
establishing criteria for technical performance evaluations. The COASTS 2006 TM is 
Mr. James Ehlert (Information Sciences Department faculty member). 
 
4.1.5 COASTS Air Marshall.    
The COASTS Air Marshall is the authority on all aviation planning, management, 
and de-confliction. The Air Marshall will liaise with all contractors, Thailand aviation 
POCs, and all NPS aviation operators. All logistics requiring aviation assets will be 
managed and controlled by the Air Marshall. The COASTS 2006 Air Marshall is Mr. Ed 




4.1.6 Participating Test Organizations.    
The primary organization for assessment for the COASTS demonstration in 
Thailand is the Naval Postgraduate School.  Other participating organizations are as 
follows: 
   
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
Joint Inter-Agency Task Force West (JIATF-W) 
Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) 
Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) 
Thai Department of Research & Development Office (DRDO) 
   
4.2 RISK ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION. 
Overall risk is estimated to be low to medium for the COASTS May 2006 
Thailand demonstration.  Risks can be mitigated by either reducing or adding additional 
experiments as appropriate.  The table below depicts the NPS developed risk matrix: 
 
Risk Area Rating Mitigation Approaches 
Technology Low 
Medium 
- early/continuous coordination with partners  
- early prototyping 
- multiple data collection events 
- modeling and simulation 
- in-process reviews 




- schedule estimates based on technology 
provider agreements 
- schedule estimates COASTS 2005 lessons 
learned 
Schedule - Demos Low 
Medium 
- incremental demonstrations 
- identify/leverage existing events 
Assessment Low - Individual researchers develop MoE and MoP 
for their components of the demonstration. 
Funding Low - significant funding confirmed, additional 
sponsors contacted 
Figure 17.   Risk Matrix 
 
4.3  DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. 
The appendices of this document will provide specific guidance on each particular 
area, element, and component under study during the COASTS demonstration. 
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5.0 TRAINING, LOGISTIC AND SAFETY. 
5.1 TRAINING. 
A primary goal of the COASTS project is to execute operational demonstrations 
in conjunction with U.S. and Thailand forces/resources.  Accordingly, appropriate 
training materials will be developed for each demonstration and operator training will be 
conducted prior to each demonstration.  Training will be performed by a combination of 
contractor and government personnel.  There are also significant hands-on educational 
opportunities for NPS students, and it is expected that multiple NPS masters theses will 
be generated by participating US and foreign NPS students. 
 
5.2 LOGISTICS. 
Maintenance and logistics support will be conducted using a combination of 
contractor support and in-house NPS expertise and facilities. This includes the 
development and distribution of maintenance, training, and operating manuals, 
instructions, or materials.  During the demonstrations reliability, availability, and 
maintainability information will be collected for later analysis and review.  
 
5.2.1 COASTS Set-Up and Demonstration. 
The COASTS team members will transit from Bangkok to Chiang Mai via 
civilian air transport.  All COASTS equipment will be transported from the Bangkok 
International Airport to the Wing 41 RTAF air base via a RTAF-supplied C-130 or 
ground transport vehicle.  The departure and return schedule are currently not determined 
but will be based upon operational and administrative requirements during each set-up or 
demonstration time period. NPS thesis students will handle the logistics, financial 
management of transportation, as well as necessary host nation support issues.  
 
5.2.2 COASTS Equipment Shipping and Storage. 
The NPS will provide JUSMAGTHAI (POC: Lt Col Mel Prell) and the American 
Embassy Bangkok (POC: LTC Mike Creed) with a list of equipment to be shipped in 
support of the March set-up and the May demonstration.  JUSMAGTHAI will help with 
the arrival of the equipment and facilitate processing through Thai Customs to minimize 
delays.  
All COASTS equipment will be stored at either Wing 41 or at JUSMAGTHAI.  
The minimum requirements for either of these facilities will be controlled access (lock 
and key) to prevent the loss of equipment and air-conditioning to preserve the material 
condition of electronic devices.  
 
5.3 SAFETY. 
The potential exists for safety or environmental hazards associated with 
technologies being utilized.  As needed, a safety analysis will be performed to identify 
potential safety hazards and risks and determine appropriate controls to preclude mishaps 
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and reduce risks.  This is especially true with regard to manned and unmanned flight 
operations.  The OM will coordinate all safety efforts associated with demonstrations, 
with the assistance of the Air Marshall for flight operations (see next paragraph).  
 
Air-space management will be handed by the COASTS Air Marshall (Mr. Ed 
Fisher). Separation of the numerous aviation assets will ensure no collisions occur during 
field experiments in Point Sur and at the Mae Ngat Dam. An NPS student is designated 
as the COASTS 2006 Safety Officer, and will conduct all operations under the direction 
of U.S. Navy Safety Instructions.  An Operational Risk Management (ORM) Matrix will 




This CONOP is intended to be a living document.  It will be updated as required 
to reflect changes to the COASTS project as it pertains to the Thailand demonstration.  
Most modifications will be at the discretion of the COASTS Oversight Group who will 
approve any substantive alterations to include changes in objectives, funding, schedule, 
and scope.  Any changes which materially affect commitments made by Thailand will be 
approved by the affected organizations.  
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APPENDIX A. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.  The goal of the COASTS network is to build and demonstrate the flexibility, 
mobility, durability, and scalability of COTS 802.11 a/b/g and 802.16 wireless networks 
deployed to rugged and varied terrain under adverse climatic conditions.  These networks 
will be the infrastructure for transmitting state of the art sensor and ISR data providing 
improved tracking of littoral and ground movements, identifying which tracks are 
potential threats, prioritizing them for action, and providing engagement confirmation 
and battle damage assessment. 
2.  The COASTS network is designed to be robust, rapidly deployable, modular, 
and reconfigurable to meet all the needs of tactical, operational, theater, and strategic 
decision makers in coalition environments.  COTS technologies, in particular open 
standard/open source technologies, provide these capabilities due to their ease of 
configuration, small form factor, technological proliferation, and low cost separate from 
the DoD acquisition bureaucracy. 
 
B. 802.16 POINT TO POINT LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS SUITE 
1. The 802.16 point-to-point links will provide long-haul connectivity between the 
scenario network at the Mae Ngat Dam and the IIFC in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The 
802.16 technology was chosen for integration in the network due to its advantages over 
the alternative technologies for long-haul communications, namely 802.11, commercial 
SATCOM (COMSATCOM), and terrestrial (802.3) infrastructure.  Specific advantages 
of 802.16 include: 
a.  Greater range than 802.11 technologies  
b.  Higher data throughput rates than COMSATCOM 
c.  No terrestrial infrastructure required 
d.  Low cost alternative to COMSATCOM and terrestrial communications 
2.  Product Information 
a.  Redline Communications Pre-IEEE 802.16 Compliant Products: 
 i. AN-50e  
  - Point to point suite consisting of two base stations, two radio 
transceiver, and two parabolic flat panel antenna of various sizes.  
  - Provides high data throughput (up to 54 Mbps) rates with very 
low latency or jitter at ranges of up to 30 KM.   
 
C.  802.16 POINT TO MULTI-POINT MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SUITE 
1. The 802.16 point to multi-point communications suite will provide mobile 
connectivity to maritime assets on the Mae Ngat Reservoir.  The 802.16 technology was 
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chosen for integration in the network due its superiority over other wireless technologies 
for mobile and multipoint wireless networking.  Specific advantages include: 
a.  Client stations associate with only one master station.  Clients do not need 
to constantly re-associate with “in range” access points as is the case with 
802.11 coverage. 
b.  802.16 communication protocol allows for high relative velocities between 
master and client stations; 802.11 does not have this capability.  
c.  Greater range than 802.11 coverage.  
2.  Product Information 
a.  Redline Communications Pre-IEEE 802.16 Compliant Products 
 i. ST-58E  
  - Man portable client station 802.16 point to multi-point networks. 
  - Provides high data throughput rates (up to 54 Mbps) to mobile 
clients at speeds up to 150 Kts. 
 ii. Point-to-Multipoint configured AN-50E 
  - Same technology as the PtP AN-50.  It includes a special 
firmware installation that enables routing to multiple slave stations.    
 
D. 802.11 WIRELESS MESHED NETWORKS 
1. The Wi-Fi network provides connectivity for mobile clients both on the ground 
and in the air. Wrapped in a lighter package than other technologies, 802.11 provides the 
throughput required to utilize various commercial technologies such as VoIP, real-time 
video, as well as sensor to shooter and intelligence collection data. 
2. The 802.11 mesh network technology was chosen for its advantages over 
alternate methods of wireless local area networking technology such as conventional 
802.11, 802.16, and analog radios.  In addition, the proliferation of 802.11 enabled clients 
makes the use of an 802.11 network almost mandatory.  Specific advantages of 802.11 
mesh networks include the following: 
a. It is self-forming and self-healing unlike conventional 802.11.  
b.  It has higher throughput, lighter pack weight and lower power 
consumption than analog radios 
c. It has a smaller form factor than 802.16. 
3.  Product Information 
a.  Mesh Dynamics MD-300 Series  
b.  Specifications   
- 2.4GHz Structured MeshTM backhaul  
- Self-healing and self-forming  
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- Session-persistent roaming  
- Integrated 802.11 b/g access  
- AES-CCMP encrypted backhaul  
- WPA (Personal and Enterprise) security  
- Multiple-SSIDs with 802.1q VLAN support  
- Independent Security profile per SSID  
- Remote Management and Monitoring  
- Power over Ethernet  
- NEMA rated outdoor enclosure  
 
E.  COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 
802.16 point-to-point and point-to-multipoint will be employed to provide long-
haul data transmission link from the mesh-network to the IIFC.  Satellite transmission 
will provide connectivity between regional fusion centers located at Bangkok, Thailand 
and California, USA.  Commercial satellite connectivity will serve as an internet gateway 
to the World-Wide Web. 
 
F. SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS APPLICATION 
1. C3Trak (see Figure 18 next page) serves as a mobile, distributed and networked 
personnel management system that delivers situational awareness capabilities in support 
of military and law enforcement operations.  C3Trak aggregates, processes and displays 
navigational, environmental, and asset management data, in near real-time, to facilitate 
C2 decision-making, and the generation and publishing of plans and orders.  C3Trak is 
comprised of three tiers of applications connected through a high speed wireless local 
area mesh network, and a high speed wireless long-haul wide area network backbone.  
Military/law enforcement utility of C3Trak involves surveillance and tracking and search 
and rescue mission areas, but C3Trak can be applied to a number of different mission 
areas where mobile ad-hoc networking is required. local commander the situational 








Figure 18.   C3Trak System Diagram 
 
2. The 1st tier establishes a peer-to-peer network of mobile handheld devices, 
linked to sensors that provide navigational inputs.  The 1st tier handheld clients can 
operate both in GPS enabled and GPS-denied environments, and can be configured to 
automatically switch between modes of operation.  In GPS-denied environments, sensor 
inputs to the mobile clients are provided by quadrature multiple frequency ranging 
(QMFR), RF Location Beacons, PNM, etc.  Mobile handheld units possess full 
capabilities to communicate with other mobile clients on the meshed wireless local area 
network, including the 2nd tier base station unit.  Communications include full text 
messaging capabilities, forwarding of absolute and relative spatial positions (see Figure 
19 next page), and asset management of resources, including mesh sensors and 





   
 
 
   
           
         
           
   
                
                          
   
               
                        
   
  






Figure 19.   Position sensor integration 
 
3. The 2nd tier base station unit serves as the primary command and control node 
in the local area network.  It provides a near real time common operational picture as it 
correlates and fuses data from multiple sensors and intelligence sources to provide the 
local commander the situational awareness needed to be able to act and react decisively.  
The base station unit acts as the intermediary between the mobile clients and the data 
warehousing and processing 3rd tier relational database management system.  Similar to 
the handheld mobile clients, the base station unit possesses an extensive suite of 
integrated automation, messaging, and collaborative applications.  However, the base 
station unit incorporates additional aggregation and processing applications to facilitate 
the local area commander with mission planning and execution.  The 2nd tier feeds 
aggregated data, by way of a high speed wireless long-haul communications link, to the 
3rd tier relational database. 
 
4. The 3rd tier applications incorporate the force monitoring applications required 
by the regional commanders to effectively assess military operations.  It is comprised of a 
series of redundant relational database and web-host servers, designed to accommodate 
and process the large volumes of data sent from the local area meshed network 
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Mr. James Ehlert  
Gp. Capt. Teerachat 
(RTAF) 
Gp. Capt. Triroj (DRDO) 
Guidance and management of 
overall project goals and 
operations. 
Air Boss Mr. Ed Fisher Coordinate and establish overall 
airspace coordination plan.  
Manage and be responsible for all 
platform operations above ground 
level, to include manned and 
unmanned aircraft operations 
within the JOA.  Act as Deputy 
Program Manager to assist PM 
when not engaged in air activities. 
Aerial Balloons  
 
ENS Joseph Russo 
 
Build and establish an operating 
802.11g network node as payload 
on a balloon. 
 
802.11g 1st Lt Robert Lounsbury  Build and establish the 802.11g 
mesh network  
802.16 OFDM 
point to point 
 
Mr. Ryan Hale Broaden the connectivity between a 
common base station and two or 




LT John Richerson 
ENS Red Miller 
Manage the collection of all 
pertinent analysis data to establish 
recorded findings.  
Sensor Grid 
 
ENS Michael Chesnut Establish network monitored 
sensors comprised of GPS, video, 
audio, and other sensors. 
Video ENS Michael Chesnut Establish and manage all video 




LT Jonathon Powers 
Mr. Ryan Hale 
 
Define the layer 1 (physical layer) 
requirements and components for 
the overall network operations. 
Situational 
Awareness 
Mr. Rich Guarino 
 
Interface with COTS providers to 
establish a situational awareness 
solution for the COASTS program. 
Evaluation Mr. Robert Sandoval Monitor and provide networking 










LT Jonathon Powers 
Mr. Ryan Hale 
Define, establish, and provide 
solutions for the critical network 
vulnerabilities. 
Weather LT John Richerson Monitor and provide 
meteorological information for 
further correlation to network 
operating characteristics. 
 
COC ENS Stephen Schall Build and operate a command 
center in which to coordinate all 
network operations.  
SATCOM MAJ Joel Pourdrier Build and establish a SATCOM 
link to show portable link 
capability.  
Strategic Node LCDR Kris Runaas 
LCDR Ed Gawaran 
Manage the Strategic Data Link at 
the receive node at the Alameda, 
CA USCG Data Fusion Center.  
UAV (fixed 
wing) 
ENS Michael Hsu Manage and control the 
Cyberdefense micro-UAV: 
Cyberbug. Establish Network link 
to the UAV.  
UAV (rotary 
wing) 
ENS Scott Diamond Manage and control the Roto-
motion micro-UAV. Establish 
Network link to the UAV. 
UAV (kite) Mr. Ryan Hale Manage and control the helia-kite 
network extender. 
Deny GPS ENS Phong Le Manage and establish the Deny 




Capt Josh Kiihne 
Capt Drew Bledsoe 
Build, manage, and establish the 
transformable micro-UAV. To 
include the network connection to 





LT Rob Hochstedler Build FLAK in order to establish an 











APPENDIX C.  NPS THESIS RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF COASTS 
2006 
LT Hochstedler Wireless Network Topologies ISO countering Asymmetric 
Threats in the Maritime Environment 
LT Powers Data Compression Applications in deployed Wireless Networking 
ENS Chesnut Applications of Integrated Sensors for Tactical operations 
LT Richerson  Optimization studies for the Usage of Micro-UAVs in a Tactical 
Environment 
ENS Le Deny GPS in tactical wireless environments 
LCDR Runaas 
LCDR Gawaran  
IT Costs of deploying Hastily Formed wireless networks into 
tactical theatres of operation 
ENS Diamond Use of wireless networks ISO fire-control data passage to Strike 
Operations 
ENS Russo Deployment of Lighter than air vehicles in tactical wireless 
network deployments 
ENS Hsu Deployment of micro-UAVs for support of ISR in tactical 
environments 
1st Lt Lounsbury Deployment of 802.11g wireless networks ISO tactical operations 
MAJ Pourdrier Analysis of UAV-received intelligence in combat operations 
Capt Kiihne 
Capt Bledsoe 
Design and analysis of a transformable mini-UAV 
LCDR Keith 
Applegate 




Wireless Network Security in Tactical Network Deployments  
ENS Crawford Study of 802.11 backhaul configurations for Tactical 
Deployments 
ENS Schall Code applications in wireless sensor deployments 










COASTS 2006 Personnel Deployment Matrix 
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APPENDIX D.  DATA COLLECTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Validation of hypotheses using collected data is an essential step in the process of 
research.  Be it test and evaluation, proof of concept, or theoretical modeling, the 
collection and analysis of data provide accepted mathematically rigorous means by which 
conclusions are drawn.  In the context of COASTS, data collection and analysis are a 
means to empower decision makers to draw conclusions based on data collected in the 
field for each phase of COASTS 2006. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Collection Points 
a. Environmental Data 
Based on past observation of network performance in Thailand, it is 
theorized that network performance is significantly affected by temperature.  To validate 
this hypothesis and potentially model the affects of temperature on network performance 
meteorological data will be collected in each phase of the COASTS project.  For the 
context of COASTS 2006, distance measurements and locations are also considered 
environmental data. 
 
b. Benchmarking Data 
MOE and MOP inputs primarily drive the need for benchmarking by 
identifying specific metrics of concern and providing thresholds of acceptable 
performance.  Specific metrics require a trend of performance across a specified range 
that can only be evaluated against preliminary, or benchmark data.  Still other metrics 
require specific performance thresholds at all levels of effective use.   
 
Data collected before the Thailand phase of operations provides a pool of 
data collected in known conditions to compare to data collected in the operational phase.  
Also, initial conclusions and potential areas of interest may be generated through the 
analysis of this initial data.  The data also provides a means to analyze the performance of 
sensor systems and network hardware against the claims of the manufacturers. 
 
Examples of benchmarking are the observed rate of detection at given 
distances for a specific sensor or the observed signal strength generated from a specific 
antenna at given distances. 
 
c. Network Data 
Performance of computing networks is potentially affected by a wide and 
varied array of inputs and atmospheric conditions.  Signal strength, latency, throughput, 
packet loss, and jitter are just a few of the performance measures associated with network 
performance.  Each of these and additional measures will be collected throughout the 
project using a commercial application that collects and stores data network specific data.  
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A time stamp is associated with each data point to match network data with data collected 
apart from the network. 
 
d. User Data 
Subjective data such as ease of use and usability of displayed information 
will be developed as categorical data.  This will enable regressive techniques to be used 
from which the team can draw more useful conclusions. 
 
e. Data Collection Operations 
To the maximum extent possible, data collection will be conducted in a 
manner that minimizes error.  When possible gauge error will be estimated from 
manufacturer specification and input into the statistical model.  Data collection methods 
will be utilized that minimize the impact on the observed values. 
 
f. Data Preparation / Model Formulation 
Once data has been collected, a permanent copy of all raw data will be 
kept in a central location by the Data Collection node leader.  Data normalization and 
manipulation will only be carried out with copies of the raw data collected. 
 
Statistical models will, to the maximum extent possible, minimize 
variability while maintaining accuracy and tractability.  Construction of statistical models 
will be documented in such a manner as to assure reconstruction of the model solely from 
the documentation. 
 
g. Analysis and Conclusions 
Only after statistical models have been constructed and validated in 
accordance with paragraph f. above will any inference from analysis be undertaken. 
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APPENDIX E.  MINI-UAVS 
A.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Mini-UAVs will be used in the COASTS scenario to provide tactically persistent 
surveillance/reconnaissance.  In the 2006 Thailand field experiment, presence of potential 
bad actors will be noted by sensor-“triggers”, and mini-UAVs will be launched to gain 
additional information on these bad actors and pass the information to local-tactical, 
regional-operational, and strategic C2 centers for continued consideration.  
 





The CyberBug is a small, lightweight, scaleable, low-cost mini-UAV.  One man 
may unpack, assemble, and launch the CyberBug in under one minute. It is hand-
launched and capable of utilizing an auto-land system.  It may be programmed for 
autonomous operation with manual override available.  It is normally equipped with a 
stabilized gimbaled low light high resolution camera, and an IR camera payload is 
available. It is electrically powered, and has about 45 minutes endurance.   
 
• Length 25-56 inches  
• Wing span 30 inches to 60 inches  
• Weight ~ 2.6 pounds scalable to 5 pounds  
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• 45 minutes to 3.5 hours approximate flight time  
• 5-20 MPH  
• Autopilot / GPS navigation  
• Hand held viewer and joy-stick  
• Small 12x camera w/Optional cameras for day and IR(Indigo)  
• 9 -18 Volt battery  
• Carrying case (small unit)  
• EO/IR payload is scalable up to several pounds  
• Includes short range data link (long range is option)  
 




The Rotomotion SR-100 is a relatively small vertical take-off and landing UAV.  
It may be programmed for autonomous operation or can be flown manually. It has an 
auto-land and auto-takeoff capability. It may be equipped with either a day camera or an 
IR camera, and utilized a low-jitter capability to stabilize the video feed. It may be 
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gasoline, diesel, or electrically powered.  If equipped with the electrical motor (COASTS 
preference for low-observable operations), it has about 60 minutes endurance.  
 
• 802.11-based Telemetry System 
• Length:2250 mm, 89” 
• Main Rotor (M/R) Dia.:1900 mm, 75” 
• Dry Weight:16 kg, 35lbs. 
• Fuel Cap:2 liter, 67 oz. ,(alcohol,diesel,50:1, 2cycle gasoline)up to 14 
liter, 470 oz., tanks available 
• Engine :2-Stroke gasoline, alcohol, diesel conversion, or electric 
• Generator (optional):150W, 12V power bus with battery backup 
• Climb rate:122 mpm, 400fpm (AFCS regulated) 
• Speed:10 mps, 65 fps (AFCS regulated) 
• Endurance:30 min to 2 hours (depending on fuel tank configuration) 
• Max Payload: up to 7 kg, 20 lbs (depending on options, altitude, fuel load)  
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APPENDIX F.  COASTS 2006 STORYLINE 
The arrival of a longboat suspected of involvement in drug and arms smuggling 
operations will be detected by various unattended sensor suites deployed at a tactical 
waterborne choke-point(s).  When triggered by the motion of the longboat, the sensors 
will send an automatic system alert through the C3Trak SSA application.  This system 
alert will be observed by all the tactical forces connected to the network (refer to Figure 
2), by the local C2 center (the IIFC in Chiang Mai), by the remote C2 center in Bangkok 
(RTAF HQ) and finally by the strategic C2 center in Alameda, CA (at the U.S. Coast 
Guard Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC)). The coalition small boat unit will 
also receive the alert via the 802.16 OFDM mesh network. Coalition small boats, 
camouflaged as local river merchants, will track the longboat, passing intelligence via 
Voice-over-IP (VoIP) communications and imagery back via mounted IP cameras over a 
wireless link.  
 
The system alert will enable coalition operators to track the movement of the 
longboat through various sensors deployed along the waterway.  At a pre-determined 
trigger point, the tactical C2 center will order the launch of the mini-UAVs and the full-
sized UAV to establish tactical persistent surveillance. The UAVs will pass video 
(electro-optical and infrared) through a wireless network established by four tethered 
aerial balloons, operating at altitudes up to 3500 feet, and each equipped with a wireless 
access point, and one non-tethered unmanned lighter-than-air vehicle (LAV) operating at 
altitudes of up to 10,000 feet.  The data obtained from the UAVs will be collected, fused, 
and disseminated by the C3Trak application to the on-scene commanders in the Mobile 
Command Platform (MCP). 
 
When the longboat arrives at a “drop-point” (near the end of the reservoir, close 
by the Mae Ngat Dam Boat Shop) the drug and explosive shipment will be transferred 
into the cargo bed of two awaiting trucks and an unidentified bad actor (man) is given a 
CD (contents include the details of the smuggling operation to include financial ties with 
terrorist organizations). This entire process is being remotely monitored (UAVs and 
balloons) and displayed at the local, regional, and strategic C2 centers. After the transfer 
is complete, the longboat departs along the reverse route. A bad actor convoy (two 
trucks) is tracked as it moves along the road atop the Mae Ngat Dam while the individual 
bad actor will leave on foot on a northward path.  
 
The scenario will then split into two parts to research, test, and display the 
versatility and multi-tasking potential of the COASTS network. One part will entail the 
bad actor being tracked on foot by a Royal Thai Army and Police squad.  The bad actor 
will cross land-based sensor suites, again initiating a C3Trak system-wide alert. The IIFC 
will order the interdiction squad (equipped with a wearable computing device which can 
send/receive all network data, and biometric and explosive residue collection capabilities) 
to coordinate the apprehension of the suspected bad actor.   
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The second part of the scenario will entail the convoy being tracked by the 
network sensors simultaneously. The vehicle carrying the larger portion of the drugs will 
also cross a Guardian sensor grid, deployed alongside the road, sending another C3Trak 
system-wide alert.  At this point, orders will be passed from the strategic command and 
control center (MIFC), via the operational node in Bangkok (RTAF HQ), to capture all 
monitored units: longboat, trucks, and bad actor. The bad actor will be captured without 
incident, but both the longboat and trucks are armed and put up heavy resistance against 
capture. Both the coalition small boat team and the vehicle interception team pass 
SITREPS via the COASTS network requesting tactical air support (L-39 jets). 
 
After apprehension of the bad actor is affected, biometric data will be gathered 
and passed to the MIFC for identity verification.  Once positive confirmation is received 
that the captive is the high value target in question, the coalition ground forces holding 
the bad actor will pass initial intelligence from the CD (captured with the bad actor’s 
personal effects) and initial custody status via C3Trak to all network users as well as the 
IIFC and MIFC. 
 
The COASTS Watch Officer (CWO) at the IIFC will request an air strike against 
the convoy from RTAF HQ.  As part of this request the CWO will pass GPS positions 
and other targeting information.  The RTAF HQ directs two L-39s from Wing 41 to 
conduct the air-to-surface strike.   
 
Concurrently, coalition maritime interdiction teams will apprehend the long boat.  
After apprehension of the bad actors, biometric data will be gathered and passed to the 
MIFC for identity verification. Once directed to maintain custody of the bad actors, the 
coalition maritime interdiction team will pass mission status via C3Trak to all network 
users as well as the IIFC and MIFC. 
 
The L-39’s loiter pending resolution of the maritime interdiction.  The scenario 
will finish after the maritime interdiction is completed and the L-39’s have departed the 
JOA.   
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APPENDIX B.  COMPLETE EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
 















45.3 12 3 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
27.9 3 3 9 75.1 29.76 70.6 
35.7 5 1 4 70.6 30.15 33.4 
38.4 8 2 16 77 29.97 94.9 
42.1 11 2 2 59.3 30.2 51.4 
32.6 4 2 13 57.4 30.00 94.1 
28.1 2 3 5 54.5 30.12 82.8 
35.2 11 3 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 
38.5 6 2 8 88 29.80 77.2 
25.6 0 1 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 
31.4 9 1 7 106.8 29.57 20.3 
39.5 7 3 12 41.8 29.62 95.1 
38.1 5 2 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
26.2 1 2 14 93.6 29.74 46.7 
37.7 8 2 3 81.4 29.88 84.2 
39.3 10 1 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 
27.5 2 2 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 
Note: 
1. Speed categories are defined as follows: 1 represents 0 to 2 mph, 2 represents 2 to 4 mph, 3 
represents 4 to 6 mph. 




Human PIR Detection Range = 33.8 + (1.42 x Sensor Elevation) – (0.0828 x Temperature) 
 
S = 2.62670 R2  = 83.1% Adjusted R2 = 80.7% 
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150.6 12 3 19 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
86.2 3 3 8 9 75.1 29.76 70.6 
79.2 5 1 11 4 70.6 30.15 33.4 
110.8 8 2 13 16 77 29.97 94.9 
124.1 11 2 39 2 59.3 30.2 51.4 
93.8 4 2 50 13 57.4 30.00 94.1 
109.0 2 3 33 5 54.5 30.12 82.8 
143.6 11 3 30 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 
104.0 6 2 28 8 88 29.80 77.2 
72.1 0 1 36 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 
86.4 9 1 47 7 106.8 29.57 20.3 
100.5 7 3 44 12 41.8 29.62 95.1 
101.4 5 2 42 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
80.6 1 2 16 14 93.6 29.74 46.7 
102.4 8 2 5 3 81.4 29.88 84.2 
73.7 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 
60.3 2 2 25 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 
Note: 
3. Cross Section values are categorical.  1 represents a small car, 2 represents a small truck, 3 
represents a large truck. 
4. “Time of Day” was created so tests were done under a variety of weather conditions. 
 
Vehicle Detection Range = 37.7 + (3.94 x Sensor Elevation) + (18.0 x Cross Section). 
 


























58.9 12 3 19 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
52.4 3 3 8 9 75.1 29.76 70.6 
31.2 5 1 11 4 70.6 30.15 33.4 
43.9 8 2 13 16 77 29.97 94.9 
45.3 11 2 39 2 59.3 30.2 51.4 
42.7 4 2 50 13 57.4 30.00 94.1 
51.7 2 3 33 5 54.5 30.12 82.8 
58.2 11 3 30 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 
43.2 6 2 28 8 88 29.80 77.2 
31.9 0 1 36 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 
31.9 9 1 47 7 106.8 29.57 20.3 
56.1 7 3 44 12 41.8 29.62 95.1 
42.9 5 2 42 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
41.0 1 2 16 14 93.6 29.74 46.7 
43.4 8 2 5 3 81.4 29.88 84.2 
32.4 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 
41.9 2 2 25 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 
Note: 
1. Cross Section values are categorical.  1 represents a small car, 2 represents a small truck, 3 
represents a large truck. 
2.     “Time of Day” was created so tests were done under a variety of weather conditions. 
 
Magnetic Detection Range = 17.6 + (0.415 x  Sensor Elevation)+ (11.6 x  Cross Section). 
 












Speed Time of 
Day 
Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
100 0 12 3 19 6 72.1 29.89 30 1 
99 1 3 3 8 9 64.3 29.86 39.8 0.99 
98 2 5 1 11 4 81.6 29.82 56 0.98 
100 0 8 2 13 16 67.8 30.03 84.5 1 
100 0 11 2 39 2 91.2 29.77 66.9 1 
99 1 4 2 50 13 52.9 30.15 82.1 0.99 
100 0 2 3 33 5 69.9 30.01 67.4 1 
100 0 11 3 30 15 64.6 29.9 41 1 
99 1 6 2 28 8 87.7 29.77 50.1 0.99 
98 2 0 1 36 10 57.6 29.85 83.6 0.98 
98 2 9 1 47 7 100.7 29.6 25.3 0.98 
100 0 7 3 44 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 1 
100 0 5 2 42 0 102.2 29.73 20.4 1 
99 1 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.99 
99 1 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.99 
99 1 10 1 22 11 54.5 30.12 82.6 0.99 
99 1 2 2 25 1 77 29.96 33.6 0.99 
 
Pd 10 Feet = 0.974 + (0.000615 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00723 x Cross Section) 
S = 0.00469833  R2  = 65.9% Adjusted R2 = 61.0% 
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Day Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
100 0 12 3 19 6 72.1 29.89 30 1 
99 1 3 3 8 9 64.3 29.86 39.8 0.99 
98 2 5 1 11 4 81.6 29.82 56 0.98 
100 0 8 2 13 16 67.8 30.03 84.5 1 
100 0 11 2 39 2 91.2 29.77 66.9 1 
99 1 4 2 50 13 54 30.14 76.2 0.99 
100 0 2 3 33 5 76.3 29.97 71.6 1 
100 0 11 3 30 15 67.8 30.03 84.5 1 
99 1 6 2 28 8 91.2 29.77 66.9 0.99 
97 3 0 1 36 10 57.6 29.85 83.6 0.97 
98 2 9 1 47 7 100.7 29.6 25.3 0.98 
100 1 7 3 44 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 1 
100 0 5 2 42 0 102.2 29.73 20.4 1 
99 1 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.99 
99 1 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.99 
98 2 10 1 22 11 54.5 30.12 82.6 0.98 
99 1 2 2 25 1 77 29.96 33.6 0.99 
 
Pd 15 Feet = 0.967 + (0.000663 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00957 x Cross Section) 
 















Day Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
100 0 12 3 19 6 72.1 29.89 30 1 
97 3 3 3 8 9 64.3 29.86 39.8 0.97 
98 2 5 1 11 4 81.6 29.82 56 0.98 
100 0 8 2 13 16 67.8 30.03 84.5 1 
100 0 11 2 39 2 91.2 29.77 66.9 1 
99 1 4 2 50 13 54 30.14 76.2 0.99 
100 0 2 3 33 5 76.3 29.97 71.6 1 
100 0 11 3 30 15 67.8 30.03 84.5 1 
99 1 6 2 28 8 91.2 29.77 66.9 0.99 
96 4 0 1 36 10 57.6 29.85 83.6 0.96 
98 2 9 1 47 7 100.7 29.6 25.3 0.98 
100 0 7 3 44 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 1 
100 0 5 2 42 0 102.2 29.73 20.4 1 
99 1 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.99 
99 1 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.99 
99 1 10 1 22 11 54.5 30.12 82.6 0.99 
99 1 2 2 25 1 77 29.96 33.6 0.99 
 
Pd 20 Feet = 0.967 + (0.00143 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00705 x Cross Section) 
 















Day Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
100 0 12 3 19 6 70.6 30.15 33.4 1 
97 3 3 3 8 9 77 29.97 94.9 0.97 
98 2 5 1 11 4 59.3 30.2 51.4 0.98 
100 0 8 2 13 16 67.8 30.03 84.5 1 
99 1 11 2 39 2 91.2 29.77 66.9 0.99 
99 1 4 2 50 13 54 30.14 76.2 0.99 
99 1 2 3 33 5 76.3 29.97 71.6 0.99 
100 0 11 3 30 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 1 
99 1 6 2 28 8 88 29.8 77.2 0.99 
96 4 0 1 36 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 0.96 
98 2 9 1 47 7 93.6 29.74 46.7 0.98 
100 1 7 3 44 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 1 
100 0 5 2 42 0 102.2 29.73 20.4 1 
99 1 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.99 
99 1 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.99 
99 1 10 1 22 11 54.5 30.12 82.6 0.99 
97 3 2 2 25 1 77 29.96 33.6 0.97 
 
 
Pd 30 Feet = 0.964 + (0.00178 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.0060 x Cross Section) 
S = 0.00909440  R2  = 49.8% Adjusted R2 = 42.6% 
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Speed Time of 
Day 
Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
98 2 12 3 19 6 36.4 29.97 93.6 0.98 
98 2 3 3 8 9 36.4 30.2 93.6 0.98 
95 5 5 1 11 4 90.3 29.76 46.6 0.95 
99 1 8 2 13 16 81.6 29.77 43.7 0.99 
99 1 11 2 39 2 64.6 29.9 41 0.99 
98 2 4 2 50 13 100.7 29.6 23.9 0.98 
99 1 2 3 33 5 76.3 29.97 71.6 0.99 
97 3 11 3 30 15 100.7 29.6 23.9 0.97 
99 1 6 2 28 8 88 29.8 77.2 0.99 
96 4 0 1 36 10 64.9 30.15 53.3 0.96 
98 2 9 1 47 7 93.6 29.74 46.7 0.98 
98 2 7 3 44 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 0.98 
97 3 5 2 42 0 102.2 29.73 20.4 0.97 
96 4 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.96 
99 1 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.99 
98 2 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 0.98 
97 3 2 2 25 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 0.97 
 
Pd 40 Feet = 0.959 + (0.00123 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00525 x Cross Section) 
S = 0.0110152  R2  = 27.8% Adjusted R2 = 17.5% 
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Speed Time of 
Day 
Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
96 4 12 3 19 6 100.7 29.6 23.9 0.96 
94 6 3 3 8 9 36.4 28.68 48.2 0.94 
94 6 5 1 11 4 54.5 30.12 82.8 0.94 
95 5 8 2 13 16 77 29.97 94.9 0.95 
95 5 11 2 39 2 64.6 29.9 41 0.95 
94 6 4 2 50 13 56.9 30.15 86.1 0.94 
93 7 2 3 33 5 76.3 29.97 71.6 0.93 
96 4 11 3 30 15 88 29.8 77.2 0.96 
96 4 6 2 28 8 88 29.8 77.2 0.96 
91 9 0 1 36 10 96.4 28.68 45.7 0.91 
94 6 9 1 47 7 82.1 28.68 85.6 0.94 
95 5 7 3 44 12 56.9 30.15 86.1 0.95 
92 8 5 2 42 0 102.2 29.73 20.4 0.92 
92 8 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.92 
94 6 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.94 
92 8 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 0.92 
94 6 2 2 25 1 61.5 29.85 83.6 0.94 
 
Pd 50 Feet = 0.907 + (0.002277 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00889 x Cross Section) 
S = 0.0107493  R2  = 50.2% Adjusted R2 = 43.1.0% 
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Speed Time of 
Day 
Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
95 5 12 3 19 6 56.9 30.15 86.1 0.95 
94 6 3 3 8 9 102.2 29.73 20.4 0.94 
94 6 5 1 11 4 54.5 30.12 82.8 0.94 
95 5 8 2 13 16 77 29.97 94.9 0.95 
95 5 11 2 39 2 64.6 29.9 41 0.95 
93 6 4 2 50 13 100.7 29.6 23.9 0.93 
93 7 2 3 33 5 36.4 28.68 48.2 0.93 
96 4 11 3 30 15 88 29.8 77.2 0.96 
96 4 6 2 28 8 61.5 29.85 83.6 0.96 
91 9 0 1 36 10 96.4 28.68 45.7 0.91 
93 7 9 1 47 7 82.1 28.68 85.6 0.93 
95 5 7 3 44 12 56.9 30.15 86.1 0.95 
92 8 5 2 42 0 76.3 29.97 71.6 0.92 
93 7 1 2 16 14 41.8 29.62 94.3 0.93 
94 6 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.94 
92 8 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 0.92 
94 6 2 2 25 1 57.4 30 94.1 0.94 
 
 
Pd 60 Feet = 0.908 + (0.00175 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.00931 x Cross Section) 
S = 0.0107493  R2  = 50.2% Adjusted R2 = 43.1% 
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Speed Time of 
Day 
Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
95 5 12 3 19 6 104.3 29.57 22.6 0.95 
93 7 3 3 8 9 45.6 29.77 91.8 0.93 
93 7 5 1 11 4 34.9 29.74 93.4 0.93 
92 8 8 2 13 16 96.4 28.68 45.7 0.92 
93 7 11 2 39 2 88 30.12 23.9 0.93 
93 6 4 2 50 13 59.3 29.74 77.2 0.93 
91 9 2 3 33 5 62.4 29.88 76.2 0.91 
95 5 11 3 30 15 88 29.8 77.2 0.95 
96 4 6 2 28 8 61.5 29.85 83.6 0.96 
88 12 0 1 36 10 96.4 28.68 45.7 0.88 
93 7 9 1 47 7 34.9 28.68 93.4 0.93 
94 6 7 3 44 12 96.4 29.74 45.7 0.94 
91 9 5 2 42 0 82.1 29.88 85.6 0.91 
93 7 1 2 16 14 88.2 29.8 75.7 0.93 
92 8 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.92 
91 9 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 0.91 
93 7 2 2 25 1 57.4 30 94.1 0.93 
 
 
Pd 70 Feet =0.893 + (0.00204 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.0104 x Cross Section) 
S = 0.00469833  R2  = 65.9% Adjusted R2 = 61.0% 
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Pd 80 Feet = 0.893 + (0.00204 x Sensor Elevation) + (0.0104 x Cross Section) 









Speed Time of 
Day 
Temperature Pressure Humidity Probability
94 6 12 3 19 6 104.3 29.57 22.6 0.95 
93 7 3 3 8 9 45.6 29.77 91.8 0.93 
93 7 5 1 11 4 34.9 29.74 93.4 0.93 
92 8 8 2 13 16 96.4 28.68 45.7 0.92 
93 7 11 2 39 2 88 30.12 23.9 0.93 
93 6 4 2 50 13 59.3 29.74 77.2 0.93 
91 9 2 3 33 5 62.4 29.88 76.2 0.91 
94 6 11 3 30 15 88 29.8 77.2 0.95 
93 7 6 2 28 8 61.5 29.85 83.6 0.96 
87 13 0 1 36 10 96.4 28.68 45.7 0.88 
93 7 9 1 47 7 34.9 28.68 93.4 0.93 
94 6 7 3 44 12 96.4 29.74 45.7 0.94 
91 9 5 2 42 0 82.1 29.88 85.6 0.91 
93 7 1 2 16 14 88.2 29.8 75.7 0.93 
92 8 8 2 5 3 38.2 28.67 92.7 0.92 
91 9 10 1 22 11 57.6 29.56 85.5 0.91 
90 10 2 2 25 1 57.4 30 94.1 0.93 
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MOTE-TO-MOTE BREAK RANGE 
 
Distance Elevation Temperature Pressure Humidity 
75.8 0 54 30.14 76.2 
76.2 0 76.3 29.97 71.6 
73.8 0 67.8 30.03 84.5 
79.5 0 91.2 29.77 66.9 
76.75 0 52.9 30.15 82.1 
80.3 0 69.9 30.01 67.4 
79.25 0 64.1 30 75.8 
81.5 0 87.7 29.77 50.1 
70.6 0 106.8 29.74 95.1 
71 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
72.25 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
75.8 0 90.3 29.75 46.6 
76.5 0 81.6 29.79 43.7 
77.25 0 64.6 29.9 41 
71.2 0 100.7 29.6 23.9 
67.1 0 36.4 28.68 48.2 
100.2 6 63.9 30.15 53.1 
95.4 6 72.7 29.76 71.3 
99.5 6 71.6 30.15 33.4 
105.4 6 75.4 29.97 90.4 
101.3 6 61.2 30.2 53.7 
93.25 6 59.7 30 92.1 
94.75 6 51.1 30.12 85.3 
102.25 6 102.8 29.6 20.4 
98.5 6 88.2 29.8 75.7 
99.66 6 62.4 30.15 53.3 
93.5 6 104.3 29.57 22.6 
102.5 6 45.6 29.62 91.8 
100.25 6 34.9 28.68 93.4 
103.1 6 96.4 29.74 45.7 
94.22 6 82.1 29.88 85.6 
96.22 6 56.9 29.56 86.1 
136.75 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 
140.8 12 75.1 29.76 70.6 
122.75 12 70.6 30.15 33.4 
145.8 12 77 29.97 94.9 
125.4 12 59.3 30.2 51.4 
138.75 12 57.4 30 94.1 
140.25 12 54.5 30.12 82.8 
136.43 12 100.7 29.6 23.9 
125.8 12 88 29.8 77.2 
144.5 12 59.3 30.2 51.4 
138.9 12 57.4 30 94.1 
130.6 12 54.5 30.12 82.8 
139.66 12 100.7 29.6 23.9 
150.22 12 88 29.8 77.2 
141.66 12 64.9 30.15 53.3 
143.33 12 106.8 29.57 20.3 
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MOTE-TO-BASE STATION BREAK RANGE 
Distance Elevation Temperature Pressure Humidity 
51.8 0 54 30.14 76.2 
53.75 0 76.3 29.97 71.6 
50.75 0 67.8 30.03 84.5 
56.2 0 91.2 29.77 66.9 
49.1 0 52.9 30.15 82.1 
51.8 0 69.9 30.01 67.4 
55.1 0 64.1 30 75.8 
53.6 0 87.7 29.77 50.1 
46.9 0 106.8 29.74 95.1 
47.8 0 36.4 28.68 93.6 
54.8 0 90.3 29.75 46.6 
55.9 0 81.6 29.79 43.7 
53.1 0 64.6 29.9 41 
54.9 0 100.7 29.6 23.9 
50.9 0 36.4 28.68 48.2 
47.2 0 54.5 30.12 82.8 
80.7 6 77 29.97 94.9 
90.5 6 59.3 30.2 51.4 
82.1 6 57.4 30 94.1 
88.7 6 54.5 30.12 82.8 
93.2 6 100.7 29.6 23.9 
91.9 6 88 29.8 77.2 
91.7 6 64.9 30.15 53.3 
90.3 6 93.6 29.74 46.7 
89.5 6 81.4 29.88 84.2 
89.5 6 75.1 29.76 70.6 
90.9 6 70.6 30.15 33.4 
81.4 6 77 29.97 94.9 
93.8 6 59.3 30.2 51.4 
84.3 6 57.4 30 94.1 
93.9 6 54.5 30.12 82.8 
94.8 6 100.7 29.6 23.9 
115.5 12 88 29.8 77.2 
120.3 12 57.6 29.56 85.5 
119.7 12 61.5 29.85 83.6 
120.3 12 63.9 30.15 53.1 
114.9 12 72.7 29.76 71.3 
117.8 12 71.6 30.15 33.4 
112.8 12 34.9 28.68 93.4 
118.3 12 96.4 29.74 45.7 
113.5 12 82.1 29.88 85.6 
114.8 12 88.2 29.8 75.7 
118.66 12 62.4 30.15 53.3 
120.33 12 104.3 29.57 22.6 
110.4 12 34.9 28.68 93.4 
116.7 12 96.4 29.74 45.7 
114.01 12 64.3 29.86 39.8 
104 12 81.6 29.82 56 
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MOTE-TO-MOTE REASSOCIATION RANGE 
Distance Elevation Temperature Pressure Humidity 
36.2 0 54 30.12 85.3
38.25 0 76.3 29.6 20.4
39.5 0 67.8 29.8 75.7
40.2 0 51.1 30.15 66.9
38.8 0 102.8 29.97 82.1
40.7 0 88.2 30.01 67.4
39.4 0 59.7 30 75.8
40.1 0 91.2 29.76 50.1
34.9 0 106.8 30.15 95.1
35.4 0 36.4 29.97 93.6
26.9 0 36.4 30.2 93.6
39.5 0 90.3 29.76 46.6
38.8 0 81.6 29.77 43.7
39.1 0 64.6 29.9 41
35.4 0 100.7 29.6 23.9
36.85 0 36.4 28.68 48.2
49.5 6 63.9 30.15 53.1
50.25 6 72.7 29.75 71.3
51.75 6 71.6 29.79 33.4
42.8 6 75.4 30.15 90.4
48.1 6 61.2 30.2 53.7
43.1 6 100.7 30 92.1
47.3 6 88 30.12 23.9
48.2 6 59.3 29.74 77.2
47.6 6 62.4 29.88 76.2
46.9 6 54.5 29.56 53.3
47.1 6 104.3 29.57 22.6
44.9 6 45.6 29.77 91.8
45.9 6 34.9 29.74 93.4
46.2 6 96.4 28.68 45.7
46.8 6 82.1 28.68 85.6
47.2 6 56.9 30.15 86.1
55.9 12 64.9 30.15 53.3
54.7 12 75.1 29.62 70.6
57.75 12 70.6 28.68 33.4
50.25 12 77 29.6 94.9
54.3 12 59.3 29.8 51.4
51.7 12 57.4 30 94.1
52.9 12 54.5 30.14 82.8
55.8 12 57.4 29.97 51.4
52.1 12 87.7 30.03 94.1
55.2 12 52.9 30.2 82.8
54.8 12 69.9 30 71.6
53.9 12 64.1 30.12 84.5
56.3 12 100.7 29.6 23.9
57.1 12 88 29.8 77.2
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APPENDIX C.  HEAT REMOVAL CONCERNS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The use of digital video surveillance imagery in tactical networking environments 
provides the watch-stander with significantly increased intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities.  The role of the cameras in the integrated network is to 
provide remote, real-time visual information to a watch-stander.  This offers several key 
benefits, including visual verification of sensor activity, remote monitoring, and 
persistent surveillance.  Providing real-time visual information assists decision makers in 
making accurate and timely decisions.  However, most commercially available internet 
protocol (IP) cameras are not designed to function in the harsh environments commonly 
found in military and law enforcement applications.  As a result of several field exercises 
and feedback from coalition military forces and in conjunction with Kestrel Technology 
Group, several design modifications have proposed to commercially available IP cameras 
to increase the longevity and reliability of digital surveillance equipment in high 
temperature environments.  Additionally, the principles used during this research are 
applicable to other electronics used in field operations. 
 
B. INTRODUCTION TO AXIS 213 PTZ NETWORK CAMERA 
Numerous law enforcement and military organizations currently use video 
surveillance technologies on a daily basis.  As a result, numerous commercial companies 
have begun developing video products designed for remote monitoring and security 
applications.  Among the most prolific of such companies is Axis Communications, 
which is a global market leader in network video products and specializes in 
“professional network video solutions for remote monitoring, security surveillance and 
broadcasting (www.axis.com/corporate/index.htm).”   
The Axis 213 PTZ Network Camera, shown in Figure 1, is the video component 
selected for use.  The camera was selected for several important reasons.  Firstly, the 
Axis 213 camera is currently in use by several military and law enforcement 
organizations worldwide.  It is currently in use by several United States military 
organizations such as the Air Force Force Protection Battle Lab.  Additionally, the Axis 
216 
213 is currently used by the Royal Thai Military Forces operations in support of the 
Global War on Terror.  Secondly, the size and shape of the Axis 213 is conducive for 
covert operations and concealment.  Additionally, the camera does not consume 
significant amounts of power and can easily be powered for extended time periods on a 
common car battery.  Finally, the Axis 213 is an easily available commercial camera 
package that provides significant performance capabilities in a single, cost-efficient 
package.  The camera offers impressive pan, tilt, and zoom functions combined with 
built-in infrared capabilities, adjustable frame rates, multiple video stream formats, and 
preset viewing positions.  Table 1 provides details of the important performance 
capabilities of the Axis 213 PTZ Network Camera. 
 
 
















Lens 2.5 – 91mm F1.6 –F4.0, motorized zoom lens 
Horizontal viewing angle: 42 – 1.7º 
Auto focus, 26x optical and 12x digital zoom 
Minimum Illumination Color mode: 1 lux, F1.6 
IR mode: 0.1 lux, F1.6* 
*Using built in IR light in complete darkness up to 3 meters 
Video Compression Motion JPEG 
MPEG-4 
Resolutions 704x480, 768x576, 160x120, 176x144 
Frame Rates Motion JPEG: Up to 30/25 frames per second 
MPEG-4: 30/25 or 21/17 frames per second 
Video Streaming Simultaneous Motion JPEG and MPEG-4 
Controllable frame rate and bandwidth 
Constant and variable bit rate 
Pan Angle Range 340º 
Tilt Angle Range 100º 
Zoom 26x optical, 12x digital 
Preset Positions 20 operator definable preset positions and configurable 
monitoring sequence 
Video Access Up to 20 simultaneous clients 
Supported Protocols IP, HTTP, TCP, ICMP, RTSP, RTP, UDP, IGMP, RTCP, 
SMTP, FTP, DHCP, UpnP, ARP, DNS, DynDNS, SOCKS 
Connectors RJ-45 
26-pin multi-connector 
Power 13 V DC, max 24 W external power supply 
Operating Conditions 5 – 40 ºC (41 – 104 ºF) 
20 – 80 % non-condensing relative humidity 
Dimensions 
(HxWxD) and Weight 
130 x 104 x 130 mm (5.12 x 4.09 x 5.12 in) 
700 grams (1.55 pounds) 
 
Table 1 Axis 213 Capabilities from Axis User’s Manual (Axis, 2005) 
 
C. THE PROBLEM 
The Axis 213 camera is a surveillance package designed primarily for indoor use 
in moderate climactic environments.  The maximum temperature of 104 ºF makes the 
unmodified camera inappropriate for most military and law enforcement applications.  
For example, during the Coalition Operating Areas Surveillance and Targeting System 
(COASTS) March demonstrations in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the Axis 213 suffered from 
many heat related performance problems.  During the demonstrations, the ambient 
temperature would routinely exceed 104 ºF.  The camera would continue to function until 
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the base of the camera reached almost 106 ºF.  Once the temperature of the camera 
peaked, the camera would overheat and stop functioning.  The camera became 
unreachable via the 802.11 network or by direct Ethernet connection.  It was suspected 
that the microchips associated with the web server were overheating.  When the camera 
overheated, the power lights would remain lit, but the camera would not respond to 
network pings, nor would it be accessible through a web browser.  Upon failure, the 
camera was placed in the shade and allowed to cool.  Once it cooled, the camera began 
operating correctly until it overheated.  On days when the ambient temperature was under 
100 ºF, the camera operated correctly without failure. 
The performance problems are indicative solely of overheating. Typically, when 
electronics suffer from heat problems, a specific chip (or set of chips) will fail and affects 
specific functions until sufficiently cooled.  This was verified through contacting the Axis 
technical support.  They confirmed that the chips associated with the web server are 
typically the first chips to overheat.  Failure was repeated several times in the laboratory 
by placing the camera inside of an oven.  The symptoms seen in the lab were consistent 
with those found in Thailand and described by the Axis technical support staff. 
As a result of the COASTS demonstrations and feedback from Thai security 
forces currently using the Axis 213 camera, and in conjunction with contractors from 
Kestrel Technology Group, several design modifications have been undertaken to 
increase the longevity and reliability of the Axis 213 in high temperature environments.  
The primary goals of the modifications are to improve heat extraction from electronic 
components while simultaneously minimizing environmental heat intake to the camera 
and ensuring full range of Pan-Tilt-Zoom capabilities. 
 
D. COOLING METHODS 
Several heat reduction and removal approaches exist for hardening electronic 
equipment operating near or above the maximum rated environmental temperature.  After 
analyzing the Axis 213, two cooling methods have been developed: the controlled 
housing temperature approach and the chip cooling method.  The following sections 
discuss the two methods in detail. 
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1. Controlled Housing Temperature Approach 
The first, and most challenging, approach to removing heat at ambient 
temperatures at or above the rated temperature is the controlled housing temperature 
approach.  This approach entails employing active and passive techniques to regulate the 
external camera housing at a temperature below the maximum operating temperature.  
The controlled housing temperature approach uses a solid state thermoelectric cooler and 
heat sink combination to cool the housing and associated electronics to a temperature 
below the ambient environmental temperature.  This approach is the most robust 
approach because the entire electronic system is kept at a nearly constant temperature 
regardless of the surrounding environment.  The controlled temperature approach, 
however, is more expensive and requires larger heatsinks and results in greater power 
consumption.  As a result, the approach is recommended for fixed locations where power 
is easily available as opposed to applications with strict size and weight constraints.  
Using the controlled housing temperature approach is expected to maximize the effective 
component life through maintaining a steady temperature without the use of any moving 
parts.  As a result, this method is expected to be most suitable for operations in extreme 
environments such as Thailand, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
The controlled housing temperature approach consists of two major components.  
The first component is a solid state thermoelectric cooler.  Peltier devices are common 
thermoelectric coolers used for electronic applications.  A Peltier device, shown in Figure 
2, is typically a few centimeters square and only a few millimeters deep.  They consist of 
small Bismuth Telluride cubes that behave as a heat pump (Thermoelectric Handbook, 
2006).  Heat is moved from one side of the device to the other by applying a current 
source.  The “cold” side of the device is typically applied to devices such as 
microprocessors and other sensitive electronic equipment.  The “hot” side of the device 
reaches high temperatures and is commonly attached to a heatsink for heat removal 
(“Thermoelectric Cooler FAQ,” 2006).  A thermostatic control switch can be added to 
activate the Peltier device only when a specified temperature is achieved.  The 
combination of a Peltier device and a control switch allows the system to behave much 
like the thermostat for an air conditioning system.  When the temperature of the device on 
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the “cold” side of the Peltier cooler is higher than the specified temperature, the Peltier 
cooler is activated and runs until the device is below the temperature threshold.   
 
 
Figure 2 Peltier Cooler with Temperature Control Switch 
 
The second component of the controlled housing temperature method is a 
heatsink.  There are two types of heatsinks available.  The first heatsink type is the 
passive heatsink.  Passive heatsinks consist of a thermally conductive metal with at least 
one flat side which is attached to the object being cooled and an arrangement of fin-like 
protrusions.  The flat part of the heat sink must maintain good thermal contact with the 
object.  Traditionally, thermal grease or gap filler is applied to ensure smooth and 
continuous contact.  The fins of the heat sink are used to increase the surface contact with 
the surrounding air.  Passive heatsinks are typically composed of either copper or 
aluminum due to their excellent thermal conducting properties.  Copper heatsinks are 
more expensive but are also more efficient thermal conductors.  Figure 3 shows a 
common passive heatsink.  The active heatsink is the second type of common heatsink.  
Active heatsinks use fans in conjunction with a passive heatsink to remove excess heat 
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from an object.  The fan increases the airflow over the heatsink, thus maintaining a larger 
temperature gradient.  By creating a larger temperature gradient, the heat sink can remove 
heat more quickly and also can operate in slightly higher ambient temperatures (Heatsink 
ABCs, 2006).  However, adding a fan also creates the possibility of equipment failure 
due to the moving parts.  Figure 4 shows a typical active heatsink. 
 
 










2. Chip Cooling Method 
The second cooling approach is the chip cooling method.  The chip cooling 
method involves removing heat from the hottest components on a circuit board.  The chip 
cooling method is commonly used by manufacturers that identify specific chips as being 
at risk of overheating.  Typically the identified chips operate several degrees hotter than 
the ambient temperature and the other surrounding circuitry.  The chip cooling method 
involves spreading the heat generated by the chips more evenly across other components 
and the surrounding air.  Two chip cooling methods exist.  The first method is heat 
spreading.  Heat spreading uses thin thermal metals which attach to the chip.  The heat 
spreader, shown in Figure 5, disperses the heat over a large area and increases heat 
removal by adding more surface area.  The second method involves increasing the 
airflow over hot chips.  If the air temperature is lower than the chip’s temperature, heat 
will be removed from the chip.  Although the fan adds a possible point of failure, 
internally mounted fans are typically suitable for cooling applications.  The chip cooling 
methods are often used in conjunction with thermal grease or thermal gap filler.  The 
grease and gap filler serve to efficiently transfer the heat generated by the chips to other 
sources such as the external casing.  The two approaches can easily be combined to create 
an efficient, low-cost solution for many heat reduction projects. 
 
 
Figure 5 T-Wing Heat Spreader Attached to a Microchip (Chomerics T-Wing Data Sheet) 
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E. PROTOTYPED COOLING SOLUTION 
Two prototyped cooling solutions for the Axis 213 camera have been designed.  
Both solutions involve a combination of the controlled housing temperature approach and 
the chip cooling approach.  Both solutions have been designed, priced, and built.  
However, due to time constraints, only one method will be tested.  After conducting 
experiments to determine the amount of excess heat needed to be removed, it was 
discovered that the Axis 213 need roughly 10 Watts of heat removal to ensure operation 
at temperatures in excess of 110 ºF.  The following sections describe the two prototypes 
designed by Naval Postgraduate School students in conjunction with Kestrel Technology 
Group. 
 
1. Active Heatsink with Chip Cooling Method 
The first custom solution designed for the Axis 213 camera combined aspects of 
both the controlled housing temperature method and the chip cooling method.  Upon 
opening the camera’s case, three chips were identified as being candidates for 
overheating.  Additionally, it was obvious that the manufacturer had identified the same 
chips.  A substance similar to thermal gap filler was placed between the chips and a large 
metal plate which connected to the camera’s base.  However, the connection between the 
chips and the metal plate was not reliable.  Additionally, the metal plate, which acts like a 
heat spreader, was not firmly connected to the base of the camera.  It became apparent 
that the heat reduction design could be improved through ensuring solid connections 
between the existing materials.  A thick layer of thermal grease was applied between the 
chips and the thermal gap filler material.  Additionally, another layer of grease was 
applied between the metal plate and the base of the camera.  Once solid connections were 
made and allowed to dry, the camera was reassembled.  Next, an active heatsink was 
chosen to help extract heat from the camera’s case.  The heatsink chosen was the 
Thermaltake Extreme Volcano 12.  The Thermaltake, shown in Figure 6, is designed to 
act as a processor cooler for computers.  It consists of a high density copper core with 66 
fins to increase surface area.  Additionally, it has an 80mm x 80mm x 32mm three blade 
fan with ball bearings, which is capable of producing airflow of nearly 72.92 cubic feet  
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per minute (User’s Manual, 2006).  The Thermaltake active heatsink is a cost-effective 
solution that is able to remove over 70 Watts of heat with the fan at maximum speed.  
Finally, the Thermaltake heatsink has a life expectancy of 80,000 hours.   
 
 
Figure 6 Thermaltake Extreme Volcano 12 Active Heatsink 
 
The heatsink connected to the base of the camera using thermal gap filler in 
addition to thermal grease.  The combination of thermal gap filler and thermal grease 
created a strong connection between the heatsink and the camera.  A strong connection is 
beneficial for both heat removal and for ensuring the camera does not fall off of the 






Figure 7 Modified Axis 213 
 
2. Controlled Housing Temperature Method 
The second heat removal modification focuses on the controlled housing 
temperature method.  As discussed previously, the controlled housing temperature 
method is more expensive but has greater potential as a long term solution for deploying 
cameras in high temperature environments.  The first step in this method was to re-seal 
the connection between the overheating chips and the base of the camera.  This ensures 
the maximum amount of heat would be transferred to the base of the camera.  Next, a 
Peltier device was soldiered to a temperature control switch.  The control switch was set 
to 90 ºF.  Once the object attached to the “cold” side of the Peltier device exceeded 90 ºF, 
the switch would activate the Peltier cooler until the object was below 90 ºF.  The 
temperature threshold was chosen because 90 ºF is well under the maximum rated 
temperature of 104 ºF.  Additionally, 90 ºF would be above the dew point found in most 
hot environments.  As a result, no condensation would form and potentially harm the 
system.  Finally, a heatsink was added to the “hot” side of the Peltier device.  Both 
custom passive and conventional active heatsinks were considered.  The passive design is 
preferred because it provides maximum reliability due to a lack of moving parts.  
However, custom passive heatsinks are often expensive.  A single 7 x 7 inch passive heat 
sink costs roughly $150.  In bulk, however, the price falls to roughly $45 per unit.  The  
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Thermaltake heatsinks, on the other hand are easily available for under $35 dollars per 
unit.  For the purposes of this research, the Thermaltake active heatsinks were used.  
Figure 8 shows the controlled housing temperature design prototype. 
 
 
Figure 8 Controlled Housing Temperature Design Prototype 
 
F. EXPERIMENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
Several experiments and demonstrations were created to test the effectiveness of 
the designs.  Initially, a rudimentary heat chamber was created using a Styrofoam box 
and a heat lamp.  The maximum temperature reached in this apparatus was 102 ºF.  
Although the maximum rated temperature of 104 ºF was not reached, the base of the 
camera was over 104 ºF.  Next, an unmodified Axis 213 was placed inside of an oven.  
Temperature was crudely regulated through slightly opening the oven door to allow heat 
to escape.  The unmodified version of the camera failed at an ambient temperature of 106 
ºF.  When the ambient temperature was 106 ºF, the temperature of the camera’s base was 
only 104 ºF.   
Having induced camera failure of an unmodified camera in a controlled method, 
the camera was incrementally modified.  First, the only modifications made were the chip 
cooling modification.  The overheating chips were sealed to the internal metal plate and 
the plate was sealed to the base of the camera.  No heat sinks were added for the first 
iteration of testing.  The modified camera was again placed in the oven.  During this 
iteration, a noticeable increase was observed.  When the ambient temperature reached 
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106 ºF, the base of the camera reached 108 ºF.  This indicates increase heat removal 
efficiency.  The Axis camera did not fail until the ambient temperature reached 112 ºF 
and the base temperature was 109 ºF.  At this point, the camera was removed from the 
oven and allowed to cool to room temperature.  Next, the Thermaltake Extreme Volcano 
heatsink was applied to the base of the Axis 213 using thermal gap filler and thermal 
grease.  Once a firm seal was formed between the camera and the heatsink, the modified 
camera was again placed inside the oven without activating the heatsink’s fan.  The 
temperature was regulated at the previous maximum temperature of 112 ºF for 30 
minutes.  During this time, the camera maintained full functionality.  There was no 
perceptible loss in optics (zoom or focus) capabilities, controllability (pan and tilt), or in 
connectivity.  The temperature was increase to 125 ºF and regulated for another 30 
minutes.  Again, there was no perceptible impact on the camera.  The temperature was 
then increased to 135 ºF and regulated for another 30 minutes.  Even at that temperature, 
there was no significant loss of capabilities.  Finally, the temperature was increase to 145 
ºF for 30 more minutes.  At this temperature the camera maintained full functionality, 
controllability, and connectivity.  Temperature measurements were taken of the camera’s 
base and the fins of the heat sink.  The temperatures achieved equilibrium at 145 ºF.  At 
this point, the tests were stopped for fear of causing irreparable damage to the camera. 
As the initial tests indicated that a fully passive solution was sufficient for full 
operations in Thailand, no tests with the controlled housing temperature design were 
conducted.  The active heatsink with chip cooling design was implemented on all but one 
of the ground-based cameras during the COASTS deployment of May, 2006.  During the 
COASTS deployment, several field tests were conducted.  The first field test conducted 
was a comparison between an unmodified Axis 213 and the modified version.  The two 
cameras were placed in the same area.  The cameras were roughly one foot apart to 
ensure they both had the same environmental exposure.  The unmodified version of the 
camera failed at 103 ºF while the modified version maintained full functionality.  At this 
point, the final camera was modified to the active heatsink with chip cooling design.  On 
two occasions, the modified version of the camera suffered failures.  There are two 
possible explanations for the failures.  The first is that the effects of the heat were 
compounded by extremely high non-condensing humidity levels.  During both failures, 
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the humidity was in excess of 95%.  This value is higher than the rated 80% non-
condensing humidity level.  The second, and more probable, explanation is the ambient 
temperature was increased due to plastic jugs used to shield the cameras from rain.  
During both failures, the cameras were placed inside of opened water jugs to provide 
protection from fast moving rain showers.  The temperature inside of the jugs was 
measured and determined to be over 112 ºF while the ambient temperature was only 107 
ºF.  Additionally, when the cameras were removed from the jugs they immediately began 
functioning correctly.  A final comparison test was performed.  One camera was placed 
inside of the jug with the Thermaltake heatsink’s fan active while the other camera was 
place in a jug without the fan running.  The camera without the fan failed at an ambient 
temperature of 108 ºF.  At the point of failure, the temperature inside of the jug was 114 
ºF.  The camera with the active fan continued to function correctly with the temperature 
inside the jug at 115 ºF.  At this point, it was decided that all ground cameras should use 
the fan assisted heatsinks to ensure operation during all demonstration and scenario 











This research focused on developing a cost-effective way to efficiently remove 
heat from commercially available digital video surveillance cameras.  The Axis 213 
network camera was analyzed based upon the needs of the COASTS program and 
feedback from coalition military forces currently using the camera in daily operations.  
During previous deployments, the Axis camera commonly suffered from heat related 
failure at or near the maximum rated temperature.  However, the camera is currently used 
by military and law enforcement agencies in high temperature environments.  Camera 
failures in these environments have risked the lives of the forces depending upon the 
camera for video surveillance.  Common cooling approaches were discussed in detail.  
The heat reduction techniques discussed are also applicable to all electronic equipment 
used in field operations.  Two heat removal prototypes have been developed for use with 
the Axis 213 camera.  The active heatsink with chip cooling prototype was thoroughly 
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tested in laboratory experiments in Monterey, CA, and in field exercises during the 
COASTS deployment to Thailand.  Unfortunately, the controlled housing temperature 
prototype was not tested due to time and money constraints. 
 
2. Analysis 
The COASTS Thailand demonstrations clearly showed the noticeable increase in 
performance due to the addition of heat removal modifications to the Axis 213 camera.  
The passive version of the tested modifications saw an 8% increase in the failure 
temperature while the active version did not fail at a 12% increase in the failure 
temperature.  Although the fully passive version of the design did not perform as well in 
the Thailand demonstrations as it did in laboratory tests, a significant improvement over 
the unmodified camera was noticed.  In active mode, the camera remained fully 
functional with the surrounding temperature reaching 115 ºF.  It is expected that camera 
will continue to function in temperatures up to 125 ºF with the fan activated.  Most 
military and law enforcement operations occur in temperatures under the 115 ºF mark.  
The average maximum temperature in Thailand is roughly 112 ºF, suggesting that the 
current design prototype would be sufficient for continued use (Thailand Weather Data, 
2006).   
The addition of heat removal solutions for digital surveillance cameras is highly 
recommended for military and law enforcement agencies.  Most electronic equipment is 
not designed to operate harsh climactic environments.  Heat and moisture are the two 
leading challenges facing the integration of commercial-off-the-shelf technologies into 
military applications.  Heat related failures cause significant degradation of capabilities, 
increases the costs of operations, and puts operators’ lives at risk.  The tested heat 
removal design was built entirely from commercially available material for minimal cost.  
The entire modifications cost roughly $50.  The design, though rudimentary, greatly 
increased the deployability of the Axis camera.  The controlled housing temperature 
prototype can be built and implemented for roughly $200.  Although the controlled 
housing temperature design costs more than the chip cooling design, it is significantly 
less than the cost of a new camera.  Additionally, the controlled housing temperature 
approach offers the greatest potential due to the ability to regulate the temperature lower 
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than the maximum rated threshold.  A steady temperature is expected to greatly benefit 
the life of the components as the stress from contraction and expansion due to heat does 
not occur.  The minimal investment for heat reducing modifications can help significantly 
increase the lifespan of the camera, reduce replacement and maintenance costs, and 
protect operators and technicians in the field. 
 
3. Avenues for Future Research 
Several areas for future research have emerged.  The most pressing avenue for 
research is the refinement and testing of the controlled temperature housing design.  
Because the design regulates the camera’s temperature regardless of the ambient 
temperature, the experiments must be conducted in true heat chambers.  Conducting the 
test in heat chambers will allow more precise control of the experiment.  Additionally, 
tests can be conducted to determine the minimum size heatsink need to ensure the camera 
can function at temperatures in excess of 130 ºF.  Creating the most space efficient design 
is beneficial for covert placement in military and law enforcement applications.  Finally, 
research should be done to develop solar shields to protect the cameras from direct sun 
exposure.  For example, heat rejecting materials can be used to create a “sun shield.”  
However, it is important that no design modifications hinder the optical or controllability 
of the devices.  
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